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PLATO'S  
APOLOGY AND CRITO  
WITH NOTES

BY  
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WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF  
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Nae ego haud paullo hunc animum malim, quam eorum omnium  
fortunas, qui de hoc judicaverunt. *Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 42*

*REVISED EDITION*

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TO  
PROFESSOR FELTON,  
OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,  
THIS EDITION OF THE APOLOGY AND CRITO  
Is Dedicated,  
AS A MEMORIAL OF PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP,  
AND AS A TOKEN OF HIGH REGARD  
FOR HIS DISTINGUISHED SERVICES TO CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP,  
AND HIS PHIL-HELLENIC SPIRIT.



## PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

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THE "Græca Majora," which was all the Greek read in college by many successive generations of American students, contained Plato's *Crito* and the narrative part of the *Phædo*; and, among all the extracts in that admirable collection, none are cherished in fresher remembrance or with a more reverential love than these inimitable productions of the great spiritual philosopher of ancient Greece. The simple beauty of the style and the almost inspired truth and grandeur of the sentiments have graven these immortal compositions, as with the point of a diamond, on thousands of hearts, and entitle them to the high place which they have held among the select educational instruments of former generations. Many a scholar saw with regret *Plato* dropped for a time entirely out of the *academic* course, and accessible to American students only in the obsolete *Græca Majora*, or in the imported editions of



foreign scholars. And, though their favorite classic author is now brought again within the reach of American students, and restored in some measure to his proper place in college education, in President Woolsey's scholarly edition of the *Gorgias*, and Professor Lewis' profound Annotations on portions of the *Laws*, still many an older and many a younger scholar cannot but sigh to see the simpler and more Socratic Dialogues of Plato *superseded*, even by the more finished dramatic imitations of his middle life, or the more profound moral and political speculations of his riper years. It is to meet expressed regrets and felt wants of this kind that the present edition of the *Apology* and *Crito* is given to the public.

While these pieces breathe in every part the moral purity, the poetic beauty, and the almost prophetic sublimity, which pervade all Plato's writings, and which have won for him the epithet "*divine*," they exhibit Socrates more adequately than he appears in any of the works of Xenophon, more truly and purely, just as he was, than he is seen in any of the other writings of Plato. They are therefore the connecting link between the two beloved disciples, and the clue to the interpretation of both. The *Apology*, especially, written shortly after the death of the Moral Philosopher, and under the full inspiration of his last words and last hours,

gives us the very soul of Socrates speaking, as it were, with the very lips of Plato. Mr. Grote has seen this and, with characteristic wisdom, has made the *Apology* the corner-stone of his admirable chapter on Socrates. How superior to the cold and barren defence which bears the name of Xenophon on the one hand, and on the other, how free from the unpractical and impracticable speculations which Plato has interwoven in some of his later dialogues! It is doubtless a faithful representation of the defence, or rather justification, we might almost say, glorification, of his own life, character, and mission, which Socrates actually pronounced before his judges. At the same time, perhaps, it may be regarded as an exemplification of Plato's beau ideal of the true Orator, whose aim and office it is, not to save the life of the accused by whatever means of falsehood, bribery, and seduction he can invent, but to set forth the claims of truth and justice in all their native right to command universal obedience. In this view the *Apology* may, perhaps, be considered as the counterpart of the exposure of rhetoric falsely so called in the *Gorgias*, and so take its place among the consecutive labors of Plato to realize the idea of all the arts and sciences; though it must be confessed that the want of the introduction and the dialectic structure, which are so characteristic of the scientific dialogues, seems rather

(not to set it aside, as Ast would set it aside, as un-Platonic, for it has all the palpable and marked peculiarities of Plato's style), but to set it apart to the more specific and no less sacred purpose of a defence by a gifted and beloved disciple of his honored and revered master.

The exordium opens, if we may be allowed to go before the reader with a brief analysis of the piece, with an expression of the astonishment of Socrates at the misrepresentations of his accusers, who have represented nothing as it is, and a declaration of his purpose to speak the plain and simple truth, in the same plain and simple language which he has been accustomed to use in his every day conversations; and as this is his whole office as an orator speaking in his own defence, so it is their sole duty, as judges, to consider whether or not he speaks the truth. (17, 18, A.) This exordium, if it does not set forth Plato's ideal of true oratory, in contrast with the studied and false rhetoric of the forum and the schools, yet no doubt exhibits the author's idea of the style and manner in which Socrates actually defended himself when on trial for his life. Accordingly, we shall find the Socrates of the *Apology* excluding all artificial rhetoric, all appeals to prejudice or passion, and declaring the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with the simplicity and directness, the frankness

and fearlessness of a philosopher who values truth and justice far more than life.\*

After this brief and plain exordium, Socrates asks leave to reply first to his first accusers, those less formal but more powerful and formidable accusers, to wit, who had been insinuating their slanders into the public mind during his life, and who had all the advantage of numbers and time, of a tribunal numerous and credulous, and of not being confronted with the accused; nay, of being personally unknown, except some one of them might chance to be a comic poet (18, B. C.), alluding especially to Aristophanes, whose name is mentioned further on, and his comedy of *The Clouds* distinctly pointed out. (19, C.) The charges thus informally brought against him were, that, "with a wicked and mischievous curiosity, he inquired into things in heaven above and things under the earth; that he made the worse appear the better reason; and that he taught others to do the same; in short, that he was a natural philosopher and a sophist." (19, B. cf. 18, B.) Socrates utterly denies the truth of these charges; declares his entire ignorance of natural philosophy as then taught, as well as of the sophist's art; offers to present witnesses in proof

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\* Cf. Valer. Max. VI., 4: *Maluitque Socrates extingui, quam Lysias superesse*—in allusion to the Oration which Lysias prepared for the use of Socrates, but which Socrates refused to deliver.

that he taught no such things to his disciples, and calls upon all present to testify against him, if they had ever heard from him any conversation, great or small, on such subjects. (19, c. d.) Moreover, he did not profess to be a teacher, like Gorgias the Leontine, Prodicus the Cean, Hippias the Elean, and Evenus the Parian, who drew away the young from the society of the wisest and best citizens (which they might enjoy gratuitously), to receive their instructions at a great price. He congratulated the possessors of such wisdom and power, and would doubtless be very proud if he possessed it himself. But truth obliges him to confess, that he has no part nor lot, great or small, in such knowledge. (19, E.; 20 c.) The modesty and irony which mark this passage, the short dialogue, into which he runs unconsciously, and which is given in the form and the words of the original conversation, and the unfavorable view which he takes of the vague and unprofitable speculations of the physical philosophers who preceded him, are all highly characteristic of Socrates, as he appears in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. (Cf. *Mem.* I., 1, 11, seqq.; I., 2, 3, seqq. et passim.)

“But what then is your business or profession? What have you said or done to raise all this hue and cry about you?” In answer to this question, Socrates admits that he bore the name of philoso-

pher, or wise man. But he pretended to merely human wisdom, such as man may properly aspire to, and such as pertains to the proper regulation of human life. (20, D. E.) This wisdom he did indeed possess. And in proof that he did, he would refer them to no less authority than the God at Delphi. (21, A.) He never supposed himself to be wise in any sense, till, in response to a question of his friend and the friend of the people (Chærephon), the Delphic Oracle declared, that there was none wiser than he. Not daring to discredit the Oracle, he then set himself to discover in what possible sense, if indeed in any sense, he was wiser than others. (21, B. C.) Accordingly he visited successively various classes of men in high repute for wisdom — politicians, poets, orators, philosophers, artisans, &c.; and he discovered to his surprise, that while they really understood pretty well their respective departments, they fancied they understood every thing else (22, D.), though, in fact, with a partial exception in favor of the artisans, they did not understand the fundamental principles even of their own profession. (22, C.) And they all, without exception, thought they knew a great deal more than they did know, while he was conscious that he knew almost nothing. (21, D.) And when he came to inquire whether he would choose to be as he was, or to have their wisdom with their want of self-

knowledge, he was constrained to answer, that he would rather be as he was, and so to assent to the truth of the Oracle (22, .e.); though he modestly adds, that the chief intent of the Oracle was doubtless to teach this general truth, that *he* was the wisest of men, who preferred that kind of wisdom which Socrates cultivated, viz., the moral and practical, and who, *like* Socrates, was conscious of the poverty of his acquirements in knowledge, and the comparative worthlessness of all the wisdom of men. (23, A. B.)

In the course of the investigation which he thus prosecuted, he offended all whom he visited, by showing them that they knew far less than they supposed. At the same time, his pupils (or rather his young friends and followers, for, as in Xenophon, so in Plato, Socrates never speaks of his disciples) delighted themselves in exposing, after his example, the ignorance of the many pretenders to superior knowledge. (23, c.) And they were angry, not with themselves, but with the innocent occasion of their humiliation. Accordingly they began to call him a most impious fellow, a corrupter of youth, and the like. When asked how; what he did; what he taught; having nothing else to say, they took up and turned against him the prejudice and calumny which the multitude were so ready to entertain against philosophers in general. (23, d.)

They confounded him with the very naturalists and sophists whom he had ever labored to confute, and thus sought to concentrate upon him the suspicion and indignation which they had incurred.

So much for the informal charges. And these prepared the way for the formal indictment for corrupting the youth and endeavoring to subvert the religion of his country. Of his three accusers, Socrates informs the judges that Meletus was angry with him for exposing, as above described, the poets, Anytus for the artisans and politicians, and Lycon for the orators. (23, E.) They were all actuated by selfish and revengeful feelings. Anytus, it should be added, was a rich leather-seller, and a man of influence in the democracy; and when Socrates, seeing signs of intellectual capacity in his son, endeavored to dissuade the father from bringing up his son to his own trade, Anytus was personally offended (Apol. Xen. 29), and was able easily to turn the passions of the populace against the reputed master of the tyrant Critias and the now hated Alcibiades. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I., 2, 12.)

In defence of himself against the charge of corrupting the youth, Socrates enters into a very characteristic dialogue with Meletus, asking, who it is that corrupts the youth, and who makes them wiser and better; whether the judges, senators, and members of the Assembly also corrupt them, or whether



he is their only corrupter, and whether it is likely to be the single individual that corrupts, and the multitude that instruct and reform, or quite the contrary, just as it is in the training of horses and the lower animals; and if he is such a corrupter of the young, whether he does it voluntarily or involuntarily, of which alternatives the former is quite incredible, since he must know that he could not corrupt them without injuring himself, and in the latter alternative, he ought not to be impeached and punished, but to be instructed and made wiser. (24, B. ; 26, A.) The conclusion of this very Socratic piece of extemporized dialectics is, that Socrates, if not too wise and good to corrupt the youth, must be too ignorant to deserve punishment for it; and that Meletus, with all his assumed superiority in wisdom and virtue, neither knows nor cares how young men can be made either better or worse. The argument, by which Socrates exculpates himself, will probably strike most modern readers as more subtle than conclusive in its reasoning, and somewhat dangerous withal in its practical tendency, since, carried out to its legitimate result, it would seem to prove that all crimes must be involuntary, and all criminals proper objects of commiseration and instruction, rather than of punishment. And we see not how the objection can be answered. It lies, however, not only against the argument here,

but against the doctrine of Socrates, which, everywhere, in Xenophon and Plato alike, resolves all the virtues into knowledge, and, by consequence, all the vices into sins of ignorance.

Taking up the other point in the indictment, Socrates now asks, whether his accuser means to charge him only with denying the gods of the state, or with downright atheism; and on being distinctly charged with the latter, he shows that this is utterly inconsistent with the language of the indictment itself, which charges him with recognizing and teaching "other divine things," and if there are "divine things," then surely there must be divinities. Just as he who speaks of human affairs, must needs recognize the existence of human beings, so in teaching *δαίμονια*, he must needs recognize *δαίμονες*; and if *δαίμονες*, then, according to the prevailing Greek idea, either gods or sons of gods; and if sons of gods, then of course gods. (26, B.; 27, E.)

Having thus disposed of his principal accuser, Socrates boldly tells the Athenians, that he has to fear, not the indictment of Meletus, but the envy and jealousy of the multitude, which have destroyed many other good men, and will probably destroy him. "Why then persist in a course of conduct which you expect will occasion your death?" "Because," such is the substance of the answer, "the

great question for a man to ask is not whether life or death will be the result of his conduct, but whether he is doing right or wrong, and acting the part of a good or bad man; as the heroes of the Trojan war, and all true heroes, have ever despised danger and death in the path of duty and glory." (28, B. C. D.) "I should behave strangely," he continues, "if when your commanders, Athenians, stationed me at Potidæa, at Amphipolis, and at Delium, I kept my post at the peril of my life, but when the God sets me down in Athens to spend my life in the pursuit of philosophy and in the examination of myself and others, then I should leave my post through fear of death. In that case, I might well and truly be charged with not believing in the gods, since I disobeyed the Oracle and feared death, and thought myself wise when I was not. For to fear death is to think one's self wise, when he is not; for it is to think one knows what he does not know. None know death. They do not know but it is the greatest good; yet they fear it, as if they knew it was the greatest of evils. I will never flee from what may be the greatest good, viz., death, into such base and criminal acts as must be the greatest evils." (28, E.; 29, A. B.)

"If you were to assure me of my acquittal in case I would pledge myself to abandon this philosophizing and questioning manner of life, my reply

would be, I respect and love you, but I will obey the God rather than you. While I live and breathe, I will never cease to proclaim the superiority of wisdom and virtue and the well-being of the soul, to riches and honor and the welfare of the body, to young and old, to citizens and foreigners, but especially to you, my fellow-citizens, as you are most nearly related to me, and because it especially becomes the honored name of Athenians. For this is the divine command, and this is for your highest interest. (29, c. ; 30, c.) And if you put me to death, be assured you will not injure me so much as yourselves. Me none of my accusers could injure in the least ; for I do not think it lawful, or possible, in the nature of things, for a better man to be injured by a worse man. I am therefore now defending, not so much myself as you ; that you may not put me to death and so reject the gift of God to you, for you will not soon find another such. (30, d. e.) That I am the gift of God to the city, you will see from this. Does it seem merely human that I have neglected my own affairs so many years and attended to your interests, persuading you like a father or an elder brother, to cultivate virtue ? And all this without any pecuniary compensation ; for, among all their false accusations, they have not dared to accuse me of receiving pay for my instruction ; and if they had, my poverty

would have been a sufficient witness against them.” (30, E. ; 31, C.)

If any were disposed to ask why he went about and persuaded them privately and personally, instead of coming before the people and counselling them as a body, he had been kept back from the latter course by a certain divine monitor\* which had attended him from his childhood—a sort of voice which always deterred him from doing what he should not do, and which had usually forbidden his participation in public affairs. And well it might, for, if he had undertaken to act his part in public, he would have been put to death long ago, and that without having rendered any real service to them or to himself; for no man could be safe in publicly opposing the inclinations of the Athenian or any other popular assembly, and forbidding them to do wrong. (31.) In proof of this, he adverts to the imminent peril to which he was exposed in the only instance in which he had held an office, when, as senator and presiding officer in the popular assembly, he resisted the will of the *demus*, and defended the lives of the ten generals when they were intent on putting them to death by one sweeping and extra-judicial decree. (32, A. B.) He had also incurred a similar peril, and exhibited the

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\* Touching the nature of this divine voice and monitor, see the discussion in the notes.

same disregard for danger and death, in refusing to obey an unrighteous command of the oligarchy, when they possessed the government. (32, c. d.)

These were well-known facts, which might be proved by any number of witnesses. And such facts showed that he, or any one else who would contend strenuously for the right, must do it privately rather than politically, if he would preserve his life even for a short period. They proved also that his influence over the young, by precept and especially by example, so far from corrupting, was suited to inspire them with an inflexible regard for justice. And if further proof was required, since his accusers had failed to bring forward the proper witnesses at the proper time, he would gladly yield the stand and let them bring forward now the fathers and elder brothers of the very young men who had been his most constant hearers and companions; for, though the young men themselves might have some reason for withholding the truth, if he had corrupted them, certainly their fathers and elder brothers could have no such motive, and the judges ought to be put in possession of their testimony. (33, d.; 34, b.)

Having thus finished his defence, Socrates proceeds to excuse himself from any attempt to enlist the sympathies and excite the compassion of the

judges in his behalf. This practice had indeed become very common in the courts of justice—so common, that it might seem strange and even arrogant for him not to do likewise. He had a wife and children, and friends whom he tenderly loved, and whose grief at his death would doubtless be very great. But such weakness, worthy only of women, was especially unworthy of Athenian men; and if seen in their great men, particularly in one who, like himself, was reputed, whether justly or unjustly, to be a man of extraordinary virtue, it was not only dishonorable to him, but it would reflect dishonor on the whole people. (35, A. B. C.) Besides, it was doing a great wrong to the judges, who needed not entreaties, but instruction and persuasion, and whose duty it was, not to sacrifice justice to personal feelings and interests, but simply to execute the laws. And not only justice but piety forbade the offering of any inducements to them to violate their oath of office; and if he should hold out any such inducements, he would thereby teach them that there were no gods, and so convict himself of atheism in the very act of defending himself against the charge. They must therefore excuse him from resorting to such methods of securing his acquittal, which he could not but regard as at once dishonorable, unholy, and unjust. (35, D.)

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With these noble sentiments, asking no favor of his judges, he submits himself to their sense of justice. They condemn him by a small majority of votes. Resuming his address, he declares that he is neither grieved nor surprised by the result. He is only surprised by the smallness of the majority by which he was condemned. (36, A.) Pronounced guilty by his judges, the next question was, what should be the penalty. His accusers said, Death. In naming a counter-proposition, as the laws allowed him to do, if he looked simply at the justice and fitness of the thing, he should propose that he be supported in the Prytaneum (State-House) at the public expense, that he might devote himself without interruption to the instruction of the people. This was a suitable return for his disinterested devotion to their highest good in time past, and this would be for their highest welfare in time to come. If this honor was justly conferred on the victor at the Olympic Games, who did not need it and who ministered only to their seeming happiness, much more was it due to him, who needed it, and who had spent his life in promoting their real good. (36, B. C. D.) And with longer time, he might perhaps be able to persuade them of his innocence. (37, A.) He deserved only good at their hands. If he should suffer death, that would perhaps prove a good. Why then should he



propose an alternative penalty, which would be a certain evil? Should he propose imprisonment? That were to subject himself to the power and caprice of the Eleven, whoever they might chance to be. (37, B. c.) Exile? His countrymen could not endure his instruction and reproof, much less would strangers. (37, D.) And for him to keep silence, though they would not believe it, were to disobey the God, and for that reason it were quite impossible. (37, E.) To live without examining himself and others were no life to him—were a life not worthy to be lived by any human being. (38, A.) Should he then propose a fine? If he had property he would part with it cheerfully, for loss of property was no evil. But he had not property enough. If indeed a mina (about \$17) would suffice, perhaps he could pay a mina. He would therefore propose a fine of one mina. And since his friends, Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus bade him propose thirty minæ, he would adjudge himself to pay a fine of thirty minæ, and give these friends as his security. (38, B.)

This high-toned vindication of his character and deserts, together with his virtual refusal to name any alternative punishment, sealed his death. He doubtless expected it would, and intended it should. The last chapter of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* is de-

voted to a statement of the reasons, and those for the most part assigned in a conversation by Socrates himself, why it was better, in his own view—better for his happiness and usefulness as well as for his fame—that he should die now, rather than live to a more advanced age. With this deliberate preference, and in full view of the consequences, he made his defence so as almost to necessitate the desired result. By an increased majority he was now condemned to death. And, in resuming the thread of his discourse, he tells those who condemned him that he did not regret the result—that death would have come soon in the course of nature, and he would much rather die uttering such a defence, than live by such ignoble means as many use. (38, c. d. e.) It is not difficult to escape death—he could readily have escaped it\*—but the difficulty is to escape sin, which is a swifter runner than even death, and has already overtaken his accusers, younger and swifter though they be than himself. (39, A. B.) And, as men are sometimes inspired with something like prophetic vision in their last hours, he warns his judges, who voted for his condemnation, that speedy vengeance will overtake them in the reproofs of their own conscience and of the numerous friends of virtue who would come

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\* Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 4; *παρὸς δὲ ἀπεθελς, κ.τ.λ.*

after him; and the only escape was not by cutting off their reprovers, but by reforming their own character and life. (39, c. d.)

Then turning to the judges who had voted for his acquittal, and who alone deserved the sacred name of judges, he labors to console them touching the issue, which they so much deplore, by giving them the true interpretation of it. (39, e.) He could not but argue that it was meant for good. For the prophetic voice—the voice of the divinity—which had often and always warned him heretofore when he was going to do wrong even in the smallest matters, now when life was at stake, and he was exposed to what are commonly regarded as the extremest of evils, had given him no warning in the whole course of his trial. Hence he inferred that death was not, as it was commonly supposed to be, an evil, but a good. (40, A. B.)

The presumption thus suggested by the divine Providence towards himself might be justified and confirmed by the following considerations: Death is either annihilation, or, which is essentially the same thing, a state of entire unconsciousness; or else it is a departure of the soul from this world to another. On the former supposition, death would be a wonderful gain; for how few of our days and nights are so happy as the hours we pass in sound sleep, undisturbed by so much as a dream; and in

that case, all time would seem no more than one such dreamless night. (40, c. d. e.) But if, on the other hand, death is a departure from this world to another, where dwell all the dead, what greater good could there be than this? There, freed from the power of judges falsely so called, he would find judges that deserved the name, such as Minos and Rhadamanthus; there he would associate with Orpheus, Musæus, Hesiod, and Homer; there he should meet with Palamedes, Ajax, and all who in past ages had fallen victims to perverted justice; and, what was better than all the rest, there he should examine and put to the test Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and other women, as he examined men here, to see if they were truly wise, or only supposed themselves to be so; and this would be immense happiness: nor would he be put to death there for the exercise of this prerogative, since, besides their superior blessedness in other respects, the dwellers in that world are immortal. (41, A. B. c.) In conclusion, he assures his judges once more that no evil can befall a good man in life or death, since the gods take care of his interests, and these events have not befallen him by chance, but have been ordered by a wise and kind Providence; tells them that he harbors no resentment against them, since, though they meant it for evil, they had done him good; entreats

them to take vengeance on his sons, by inflicting on them the same pains he had inflicted on his pleasure-loving countrymen, if they are ever seen caring more for riches or any thing else than for virtue, or thinking more highly of themselves than they ought to think, for this, and this only, will be a just recompense for what he has done for the Athenian people; and then he takes leave of them, saying, Now it is time that we depart—I to die, you to live; and which of us is going to the better destiny is known only to the Deity.

Such, in substance, is the Defence of Socrates. So far from believing that we are indebted to the imagination of Plato for the lofty character of Socrates, as he appears in this Apology, we cannot but feel that we owe the elevation and eloquence of the Apology to the real greatness and heroism of its subject. The form and the words may be Plato's; but the substance and the spirit must be Socrates'; and we need only to have heard it from his lips to perfect the moral sublime. Profane literature has nowhere furnished a better delineation of the spiritual hero, rising superior to the fear and the favor of man in the strength of his own conscious integrity and of a serene trust in God. Faith in God, which had been the controlling principle of his life, was the power that sustained him

in view of approaching death, inspired him with more than human fortitude in his last days, and invested his dying words with a moral grandeur that "has less of earth in it than heaven." The consciousness of a divine mission was the leading trait in his character and the main secret of his power.\* This directed his conversations, shaped his philosophy, imbued his very person, and controlled his life. This determined the time and manner of his death. And this abiding conviction, this "ruling passion strong in death," is the very life and breath and all-pervading atmosphere of the *Apology*.

Nor is the religious element less pervading and controlling in the *Crito*, though there social duty and political principle are also made prominent. This piece presents Socrates to us in prison awaiting the execution of his unjust sentence. There *Crito*—the friend and benefactor of his youth, the companion of his middle-life, and the stay and staff of his advanced years—calls upon him at break of day, and, finding him in sound sleep, sits down by his side in silent admiration of his calmness on the very eve of death. Socrates awakes, and a dialogue ensues, beginning in the natural and easy manner so characteristic of Plato, leading on easily to the

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\* Cf. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part II., chap. lxviii.

discussion of the topic which lies nearest Crito's heart, viz., the release of his friend, and ending, like the *Apology*, in a strain of rapt and inspired eloquence, before which Crito himself stands convinced, silenced, and overawed, as in the presence of some superior being.

After inquiring the hour, how Crito gained admission so early, and why he had not awaked him sooner, which leads him to remark upon the absurdity of shrinking from death, especially at his advanced age, Socrates asks the errand of his friend at that early hour. Crito replies, that the sacred ship (during whose voyage no one could be put to death at Athens) was drawing near on its return from Delos—that it would probably arrive that day, and on the day following, Socrates must die. (43, A. B. C. D.) Socrates expresses his readiness to die whenever it pleases the gods, but adds his belief that the ship would not arrive till the next day, and his execution would take place on the third day, assigning as the reason for that opinion a dream and vision, which he had just seen in sleep, and which it was well that Crito had not disturbed. A beautiful woman, dressed in white, had appeared to him, calling him and repeating the words of Homer touching the return of Achilles to his native land: "On the third day, Socrates, you will arrive at the fertile Phthia," which he interpreted

as a divine intimation, and therefore infallible proof, that on the third day he would reach his *home* in a better world. (44, A. B.) Beautiful fiction, if the dream was the offspring of Plato's imagination! More beautiful fact, if the dream was real! And we know not why we should doubt it. What more natural than that such a notorious dreamer, so familiar with all the poetry of his country, especially that of Homer, and meditating of his speedy departure with lively and joyful imaginings by day, should dream of it under so poetical and attractive a form by night!

Crito now proceeds to press him with various and urgent motives—justice to himself, duty to his wife and children, regard to the affection and reputation of his friends, and the like—to bribe his keepers, forfeit his bail, and make his escape, declaring that it can be done at a very small expense, and he and the other friends would gladly meet any losses or dangers which might befall them in such a course, rather than lose such a friend, and, moreover, incur the disgrace with the multitude of sacrificing him to the love of money. (44, c.; 46.) “But why, my dear Crito, why should we so much regard the opinion of the multitude? For the best men, whose opinion is most worthy of consideration, will *believe* that these things are, as they are in *reality*, and that not you, but myself, am re-



sponsible for my death.” “Nevertheless, you see, Socrates, that it is *necessary* to pay attention to the opinion of the multitude, for the present circumstances show that the multitude can effect, not the smallest of evils only, but nearly the greatest, if one is calumniated among them.” “I could wish, Crito, the multitude were able to effect the greatest evils, that they might also accomplish the greatest good; for then it would be well. But now they can do neither of these. For they can neither make a man wise nor unwise.” The same simple but sublime sentiment with which we have become familiar in the *Apology*: Character is the only thing pertaining to man that is of any account; and this his bitterest enemies cannot touch. “But they do just what they happen to do.” (44, D.) That is, the conduct of the multitude, instead of being regulated by intelligent principle, is governed by blind chance; and such labors, however strenuous, are always fruitless. Accordingly, next to his great moral and religious mission, it was the perpetual study of Socrates’ life to bring his countrymen, especially the young men of Athens, to a right understanding of themselves, their duties, and their pursuits, and thereby to an intelligent discharge of all the functions of proper manhood in the light of established rules and fixed principles.

The opinions of the multitude, he goes on to

argue, are sometimes right and sometimes wrong; while the standard of rectitude is unchangeable and eternal. Our duty depends, not on the opinions of the multitude, nor does it change with the change of our circumstances and interests. It has nothing to do with the consequences of our actions. Imprisonment, exile, death itself—these are bugbears to frighten children with, but they will not deter the true man from the performance of his duty, or swerve him in the least from adherence to principle. As to his escape from the prison without the consent of the rulers of the state, the great question, and the only question he can entertain is, whether it is right, since right reason is the only friend to whose solicitation he ever allowed himself to yield. The alacrity of his friends was very commendable, if rightly directed, but if not, the greater it was, by so much it was the more blameworthy. Against the dictates of reason and conscience, he could not be influenced in the least by a regard to the reputation of his friends or his own life. (46, B.; 47, A.)

A discussion ensues, in which Socrates proves to the conviction of Crito himself, that, in such a question, regard must be had, not to the opinions of the ignorant multitude, but of the truly wise, just as, in gymnastic exercises, the gymnast gives heed to the approbation or censure only of the

physician or the master of the gymnasium (47, B. c. D.), that by acting unwisely and unjustly the *soul* is corrupted and destroyed, which is a far greater evil than the disease or destruction of the body (47, E.; 48, B.); that it is not right to injure or retaliate an injury in any case, least of all against one's country (49, A. seqq.); that the well-being of our country depends on the sacredness of the laws and the obedience of the citizens (50, B.), and our country should be obeyed and revered as a more sacred thing than father, or mother, or the dearest friends (51, A. B.); that a citizen by no means stands on an equal footing with his country, so as to have a right to treat her as she treats him, or to pronounce judgment on her acts as she does on his (50, E.); that every citizen who remains in a free country, which allows the inhabitants full liberty to emigrate when and where they please (especially if, like Socrates, he has remained during a long life, and never gone abroad at all, and never complained of the laws), has virtually assented to the justice of the laws, and has entered into a tacit compact to obey them, as interpreted and executed by their appointed guardians, unless he can persuade them to alter their decisions (52, A.; 53, A.); and that by escaping the penalty imposed upon him by the laws, he would convict himself of being a law-breaker, and make himself an object of sus-

picion as an enemy of law and justice, wherever he might go on earth, and even in Hades (53, B. ; 54, B.). As the discussion proceeds, the laws seem to rise in dignity and sacredness, till they are seen embodied in a form more than human and enthroned in unearthly majesty ; and they are heard, in meek yet authoritative tones, expostulating with Socrates on the injustice, folly, and pernicious tendency of the course which his friends are recommending. Socrates, too, catches the spirit of the laws, becomes instinct, as it were, with their life, and, like the Pythian priestess or an inspired corybant, deaf to every other voice, can do only as the voice of law (which is the voice of God) commands him : "The voice of these expostulations rings in my ears, and I am unable to hear other arguments. Be assured, if you urge any thing of a contrary tenor, you will labor in vain. This way God leads ; and in this way let us follow."

The *Crito*, like the *Apology* and the other dialogues that were written soon after the death of Socrates, has a twofold object—the one practical and personal, the vindication of Socrates from the charge of impiety, and corrupting the youth—the other ideal and universal, to exhibit the true idea of the good citizen, or the good man in his relation to the state. And, it is not too much to say,

it accomplishes both these objects perfectly. It is a triumphant vindication of the character of Socrates, setting his patriotism in the strongest light, and showing that he sacrificed his life to what most men would deem an overscrupulous regard for the constituted authorities, even in an unjust and unrighteous exercise of the power intrusted to them. At the same time, it sets forth a perfect pattern of the patriotic and loyal citizen, submitting to an unrighteous sentence (so long as it was according to the form of law, and since it concerned only himself, while no usurped authority of oligarchy or democracy could force him to do wrong to others), and with heroic, nay, religious devotion, laying himself a willing victim before the laws and on the altar of his country.

As a work of art, the *Crito* ranks very high—higher than the *Apology*; though, we think, the latter is capable of full vindication in this light, and stands on higher ground, simply as a work of art, than is commonly supposed. But the *Crito*, though the plot is exceedingly simple, and the *moral* of the dialogue is every where conspicuous, is conformed to the most rigid rules of the drama. The unities of time, place and impression, are perfectly preserved. The scene is laid wholly in the prison—perhaps the same cell hewn out of the solid rock, near the Pnyx and the Agora, which

now bears the name of "The Prison of Socrates." The hour is the morn of his anticipated execution, when he is awaked out of sound sleep by a visit of his most intimate personal friend, who comes, if possible, to persuade him to escape, as he easily may, the execution of his unjust sentence. The characters are of the highest dignity and interest in themselves, and most intimately related to each other—Athens' wisest and best philosopher, and one of her wealthiest and most deserving citizens. The subject of discussion, as stated in the traditional caption of the dialogue, and in the dialogue itself, is *περὶ πρακτέου*, or, WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE, involving the whole duty of the citizen to the laws of his country, and, more remotely, the fundamental theory of government and society. On the result hang the life of the philosopher, the reputation and happiness of his numerous friends, and the interests of good order and good government, not only in Athens, but wherever Athenian influence shall be felt to the end of time. The persons, the principles, the interests involved, all awaken the liveliest sympathy. The affectionate solicitations, the persuasive arguments, the pathetic appeals, the generous friendship and self-sacrificing devotion of Crito, go to our hearts. While he speaks, we are more than half inclined to think that not the desirable and the expedient only, but

the true and the right, are on his side. But Socrates, forgetting himself, overlooking his family and friends, and looking beyond the mere reputation of Athens, and even the right and wrong of the present case in itself considered, holds us sternly to the consideration of the great principles of law and order which it involves, and compels the assent of our reason and conscience, though against all our inclinations, and against the first dictates of our understanding. The conflict enters the breast of the reader. His judgment is perplexed with doubts and difficulties. His heart alternately hopes and fears the success of either party in the argument. As he feels constrained to assent more and more to the reasoning of Socrates, he wishes he could have decided otherwise. In the felicitous language of Stallbaum: "*Etenim generosa Critonis amicitia æque afficiat et commoveat legentium animos necesse est, atque Socratis in virtute, constantia et pia adversus leges publicas reverentia, ut velis idem et cum Socrate noluisse et cum Critone voluisse.*" And when, at the conclusion, Socrates, transported with veneration for the purity and dignity of the law, not of men only but of God also, and rapt with the vision of what awaited him beyond the grave, rises into something more than human, we sit looking on, by the side of his friend Crito and in the same state of mind, silenced, con-

vinced against our will, no longer pitying, still less censuring, but admiring, envying, almost worshipping him, as he looks upward and longs to take his flight.

The *Apology* and the *Crito* bear unequivocal evidence of proceeding from the same author; and that author, Ast to the contrary notwithstanding, Plato, and Plato under the same hallowing and inspiring influence, and in the same happy state of mind. The language, the style, the constructions, the idioms, are all Platonic. The sentiments and the spirit are those of Plato under the immediate inspiration of the life and death of Socrates. They are both dramatic, and this marks them both as of Platonic origin. True, the one is a monologue, and the other is a dialogue. But thus only could he act his proper part in the different circumstances in which he is placed. In the one, he pleads his cause in open court before his judges; in the other, he argues his case in prison with his friend. But in both, we *see* him, we hear him, we sit at his feet, we drink in his words, we catch his spirit. In the one, he stands before us the impersonation of the true orator; in the other, the model of the good citizen. But in both, the man rises far above his relations; the spirit overmasters the body and triumphs over all its outward circumstances. In both, we feel a spontaneous and irresistible conviction,



that we see and hear the real Socrates uttering essentially his own sentiments, in essentially his own language, in two of the most real and most critical emergencies of his life. But in both we see him dramatized and idealized, at the same time that he is made real and represented as he is, with that inimitable skill and grace, which, together with his high spirituality, are the undisputed prerogatives of the divine Plato.

The present edition is, in the main, an exact reprint of Stallbaum's third edition, 1846. The few exceptions are specified in the notes, and the reasons given for the choice of a different reading. The notes of Stallbaum are so felicitous, especially in the illustration of Plato's peculiar idioms and constructions, that any one who has read them bears the results almost unconsciously with him in all his subsequent reading of the same author. Wherever I have consciously borrowed from him, I have given him credit in the notes. I have also had before me the editions of Bekker, Fischer, Forster, Heindorf, Ast, Schleiermacher, Buttmann, Nüsslin, Elberling, etc., together with versions in German, French, and English, too numerous to mention; and have used them whenever they could be of use, though most of them have been of very little service. In conclusion, I can hardly leave a better wish for the student of these pages than

that, with far less labor than they have cost me, he may receive some small portion of the pleasure and profit which I have derived from them. He must be more or less than human, who can rise from the study of these immortal works of Plato, without higher ideas of the authority of law, the sacredness of duty, the power of faith, and the dignity of man's rational, moral, and immortal nature.

## PREFACE TO THE REVISED EDITION.

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THIS edition has been carefully revised, the Notes have been largely rewritten, the text has been changed, and the whole has been reprinted and stereotyped anew. The text is that of Cron, in his eighth edition, which is the result of a more extended and careful recension of manuscripts, and which not only differs much, in orthographical particulars, from Stallbaum and other early standard texts, but shows greater irregularity than we were formerly wont to expect in Greek orthography, especially in regard to *ν ἐφελευστικόν*, moveable *ς*, elision, hiatus, and the like details. The work of revision, begun by myself, but by necessity discontinued, has been mostly done by my son, Professor H. M. Tyler, of Smith College, under my own supervision and review however, and with valuable assistance from Mr. L. H. Elwell, instructor of Greek in Amherst College, who has made most of the grammatical references, and to whom we are also indebted for

not a few useful suggestions, the result of many years' use of the book in the class-room.

The preface of the first edition is retained entire, partly because it is largely in the nature of an introduction, which a whole generation of teachers and students have found to be useful, and have assured me that they would not willingly dispense with, and partly as a sort of educational landmark, or historic monument, which incidentally marks and records the progress of classical studies since the time when the "*Græca Majora*" contained in a single volume all, and more than all, of the Greek that was read in our colleges and universities. The chief object of the preface or introduction was not to instruct students in the philosophy of Socrates or Plato—the *Apology* and *Crito* are so entirely practical that they do not seem to be a suitable medium of such instruction—but to help them understand the life and character of the great moral philosopher, catch the sentiments and style and spirit of the author, and come under the educating and inspiring influence of these sublime productions. The chief end of the Notes, in the first edition and also in the revision, is the same; they are educational rather than critical or philosophical; they have respect not so much to the grammar as to the ethics and the politics, not so much to the language as to the literature and the life. At the

same time, it is hoped that the peculiarities of Plato's language, and the characteristic features of the Socratic philosophy, so far as they are contained or implied in the *Apology* and *Crito*, will be found to be sufficiently explained in the Notes. The grammatical references in this edition are chiefly to Goodwin and to Allen's edition of Hadley, occasionally to Jelf, and Goodwin's *Moods and Tenses*.

It is now almost thirty years since the appearance of the first edition. Meanwhile the book has gone through many editions, and borne some humble part in the education of no one knows how many thousands of noble youth in every section of our country. Thankful for the privilege of thus contributing to the discipline of young minds, the formation of right characters, and the inculcation of just and lofty sentiments in past years, we send it out again revised, we trust, improved, and we hope to meet with no less favor and do a still better work in time to come.

W. S. TYLER.

AMHERST, *January, 1887.*

## ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

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Ι. Ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνοῦσθαι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὴ μὴδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν  
10 φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τᾶληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς  
15 εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε  
εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν· πιστεύω  
20 γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκη-

σάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες,  
 τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς  
 ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-  
 ναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν  
 αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὧν περ  
 εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα  
 ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μῆτε θαυμάξουσιν  
 D μήτε θορυβεῖν τοῦτο ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν  
 ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγευώς  
 ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε 10  
 λέξεως. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον  
 18 ὢν, ξυνεγινώσκετε δήπου ἂν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ  
 τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἔλεγον, ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ  
 καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν  
 μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως εἶναι — ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, 15  
 ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη — αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ  
 τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή·  
 δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τὰ ληθῆ  
 λέγειν.

II. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, 20  
 ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατη-  
 γορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγορούς, ἔπειτα δὲ  
 B πρὸς τὰ ὕστερα καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ  
 κατήγοροι γεγόνασιν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάσαις πολλὰ ἤδη  
 ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦ- 25  
 μαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀνυτον, καί περ ὄντας καὶ τούτους  
 δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν  
 τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε

καὶ κατηγοροῦν ἐμοῦ, ὥς ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς  
 ἀνὴρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς  
 ἅπαντα ἀνεξετηκῶς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν.  
 οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατα- C  
 σκεδάσαντες οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατήγοροι. οἱ γὰρ  
 ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς  
 νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ  
 πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ  
 τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἣ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπι-  
 10 στεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἔνιοι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια,  
 ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδε-  
 νός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα  
 οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῶδιο- D  
 ποιὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώ-  
 15 μενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι  
 ἄλλους πείθοντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν.  
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ  
 οὐδ' ἐλέγξει οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ  
 σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς  
 20 ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ  
 λέγω διττοὺς μου τοὺς κατηγοροὺς γεγόνέναι, ἐτέρους  
 μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι E  
 οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν  
 με ἀπολογήσασθαι. καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον  
 25 ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε  
 τῶν ὕστερον. εἶεν. ἀπολογητέον δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-  
 ναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολήν,  
 ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως



ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλομένη μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον ἔστω καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

- B III. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἣ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν 10 κατηγορῶν τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν
- C καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστι· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑώρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφά- 15 νους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινα ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαῖω. καὶ οὐχ ὥς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός 20
- D ἐστίν, μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστι· μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγο- 25 μένου. πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ

τούτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τᾶλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν [ἐστιν], οὐδέ γ' εἴ τις ἀκηκόατε ὥς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώ-  
 5 πους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ ἔ  
 καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη  
 παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος  
 καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων  
 γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὧ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην  
 10 τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολι-  
 τῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ὃ ἂν βούλωνται, τούτους πείθουσι  
 τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι 20  
 χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην  
 15 ἐπιδημοῦτα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε  
 χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλ-  
 λία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην — ἐστὸν  
 γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο υἱέε — ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου  
 τὼ υἱέε πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν  
 20 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἔμελλεν αὐτῷ  
 καλῶ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· Β  
 ἦν δ' ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἵππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν·  
 νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὸν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις  
 ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀν-  
 25 θρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι  
 γὰρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν υἱέων κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις,  
 ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς. Τίς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,  
 καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐήνος, ἔφη, ὦ

Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὐήνον  
 C ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ  
 οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλ-  
 λυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα·  
 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. 5

V. Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλ', ὦ  
 Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστὶ πρᾶγμα ; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί  
 σοι αὐται γεγόνασιν ; οὐ γὰρ δῆπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν  
 ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη  
 φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον 10  
 ἢ οἱ πολλοί· λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί ἐστίν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς  
 D περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια  
 λέγειν ὁ λέγων, καὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι τί  
 ποτ' ἐστὶν τοῦτο δ' ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν  
 διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δὴ. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν 15  
 ὑμῶν παῖζειν, εἰ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν  
 ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ  
 διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ  
 σοφίαν ταύτην ; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία.  
 τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ 20  
 E τάχ' ἂν οὖς ἄρτι ἔλεγον μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπου  
 σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ  
 ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλ' ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεται τε  
 καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα 25  
 λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ'  
 εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ  
 ἐμῆς εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστὶ σοφία καὶ οἷα μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέ-

ξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε  
 που. οὗτος ἐμός τε ἐταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ 21  
 πλήθει ἐταῖρός τε καὶ ξυνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ  
 μεθ' ὑμῶν κατήλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν,  
 ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὅτι ὀρμήσειε. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς  
 Δελφούς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι· καὶ  
 ὅπερ λέγω μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ  
 τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα  
 σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν  
 10 αὐτοῦ οὕτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω B  
 γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα  
 γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσιν· τί ποτε λέγει  
 ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα  
 15 οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοῖδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν ποτε  
 λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου  
 ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν  
 χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει, ἔπειτα μόγις πάννυ ἐπὶ  
 ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινα ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ  
 20 τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς ἐνταῦθα, εἶπερ  
 πού, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ  
 ὅτι οὕτοσιν ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος ἔστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα.  
 διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι  
 λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς δὲ ἐγὼ σκοπῶν  
 25 τοιοῦτόν τί ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι—καὶ διαλεγό-  
 μενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι  
 σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα  
 ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὐ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι

Δὸτι οἶοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ' οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν  
 τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων·  
 πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν δ' οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν  
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν  
 γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ὅ  
 οὗτος μὲν οἶεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ ὥσπερ  
 οὖν οὐκ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι. ἔοικά γ' οὖν τούτου γε  
 σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἂ μὴ  
 οἶδα οὐδὲ οἶομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ' ἄλλον ἦα τῶν  
 Εἰσὲν ἐκεῖνον δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα 10  
 ταῦτα ἔδοξε· καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολ-  
 λοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ἦα αἰσθανόμενος  
 μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιώς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην,  
 ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔδοκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ 15  
 πλείστου ποιείσθαι· ἰτέον οὖν σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησ-  
 μὸν τί λέγει ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τοὺς τι δοκούντας εἰδέναι.  
 22 καὶ νῆ τὸν κύνα, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς  
 ὑμᾶς τάληθῇ λέγειν — ἡ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον·  
 οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν 20  
 τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν,  
 ἄλλοι δὲ δοκούντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι  
 ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν  
 ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξαι ὥσπερ πόνοους τινὰς πονουῦντος,  
 ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ 25  
 τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἦα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν  
 Βτραγωδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους,  
 ὧς ἐνταῦθα ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἑμαυτὸν

ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν  
τὰ ποιήματα, ἃ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι  
αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἅμα τι καὶ  
μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν,  
ὦ ἄνδρες, τάληθ'· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὥς ἔπος γὰρ  
εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον  
ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνω οὖν καὶ  
περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν  
ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὲ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ  
οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέ-  
γουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι.  
τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπον-  
θότες· καὶ ἅμα ἡσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποιήσιν  
οἰομένων καὶ τὰλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ  
ἦσαν. ἀπῆα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἴομενος περι-  
γεγονέναι ὥπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦα.  
ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὁ  
τούτους δέ γ' ἤδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ  
ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλ'  
ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην, καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώ-  
τεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταυτόν μοι  
ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ  
ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργά-  
ζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἡξίου καὶ τὰλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος  
εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν  
ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησ-  
μοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτω ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν μήτε

τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἂ ἐκείνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-  
 23 ναῖοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθαι μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύτεραι, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γάρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἂ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ 10 κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός, καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτο λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρήσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι 15 B ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἂν τινα οἶωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὴν 20 μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι C σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκεῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία· εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

25

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώ-

πων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἴτ' ἐπιχει-  
 ροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κάππειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι  
 πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰόμενων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων,  
 εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ' αὐτῶν  
 β ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέ-  
 γουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαιώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει D  
 τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν  
 καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγ-  
 νοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων  
 10 τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ  
 μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν  
 ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, οἶομαι, οὐκ  
 ἂν ἐβελοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίνονται προσποιού-  
 μενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φι-  
 15 λότιμοι ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ξυντεταγμέ- E  
 νως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν  
 ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες.  
 ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ  
 Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος,  
 20 Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν,  
 Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος 24  
 ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἷός τ' εἶην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν  
 ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ  
 οὕτω πολλὴν γεγонуῖαν. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 25 Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν  
 ἀποκρινφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ' ὑποστειλάμενος. καί-  
 τοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι· ὃ καὶ  
 τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ δια-



βολή ἢ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἷτια ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ εἴαν τε νῦν  
B εἴαν τε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι  
κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς·  
πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς ε  
φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπο-  
λογεῖσθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δὴ ὥσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων  
κατηγόρων λάβωμεν αὐτὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει  
δὲ πως ᾧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους  
διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὐδ' ἢ πόλιν νομίζει οὐ νομί- 10  
C ζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα  
τοιούτον ἐστὶν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἑκάστω  
ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με δια-  
φθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν  
φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται ῥαδίως εἰς 15  
ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσ-  
ποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ  
πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὥς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει πειράσομαι  
καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

XII. Καὶ μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ 20  
D περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι  
ἔσονται; Ἐγώ γε. Ἴθι δὴ νῦν εἰπέ τούτοις τίς αὐτοὺς  
βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι.  
τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὥς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις  
τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα 25  
Ἴθι εἰπέ καὶ μῆνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστίν. ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέ-  
λητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ  
αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ

ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν ; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὦγαθέ,  
 τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο Ε  
 ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον  
 καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 5 οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε ; οἶδε τοὺς νέους  
 παιδεύειν οἳ τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ; Μάλιστα.  
 Πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ ; Ἄπαντες.  
 Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν  
 ὠφελούντων. τί δὲ δὴ ; οἶδε οἱ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους  
 10 ποιοῦσιν ἢ οὐ ; Καὶ οὗτοι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί ; Καὶ 25  
 οἱ βουλευταί. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ  
 ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθεύουσι τοὺς νεωτέ-  
 ρους ; ἢ κακῆνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες ; Κακῆ-  
 νοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγα-  
 15 θοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω.  
 οὕτω λέγεις ; Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ'  
 ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἢ  
 καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν· οἱ μὲν βελτίους  
 ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἰς δέ τις ὁ Β  
 20 διαφθείρων ; ἢ τούναντιον τούτου πᾶν εἰς μὲν τις ὁ  
 βέλτιος οἷός τε ὦν ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶν ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἵππικοί·  
 οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ἐάνπερ ξυνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, δια-  
 φθεύουσιν ; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ  
 ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ζώων ; πάντως δῆπου,  
 25 ἐάν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάν τε φῆτε· πολλή  
 γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν  
 μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ οὐ  
 γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε

ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σάν-  
του ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκε περὶ ὧν ἐμέ  
εἰσάγεις.

XIII. Ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε,  
πότερόν ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ 5  
πονηροῖς; ὦταν, ἀποκρίναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν  
ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς  
αἰεὶ ἐγγυτάτῳ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;  
Πάνυ γε. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόν-  
D των βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελείσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, 10  
ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ'  
ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Φέρε δῆ,  
πότερον ἐμέ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὥς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεω-  
τέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;  
Ἐκόντα ἔγωγε. Τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ 15  
ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἰ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὦν,  
ᾧστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακὸν τι ἐργά-  
ζονται αἰεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ  
E ἀγαθόν· ἐγὼ δὲ δῆ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἤκω, ᾧστε  
καὶ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι, ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν 20  
ξυνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ᾧστε  
τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν ποιῶ, ὥς φῆς σύ; ταῦτα  
ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον  
ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ, εἰ διαφθεί-  
26 ρω, ἄκων, ᾧστε σύ γε κατ' ἀμφοτέρα ψεύδει. εἰ δὲ 25  
ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτη-  
μάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα  
διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω,

παύσομαι ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ξυγγενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.

- δ XIV. Ἄλλα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν δῆλον ἤδη ἐστίν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτω τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ δὴ B λέγε ἡμῖν πῶς με φῆς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω 10 θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνν μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπέ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς 15 ἀνδράσι τούτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον C λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὔσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέ- 20 ρους· ἡ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ὡ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω D θεοὺς εἶναι ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι; Μὰ Δί', ὦ 25 ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἀναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι

ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει  
τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ'  
ἐμοῦ μαθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ,  
Εδραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους  
καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῇται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε  
καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ' ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι  
δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί'  
οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν. Ἄπιστός γ' εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα  
μέντοι, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐτοσί,  
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστῆς καὶ ἀκόλασ- 10  
τος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεῖ τινὶ καὶ  
ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι. ἔοικε γὰρ ὥσπερ  
27 αἰνυγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ, ἄρα γινώσεται Σωκρά-  
της ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαν-  
τῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἑξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς 15  
ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν  
αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ  
Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων.  
καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.

XV. Ξυνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνε- 20  
ται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναι, ὦ Μέλητε·  
ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρητησάμην, μέμνησθέ  
Β μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους  
ποιῶμαι. ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώ-  
πεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ 25  
νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ  
ἄλλα θορυβεῖται· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει,  
ἵππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι,

αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα ; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν·  
 εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλῃ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι λέγω καὶ τοῖς  
 ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι·  
 ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμο- C  
 νας δὲ οὐ νομίζει ; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς ὠνησας ὅτι μόγῃς  
 ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμό-  
 νια μὲν φῆς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτ' οὖν  
 καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά· ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ  
 τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντι-  
 10 γραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δῆπου  
 πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει ;  
 ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ  
 ἀποκρίνεις. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγοῦ- D  
 μεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας ; φῆς ἢ οὐ ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν  
 15 εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὥς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινές  
 εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγὼ φημί σε αἰνίτ-  
 τεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι  
 ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδὴ περ γε δαίμονας  
 ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δ' αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσι νόθοι  
 20 τινές ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων, ὧν δὴ καὶ  
 λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο  
 εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ ; ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη, ὥσπερ E  
 ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ [καὶ] ὄνων [τοὺς  
 ἡμίονους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλ',  
 25 ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώ-  
 μενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην] ἢ ἀπορῶν  
 ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα  
 πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὥς

[οὐ] τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμίᾳ μηχανῇ ἐστίν.

- 28 XVI. Ἄλλα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, εἴνπερ αἰρή, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ 10 φθόνος. ἂ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας B ἤρηνκειν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσειν· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως δ' ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας, ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον 15 λόγον ἀντεῖποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἷσι δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνῳ μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττη, πότερα δίκαια ἢ 20 ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. 20 C φαῦλοι γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἳ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὥστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτείνειν, θεὸς οὖσα, 25 οὕτωςί πως ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ· αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ'

Ἔκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος· ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν  
θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγόρησε, πολλὸν δὲ μάλλον  
δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, D  
αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην δίκην ἐπιθéis τῷ ἀδικούντι, ἵνα  
5 μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν  
ἄχθος ἀρούρης. μὴ αὐτὸν οἶε φροντίζειν θανάτου καὶ  
κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ  
ἀληθείᾳ· οὐδ' ἂν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον  
εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ὡς ἐμοὶ  
10 δοκεῖ μένοντα κινδυνεύειν μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μῆτε  
θάνατον μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, ὦ  
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, E  
οὗς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν  
15 Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐδ' ἐκείνοι ἔταττον  
ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν,  
τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾤηθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον,  
φιλοσοφούντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμμαντὸν καὶ  
τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο  
20 ὅτιοῦν πρῶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. δεινὸν τὰν εἶη, καὶ 29  
ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστή-  
ριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ  
δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὢν. τὸ  
γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν  
25 ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν  
ἂ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδ' εἰ  
τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν τῶν ἀγα-  
θῶν, δεδίασι δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν



Βέστι. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπο-  
 νειδιστος ἢ τοῦ οἶεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δ', ὦ  
 ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν  
 ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι,  
 τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾿Αἰδοῦ ο  
 οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν  
 τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ  
 αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι  
 κακά ἐστίν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέ-  
 οποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδ' εἴ με νῦν 10  
 ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἡ τὴν  
 ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἢ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον,  
 οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς  
 ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτη-  
 δεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασιν 15  
 διαφθαρῆσονται — εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ  
 Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίε-  
 μέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ  
 ζητήσῃ διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλῃς ἔτι  
 τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ 20  
 τούτοις ἀφίετε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλ-  
 λον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε  
 ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύο-  
 μένός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενός ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, 25  
 λέγων οἷά περ εἶωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος  
 ὢν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν  
 καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύnei ἐπιμελούμενος

ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλείστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονή- **Ε**  
σεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη  
ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις ; καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν  
ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω  
**5** αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω  
καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆθαι ἀρετὴν,  
φάναι δέ, ὄνειδιώ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου  
ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ **30**  
νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω,  
**10** καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῶ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσω μου  
ἐγγυτέρω ἔστε γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ  
ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἶομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν  
γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.  
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων  
**15** ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μίττε σωματῶν **Β**  
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω  
σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων·  
οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρή-  
ματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ  
**20** ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω  
τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τίς μέ φησιν  
ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην  
ἂν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε  
ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ  
**25** μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι. **Ο**

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ  
ἐμμελισταί μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς  
ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε

ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἅττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα,  
 ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο.  
 εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον  
 ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάβετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς·  
 ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάβειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε  
 Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν  
 Δ εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκ-  
 τείνειε μεντὰν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ  
 ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἶεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα  
 κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἢ 10  
 οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι.  
 νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ  
 ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἶοιτο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ  
 ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν  
 Ε ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ 15  
 ῥαδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γε-  
 λοϊότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ],  
 ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ  
 νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος·  
 οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι 20  
 τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνει-  
 31 δίζων ἓνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην  
 πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως  
 ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε,  
 φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δ' ἴσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ 25  
 οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἅν με, πειθό-  
 μενοι Ἄνυτῳ, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν  
 βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἅν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὃ

θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι ὃ ἐγὼ  
 τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει  
 δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ B  
 ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ  
 5 ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη,  
 τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν αἰεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα  
 ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπι-  
 μελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέ-  
 λαιον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην,  
 10 εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι  
 οἱ κατήγοροι τᾶλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατη-  
 γοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντή-  
 σαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥς ἐγὼ ποτέ τινα ἢ C  
 ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἤτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ  
 15 παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὥς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ  
 ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περιωὼν καὶ πολυ-  
 πραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ  
 πλήθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου  
 20 δὲ αἰτίον ἐστίν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ-  
 λαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, D  
 ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγρά-  
 ψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστίν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή  
 τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο  
 25 ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε· τοῦτό  
 ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ  
 παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ  
 ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαί ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν

τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλῃ καὶ οὐτ'  
 Ε ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἂν ἐμαντόν. καὶ μοι μὴ  
 ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώ-  
 πων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ  
 γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ δ  
 παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι  
 32 τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ  
 μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ  
 δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι 10  
 τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-  
 -σατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδ'  
 ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ  
 ὑπέικων δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἅμα ἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν  
 φορτικά μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῇ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ 15  
 Β' Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ἤρξα ἐν  
 τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ  
 Ἀντιοχίς πρυτανεύουσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατη-  
 γοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας  
 ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὥς ἐν τῷ 20  
 ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε. τότε ἔγὼ μόνος τῶν  
 πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νό-  
 μους [καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην], καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων  
 ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν  
 C κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ 25  
 δικαίου ᾧ μὴν μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθ'  
 ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων φοβηθέντα  
 δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρα-

τοῦμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλυγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ  
 τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμφθέντες με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς  
 τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα  
 τὸν Σαλαμῖνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνῃ· οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις  
 5 ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον βουλόμενοι ὥς  
 πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν· τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ οὐ  
 λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν D  
 μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν, τοῦ  
 δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ  
 10 πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν  
 οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὔσα ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ'  
 ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ὄχοντο  
 εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ὄχόμην ἀπὼν  
 οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταύτ' ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ  
 15 ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται  
 πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέ- E  
 σθαι, εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττωι ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς  
 ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ὥσπερ χρὴ τοῦτο  
 20 περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς. ἀλλ' 33  
 ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε, εἴ πού τι ἔπρα-  
 ξα, τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ  
 πώποτε ξυγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ  
 25 οὔτε τούτων οὐδενί, οὐδ' οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασιν  
 ἐμούς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς  
 πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαν-  
 τοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμῇ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε

πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα  
 μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ'  
 ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἔρω-  
 B τῶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν  
 λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε δ  
 μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε  
 ὑπεσχόμεν μὴδενὶ μὴδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδί-  
 δαξα· εἰ δὲ τίς φησι παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ  
 ἀκούσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ  
 ἀληθὴ λέγει.

10

XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δὴ ποτε μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί-  
 - τινες πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 C Ἀθηναῖοι· πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι  
 ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν  
 εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δ' οὐ· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδὲς. ἐμοὶ δὲ 15  
 τοῦτο, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράτ-  
 τειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ,  
 ὥπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτι οὖν  
 προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθὴ  
 ἐστὶ καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων τοὺς 20  
 D μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρὴν δήπου, εἴτε  
 τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις  
 οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ  
 αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι·  
 εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, 25  
 πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφούς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας,  
 εἴπερ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκείοι,  
 νῦν μεμνήσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν

αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὀρώ, πρῶτον μὲν  
 Κρίτων οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης, Κριτο-Ε  
 βούλου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος,  
 Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ· ἔτι Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς  
 5 οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὧν οἱ  
 ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασι, Νικόστρατος  
 Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου — καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδotos  
 τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνός γε αὐτοῦ κατα-  
 δεσθῇ — καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου οὗ ἦν Θεάγης 34  
 10 ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος οὗ ἀδελφός  
 οὐτοσί Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε  
 ἀδελφός. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν  
 ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρα-  
 σχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν  
 15 παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἴ τι ἔχει  
 τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτου πᾶν τοῖναντίον εὐρήσετε, ὦ  
 ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι,  
 τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκέλους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι  
 Μέλητος καὶ Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι Β  
 20 τάχ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι,  
 πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα  
 ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν  
 τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ,  
 ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι ;  
 25     XXIII. Εἰεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμ' ἂν  
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστί ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦ-  
 τα. τάχα δ' ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ὁ  
 ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῦ τοῦ ἡγῶνος ἡγῶνα



ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς  
 μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδίᾳ τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασά-  
 μενος, ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθῇ, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰ-  
 κείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων  
 ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων ὥς ἂν δόξαιμι τὸν ἔσχα-<sup>5</sup>  
 τον κίνδυνον. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστε-  
 ρον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις  
 θεῖτο ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψήφον. εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως  
 D ἔχει — οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεικῇ ἂν  
 μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, 10  
 εἰσὶ μὲν ποῦ τινες καὶ οἰκέιοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ  
 τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδ' ἀπὸ πέτρης  
 πέφυκα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκέιοί μοι εἰσι  
 καὶ υἱεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μεῖράκιον  
 ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδίᾳ· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο 15  
 ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί  
 δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ  
 E ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν  
 θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος,  
 πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει 20  
 οὗ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ  
 τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτ' οὖν  
 ἀληθὲς εἴτ' οὖν ψεῦδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι  
 τὸ Σωκράτῃ διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 25 εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε 25  
 ἀνδρεία εἴτε ἄλλῃ ἡτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται,  
 αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἷουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἐώρακά τινας,  
 ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ

ἐργαζομένους, ὥς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃ τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστ' ἂν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων  
 5 ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὗς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις B τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρή ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι, οὔτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν  
 10 ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν  
 15 μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον C ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς  
 20 νόμους. οὐκ οὖν χρή οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιорκεῖν οὔθ' ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὖσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιούτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ἢ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως D  
 25 καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτονί. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὁμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγείσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν

ἐμαντοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγορῶν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

**E** XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 36 ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺν μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ 10 ῥόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ' ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοί δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη 15 Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσιντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε Β χιλίας δραχμὰς οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἰεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη- 20 ναῖοι; ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλ' ἀμελήσας ὧν περ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν 25 ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαντὸν τῷ ὄντι Ο ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ' ὄντα σφῆζεσθαι,

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦα, οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαντῶ  
 ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον  
 ἰὼν εὐεργετῆν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι,  
 ἐνταῦθα ἦα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρό-  
 5 τερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδεὶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν  
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώ-  
 ττος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς  
 πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον  
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὢν ; D  
 10 ἀγαθὸν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν  
 ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταυτὰ γε ἀγαθὸν  
 τοιοῦτον, ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ  
 πένητι εὐεργέτῃ δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα  
 παρακελεύσει ; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-  
 15 ναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πυρτα-  
 νελῷ σιτεῖσθαι, πολὺ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ  
 ἢ ξυνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγῃ νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίᾳσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ  
 ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι· καὶ E  
 ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ  
 20 με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, 37  
 ἐν πυρτανελῷ σιτήσεως.

XXVII. Ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παρα-  
 πλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς  
 ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ  
 25 Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι  
 ἐγὼ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς  
 τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διει-  
 λέγμεθα· ἐπεὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ B

ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον  
 κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰς, ἐπέισθητε ἄν· νῦν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον  
 ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πε-  
 πεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτὸν  
 γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτός, ὡς ἄξιός 5  
 εἰμί του κακοῦ, καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ.  
 τί δέισας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὐ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται,  
 ὃ φημι οὐκ εἶδέναι οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακόν ἐστιν;  
 ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων,  
 τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ 10  
 ζῆν ἐν δεσμοτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ αἰὲ καθισταμένῃ  
 ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἑνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι  
 ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν μοι ἐστίν ὅπερ νῦν δὴ  
 ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτίσω.  
 ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τούτου 15  
 τιμήσαιτε. πολλὰ μεντὰν με φιλοφνυχία ἔχοι, εἰ  
 οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι,  
 ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἰοί τε ἐγένεσθε  
 ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ'  
 Δύμῃν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε 20  
 ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα  
 αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥάδιως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι.  
 καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῶδε  
 ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ  
 ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, 25  
 λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε.  
 καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξε-  
 λῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπε-

λαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτοὺς τούτους.

XXVIII. Ἴσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ Ε  
 ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει ἡμῖν  
 5 ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον  
 πείσαι τινος ὑμῶν. ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ  
 ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν  
 ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένη· ἐάν τ' αὖ  
 λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἀνθρώπῳ 38  
 10 τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι-  
 εῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε  
 διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ  
 δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ'  
 ἔτι ἡττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν  
 15 οὕτως ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον.  
 καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ  
 οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην  
 ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν  
 ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν Β  
 20 ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμήσαι.  
 Ἴσως δ' ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ὑμῖν μνᾶν ἀργυρίου·  
 τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολ-  
 λόδωρος κελεύουσίν με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι,  
 25 αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ  
 δ' ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεοι. C

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων  
 τὴν πόλιν λαιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα  
 σοφόν· φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ  
 βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον δ  
 χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο·  
 ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ  
 βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς  
 D πάντα ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμέ-  
 νους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς 10  
 τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων  
 ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ὥμην δεῖν  
 ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην.  
 πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι  
 λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν 15  
 λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστα ᾗν  
 E ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα  
 ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς  
 ἐγὼ φημι· οἶα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκού-  
 ειν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε ῥήθην δεῖν ἔνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου 20  
 πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει  
 οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰρούμαι  
 ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν· οὔτε  
 γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτ' ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτ' ἐμὲ οὔτ' ἄλλον  
 89 οὐδένα δεῖ τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν 25  
 ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις  
 δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ  
 ὅπλα ἀφείλῃ καὶ ἐφ' ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων·

καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς  
κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἔάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν  
ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἦ χαλεπὸν, ὦ  
ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον  
5 πονηρίαν· θάττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν Β  
ἄτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου  
ἑάλων, οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἄτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες  
ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι  
ὑφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλὼν, οὗτοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς  
10 ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ  
τε τῷ τιμῆματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μὲν που  
ἴσως οὕτω καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως  
ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησ- C  
· 15 μῶδῃσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου. καὶ γὰρ εἰμι ἤδη  
ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησιμφοδοῦσιν, ὅταν  
μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ἄνδρες, οἱ ἐμὲ  
ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἤξειν εὐθύς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν  
θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νῆ Δία ἢ οἶαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτό-  
20 νατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσ-  
θαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ  
ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται  
ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ D  
οὐκ ἠσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῃ νεώτεροί  
25 εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἶεσθε  
ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν  
τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε.  
οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε



καλή, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολοῦειν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν δια-  
 Ελεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῦ πράγματος, ἐν  
 ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὐπω ἔρχομαι οἱ  
 ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παρα-  
 μέivate τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθο-  
 λογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν· ὑμῖν γὰρ ὡς 10  
 40 φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδειῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ξυμβεβηκὸς  
 τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες, δικασταί— ὑμᾶς  
 γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖην— θαυμάσιόν  
 τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμο-  
 νίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰὲ 15  
 ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι  
 μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ξυμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὀράτε  
 καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται  
 Βέσχατα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιώντι ἔωθεν οἴκοθεν  
 ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον 20  
 ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ  
 μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ  
 δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ  
 ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ  
 ἡναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; 25  
 ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ξυμβεβηκὸς  
 τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς  
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἴομεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ

τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μὴ τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.

XXXII. Ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς  
 εἴ ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστι τὸ  
 τεθνάναι· ἡ γὰρ οἶον μὴδὲν εἶναι μὴδ' αἰσθησιν μηδε-  
 μίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἡ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα  
 μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὐσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ  
 τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε D  
 10 μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἶον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις  
 καθεύδων μὴδ' ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὄρᾳ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν  
 εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον  
 δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα, ἐν ἣ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε  
 μὴδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας  
 15 τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ  
 νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον  
 ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ  
 ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν  
 μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας E  
 20 πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον  
 ὁ θάνατός ἐστι, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν  
 πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία  
 νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδημήσαι ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε  
 εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθὴ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἄρα  
 25 ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἅπαντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τού-  
 του εἴη ἂν, ὢ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς  
 Ἄϊδον, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν 41  
 εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται

ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ  
 Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένον-  
 το ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἄρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία ; ἡ  
 αὖ Ὀρφεὶ ξυγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἑσιόδῳ καὶ  
 Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν ; ἐγὼ μὲν 5  
 γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ·  
 ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐ-  
 Β τόθι, ὅποτε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμῆδαι καὶ Ἀΐαντι τῷ Τελα-  
 μῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον  
 τέθνηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλουντι τὰ ἑμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς 10  
 τὰ ἐκείνων, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ  
 μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ  
 τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς δὴ αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ  
 τίς οἶεται μὲν, ἔστιν δ' οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ' ἂν τις, ὧ  
 ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν 15  
 C ἄγοντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιάν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον,  
 ἢ ἄλλους μυρρίους ἂν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας,  
 οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχα-  
 ρον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας. πάντως οὐ δῆπου τούτου γε  
 ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμο- 20  
 νέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν  
 χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθὴ  
 ἐστίν.

XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασται,  
 εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἔν τι τοῦτο 25  
 D διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν  
 οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται  
 ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ

τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς  
 5 κατηγοροῖς οὐ πᾶν χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγοροῦν, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. το-  
 σόνδε μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς υἱεῖς μου ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταῦτα ταῦτα λυ-  
 10 ποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπον, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν  
 15 ταῦτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφ' ὑμῶν, 42 αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ υἱεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπό-  
 τεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

## ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.  
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

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48 Ι. ΣΩ. Τί τηνικάδε ἀφίξαι, ὦ Κρίτων ; ἡ οὐ πρὸς  
ἔτι ἐστίν ;

ΚΡ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα ;

ΚΡ. Ὅρθρος βαθύς.

5

ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὅπως ἠθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτη-  
ρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

ΚΡ. Ξυνήθης ἤδη μοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ  
πολλάκις δεῦρο φοιτᾶν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ'  
ἐμοῦ.

10

ΣΩ. Ἄρτι δὲ ἤκεις ἡ πάλαι ;

ΚΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΣΩ. Εἴτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἀλλὰ συγῇ  
παρακάθῃσαι ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς 15  
ἤθελον ἐν τοσαύτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι.  
ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὥς ἡδέως  
καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὥς ἡδιστα

διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστῶσῃ ξυμφορᾷ ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρᾶως φέρεις.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Κρίτων, πλημμελὲς εἴη ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικούτου ὄντα, εἰ δεῖ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τηλικούτοι ἐν τοιαύταις ξυμφοραῖς ἀλίσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται ἢ ἡλικία τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ  
10 τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ οὕτω πρὸ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπήν, οὐ σοί, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπήν καὶ βαρείαν, ἣν ἐγὼ ὡς ἐμοὶ  
15 δοκῶ ἐν τοῖς βαρύντατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκεται ἐκ Δήλου, οὗ δεῖ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; D

ΚΡ. Οὗτοι δὴ ἀφίκεται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν τήμερον ἐξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἡκουτές τινες ἀπὸ  
20 Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων [τῶν ἀγγέλων] ὅτι ἤξει τήμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὔριον ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτᾶν.

II. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἶμαι ἤξειν  
25 αὐτὸ τήμερον.

ΚΡ. Πόθεν τοῦτο τεκμαίρει;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. τῇ γάρ που ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἢ ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἤξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἔκ τινος ἐνυπνίου ὃ ἐώρακα ὀλίγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτός· καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινι οὐκ ἐγείραί με. 5

ΚΡ. Ἦν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνύπνιον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν·  
B ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡματί κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἴκοιο.

ΚΡ. Ἄτοπον τὸ ἐνύπνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10

ΣΩ. Ἐναργές μὲν οὖν ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων.

III. ΚΡ. Λίαν γε, ὥς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ' ὦ δαιμόνιε Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι· ὥς ἐμοί, εἰ σὺ ὑποθάνης, οὐ μίᾳ ξυμφορᾷ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτηδείου, οἷον 15 ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτε εὐρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξω, οἳ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὥς οἷός τε ὦν σε σφάζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καί-  
C τοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; οὐ γὰρ πείσονται 20 οἱ πολλοὶ ὥς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἠθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμουμένων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἳ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὧν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὕτω πε- 25 πρᾶχθαι ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ.

D ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ὁρᾷς δὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ

παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἰοί τέ εἰσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ σμικρό-  
 τата τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα  
 σχεδόν, ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ᾖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οἰοί τε εἶναι οἱ  
 5 πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἵνα οἰοί τε ἦσαν  
 καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἶχεν. νῦν δὲ  
 οὐδέτερα οἰοί τε· οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα  
 δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἂν τύχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐχέτω· τάδε δέ, ὦ  
 10 Σώκρατες, εἰπέ μοι· ἂρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν Ε  
 ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συ-  
 κοφάνται ἡμῶν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὥς σε ἐνθένδε  
 ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν  
 οὐσίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι  
 15 πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔασον  
 αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν σώσαντές 45  
 σε κινδυνεύειν τούτου τὸν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δέῃ ἔτι  
 τούτου μείζω. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθεύμαι, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα  
 20 πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μῆτε τοίνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ  
 τὰργύριόν ἐστιν, ὃ θέλουσι λαβόντες τινὲς σῶσαι σε  
 καὶ ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐνθένδε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὀρᾷς τούτους τοὺς  
 συκοφάντας ὥς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν δέοι ἐπ' αὐτοὺς  
 25 πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου; σοὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα Β  
 ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι ἱκανά· ἔπειτα καὶ εἴ τι ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος  
 οὐκ οἶει δεῖν ἀναλίσκειν τὰμά, ξένοι οὗτοι ἐνθάδε ἔτοι-  
 μοι ἀναλίσκειν· εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμικεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο



ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας ὁ Θηβαῖος· ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ  
 Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάννυ. ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω,  
 μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαι, μήτε  
 δ' ἐλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι  
 οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ἐξελθὼν ὅτι χρέω σαυτῷ· πολλαχοῦ μὲν δ  
 γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι ἂν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε· ἐὰν δὲ  
 C βούλη εἰς Θετταλίαν ἵεναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε  
 περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσονται καὶ ἀσφάλειάν σοι παρέξονται  
 ὥστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

V. Ἔτι δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς 10  
 ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξὸν σωθῆναι·  
 καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἅπερ ἂν  
 καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιέν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν σὲ δια-  
 φθεῖραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱεῖς  
 τοὺς σαυτοῦ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὓς σοι ἐξὸν καὶ 15  
 D ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεῦσαι οἰχῆσαι καταλιπών, καὶ τὸ  
 σὸν μέρος, ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν· τεύξονται  
 δὲ ὡς τὸ εἶκός τοιούτων οἷάπερ εἶωθε γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς  
 ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανούς. ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι  
 παῖδας, ἢ ξυνδιαταλαιπωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παι- 20  
 δεύοντα· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ῥαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι·  
 χρὴ δέ, ἅπερ ἂν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος ἔλοιτο,  
 ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντά γε δὴ ἀρετῆς διὰ παντὸς  
 τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγωγε καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ  
 E ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδεύων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξη 25  
 ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τινὲ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ  
 πεπραῆχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον  
 ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγὼν τῆς

δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τουτὶ ὥσπερ  
κατάγγελως τῆς πράξεως κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ  
ἡμετέρα διαπεφευγέναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἷτινές σε οὐχὶ  
ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτόν, οἷόν τε ὃν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ 46  
τι καὶ μικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὦ Σώκρα-  
τες, ὅρα μὴ ἅμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρῷ ἢ σοὶ τε καὶ  
ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύου, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλευέσθαι  
ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή· τῆς γὰρ  
ἐπιούσης νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεῖ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δέ  
10 τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἷόν τε. ἀλλὰ  
παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς  
ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

VI. ΣΩ. ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ  
ἀξία, εἰ μετὰ τινος ὀρθότητος εἴη· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅσῳ B  
15 μείζων, τοσοῦτ' χαλεπωτέρα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρή  
ἡμᾶς εἴτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μή· ὥς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον  
νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰεὶ τοιοῦτος οἶος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ  
πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος  
φαίνεται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους οἷς ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον  
20 οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἦδε ἡ τύχη γέγο-  
νεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὅμοιοι φαίνονται μοι καὶ τοὺς  
αὐτοὺς πρεσβεύω καὶ τιμῶ ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον· ὦν O  
ἐὰν μὴ βελτίῳ ἔχωμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἴσθι  
ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοὶ ξυγχωρήσω, οὐδ' ἂν πλείω τῶν νῦν  
25 παρόντων ἢ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὥσπερ παιῖδας ἡμᾶς  
μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιπέμπουσα  
καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα  
σκοποῖμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον

ἀναλάβοιμεν, ὃν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον  
καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν  
D δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ· ἡ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ  
δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατὰδηλος ἄρα  
ἐγένετο ὅτι ἄλλως ἔνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδιὰ 5  
καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγωγ' ἐπισκέ-  
ψασθαι, ὦ Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἴ τί μοι ἀλλοιό-  
τερος φανέται ἐπειδὴ ᾗδε ἔχω ἢ ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν  
χαίρειν ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως ὡς ἐγῶμαι  
ἐκάστοτε ᾗδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, ὥσπερ νῦν 10  
δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἅς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι  
δέοι τὰς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τὰς δὲ μὴ. τοῦτο  
πρὸς θεῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι;  
E σὺ γὰρ ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθ-  
νήσκειν αὔριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούοι ἡ παρούσα 15  
47 ξυμφορά· σκόπει δὴ, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι,  
ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δόξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν,  
ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; [οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν  
μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ;] τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

KP. Καλῶς.

20

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ ποιη-  
ραὶ μὴ;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταὶ δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, ποιηραὶ δὲ  
αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

25

KP. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο;  
B γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς

ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει,  
ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρί-  
βης ὢν ;

ΚΡ. Ἐνὸς μόνου.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρή τοὺς ψόγους καὶ  
ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ  
μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν ;

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ ἄρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον  
10 καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ  
ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίοντι, μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ ξύμπασι τοῖς  
ἄλλοις ;

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας  
15 αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς  
τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαιόντων, ἄρα οὐδὲν  
κακὸν πείσεται ;

ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ  
20 εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος ;

ΚΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλ-  
λυσιν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα, ὧ Κρίτων,  
οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν  
25 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ αἰσχυρῶν καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν  
καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστίν ; πότερον  
τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι  
αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐπαίων, ὃν δεῖ καὶ

αἰχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους, ὃ εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο ; ἢ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τοῦτο ;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἐὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαϊόντων Εὐδόξῃ, ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ ; ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα· ἢ οὐχί ; 10

ΚΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος ;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρ- 15  
μένου, ὃ τὸ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν ;  
ἢ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι  
48 ποτ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων, περὶ δ' ἢ τε ἀδικία καὶ ἢ  
δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν ;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς. 20

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμώτερον ;

ΚΡ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ βέλτιστε, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὕτω φροντιστέον, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ ἐπαῖων περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. 25  
ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντιῶν.

ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἂν τις, οἷοί τέ εἰσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινύνναι.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὦ Σώ-Β  
κρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ', ὦ θαυμάσιε, οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι ὅμοιος εἶναι [τῷ] καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκοπεῖ εἰ ἔτι μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὐ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

10 ΚΡ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστι, μένει ἢ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο  
15 σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένθε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ο φαίνεται δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐώμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μὴ ὥς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ  
20 Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίως ἀποκτινύνντων καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, εἰ οἷοί τ' ἦσαν, οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ' ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἰρεῖ μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ἡ ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξομεν καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τού-  
25 τοις τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσιν καὶ χάριτας καὶ αὐτοὶ δ  
ἐξάγοντές τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέη ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὗτ' εἰ ἀπο-

θνήσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅρα δὲ τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἴ πη ἔχεις ὅ ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι·  
 Εἰ δὲ μή, παῦσαι ἤδη, ὦ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὥς χρηρὲς ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι· ὥς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῶμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς 10 σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν σοι ἱκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρῶ  
 49 ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οἴῃ.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλα πειράσομαι.

Χ. ΣΩ. Οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὔ; ἢ οὐδα- 15 μῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὥς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὠμολογήθη; [ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο·] ἢ πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκείναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίαι ἐν ταῖςδε ταῖς ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ὦ Κρίτων, ἄρα τηλικοῖδε [γέροντες] 20  
 Β ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδῇ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάβομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἴτε φασὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴτε μή, καὶ εἴτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἔτι τῶνδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἴτε καὶ πραότερα, ὅμως τό γε 25  
 ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχροὺς τυγχάνει  
 δν παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμὲν ἢ οὔ;

ΚΡ. Φαμέν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδὴ γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν ; 0

5 ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ δή ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ ;

ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πᾶσχοντα, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον ;

10 ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.

ΚΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν  
15 οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοι ἂν πᾶσχη ὑπ' αὐτῶν.  
καὶ ὅρα, ὦ Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ Δ  
δόξαν ὁμολογῇς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ  
δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ,  
τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους  
20 ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευ-  
ματα. σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ μάλα, πότερον κοινω-  
νεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευό-  
μενοι, ὥς οὐδέποτε ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε  
τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πᾶσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀν-  
25 τιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς  
ἀρχῆς ; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, Ε  
σοὶ δ' εἴ πῃ ἄλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ διδασκε. εἰ δέ  
ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἄκουε.



ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δ' ἐρωτῶ·  
πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαια ὄντα ποιητέον  
ἢ ἑξαπατητέον ; 5

ΚΡ. Ποιητέον.

ΧΙ. ΣΩ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε  
50 ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας  
ποιούμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὓς ἥκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὐ ; καὶ ἐμμένο-  
μεν οὓς ὁμολογήσαμεν δίκαιοις οὖσιν ἢ οὐ ; 10

ΚΡ. Οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς δ'  
ἐρωτᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ᾧδε σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε  
εἶτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο,  
ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες 15  
ἔρουντο· εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν ;  
ἄλλο τι ἢ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ ᾧ ἐπιχειρεῖς διανοεῖ τοὺς τε  
B νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ξύμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν  
μέρος ; ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι  
καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν 20  
ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνονται καὶ  
διαφθείρονται ; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ  
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι ἄλλως τε καὶ  
ῥήτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὃς  
τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάττει κυρίας εἶναι. 25  
ἢ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι ἡδίκηει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἢ πόλις  
C καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἔκρινεν ; ταῦτα ἢ τί ἐροῦμεν ;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῆ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XII. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἡ ἐμμένειν ταῖς δίκαις αἷς ἂν ἡ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζοιμεν λεγόντων, ἴσως ἂν εἴποιεν ὅτι, ὦ  
 5 Σώκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ λεγόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἴωθας χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐρωτᾷν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῖν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπι- D χειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύναι; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν σε ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μητέρα σου ὁ πατήρ  
 10 καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τούτοις ἡμῶν, τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὥς οὐ καλῶς ἔχουσιν; οὐ μέμφομαι, φαίην ἄν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ᾗ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἡ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ  
 15 τούτοις τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρὶ τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, E φαίην ἄν. εἰεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένου καὶ ἐξετράφης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχους ἂν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὥς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἔκγονος καὶ δοῦλος, αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ  
 20 σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄρ' ἐξ ἴσου οἶε εἶναι σοὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἅτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς σε ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιεῖν, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶε δίκαιον εἶναι; ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοὶ τὸν πατέρα οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου ἦν τὸ δίκαιον καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην, εἴ σοι ὦν  
 25 ἐτύγχανεν, ὥστε, ἅπερ πάσχοις, ταῦτα καὶ ἀντιποιεῖν, οὔτε κακῶς ἀκούοντα ἀντιλέγειν οὔτε τυπτόμενον ἀντι-  
 τύπτειν οὔτε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά· πρὸς δὲ τὴν δ1 πατρίδα ἄρα καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔσται σοι, ὥστε, εἴαν σε

ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἡγούμενοι εἶναι,  
καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καθ' ὅσον  
δύνασαι ἐπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα  
ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπι-  
μελόμενος; ἢ οὕτως εἰ σοφός, ὥστε λέλθῃν σε ὅτι 5  
μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάν-  
των τιμώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ πατρὶς καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ  
B ὑγιώτερον καὶ ἐν μείζονι μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοὺς καὶ  
παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ  
μᾶλλον ὑπέκκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσιν 10  
ἢ πατέρα, καὶ ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ  
πάσχειν, ἐάν τι προστάτῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντα,  
ἐάν τε τύπτεσθαι ἐάν τε δεῖσθαι, ἐάν τε εἰς πόλεμον  
ἄγῃ τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα,  
καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεκτέον οὐδὲ 15  
ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν  
πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητέον ἃ  
C ἂν κελεύῃ ἢ πόλις καὶ ἢ πατρὶς, ἢ πείθειν αὐτήν ἢ τὸ  
δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δ' οὐχ ὅσιον οὔτε μητέρα  
οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἔτι ἡττον τὴν πατρίδα; 20  
τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων; ἀληθῇ λέγειν τοὺς  
νόμους ἢ οὐ;

KP. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ΣΩ. Σκόπει τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαῖεν ἂν  
ἴσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῇ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ 25  
δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἃ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς  
γάρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρέψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μετα-  
δόντες ἀπάντων ὧν οἰοί τε ἡμεν καλῶν σοὶ καὶ τοῖς

ἄλλοις πᾶσι πολίταις, ὅμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν D  
 πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὴν δοκι-  
 μασθῇ καὶ ἴδῃ τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς  
 τοὺς νόμους, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἀρέσκωμεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα  
 5 τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν  
 τῶν νόμων ἐμποδῶν ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, ἐάν τέ τις  
 βούλεται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποικίαν ἵεναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκοιμεν  
 ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, ἐάν τε μετοικεῖν ἄλλοσέ ποι  
 ἐλθῶν, ἵεναι ἐκείσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται ἔχοντα τὰ αὐ-  
 10 τοῦ. ὃς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὁρῶν δὴν τρόπον ἡμεῖς E  
 τὰς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τᾶλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦμεν,  
 ἥδη φαμέν τοῦτον ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς  
 κελεύωμεν ποιήσῃ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τριχῇ  
 φαμέν ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖς οὖσιν ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται,  
 15 καὶ ὅτι τροφεῦσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι  
 οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιου-  
 μεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀγρίως ἐπιταττόντων 22  
 ποιεῖν ἂν ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφέντων δυοῖν θύτερα, ἡ  
 πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.  
 20 XIV. Ταύταις δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Σώκρατες, ταῖς  
 αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂν ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ  
 ἥκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν  
 ἐγὼ εἴποιμι· διὰ τί δή; ἴσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπ-  
 τοιντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ  
 25 αὐτοῖς ὁμολογηκῶς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν.  
 φαῖεν γὰρ ἂν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων B  
 τεκμήριά ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ  
 πόλις· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων

διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφε-  
 ρόντως ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὐτ' ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώποτ' ἐκ τῆς  
 πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἅπαξ εἰς Ἴσθμόν,] οὔτε  
 ἄλλοσε οὐδαμόσε, εἰ μὴ ποι στρατευσόμενος, οὔτε  
 C ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πώποτε ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δ  
 ἄνθρωποι, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδὲ ἄλλων  
 νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ  
 ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὕτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἡροῦ καὶ ὁμολό-  
 γεις καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας  
 ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσω ὡς ἀρεσκούσης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι 10  
 τοῖνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἐξῆν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ  
 ἐβούλου, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς,  
 τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι. σὺ δὲ τότε μὲν ἐκαλλωπίζου  
 ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἡροῦ. ὡς  
 D ἐφῆσθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον· νῦν δὲ οὐτ' ἐκείνους 15  
 τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει,  
 ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθεῖραι, πράττεις τε ἅπερ ἂν δοῦλος  
 φανυλότητος πράξειεν, ἀποδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ  
 τὰς ξυνθήκας τε καὶ τὰς ὁμολογίας, καθ' ἃς ἡμῖν  
 ξυνέθου πολιτεύεσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο 20  
 αὐτὸ ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντές σε ὁμο-  
 λογηκέναι πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ λόγῳ,  
 ἢ οὐκ ἀληθῆ. τί φῶμεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων;  
 ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμολογῶμεν;

KP. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25

E ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαῖεν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς  
 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὑπὸ  
 ἀνάγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθεὶς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ

χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλευσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν  
 ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπιέναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν  
 ἡμεῖς μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντό σοι αἱ ὁμολογίαι εἶναι.  
 σὺ δὲ οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἃς δὴ  
 5 ἐκάστοτε φῆς εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν  
 Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐδὲ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάτ- 53  
 τω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ  
 οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὕτω σοι διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων  
 Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι δηλον  
 10 ὅτι· τίνοι γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; νῦν δὲ δὴ  
 οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ, ὦ  
 Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως  
 ἐξελθών.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβὰς καὶ ἑξαμαρ- B  
 15 τάνων τι τούτων τί ἀγαθὸν ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς  
 ἐπιτηδέλους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύουσιν  
 γέ σου οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγειν καὶ στερηθῆναι  
 τῆς πόλεως ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδόν τι δήλον·  
 αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πόλεων  
 20 ἔλθῃς, ἢ Θήβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε — εὐνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφο-  
 τεραι — πολέμιος ἦξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολι-  
 τείᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι περ κήδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑπο-  
 βλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἡγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ  
 βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν ὥστε δοκεῖν 0  
 25 ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ νόμων διαφθορεὺς  
 ἐστι, σφόδρα πονεῖ δόξειεν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοήτων  
 ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεὺς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὰς  
 τε εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτά-

τους ; καὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦντι ἄρα ἄξιόν σοι ζῆν ἔσται ; ἡ  
 πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος  
 — τίνας λόγους, ὦ Σώκρατες ; ἡ οὐσπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ  
 ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις  
 καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι ; καὶ οὐκ οἶε ἄσχημον ἂν δ  
 D φανεῖσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα ; οἶεσθαι γε χρή.  
 ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς  
 Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος · ἐκεῖ γὰρ  
 δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἡδέως  
 σου ἀκούοιεν ὡς γελοῖως ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἀπεδί- 10  
 δρασκες σκευὴν τέ τινα περιθήμενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβὼν  
 ἢ ἄλλα οἶα δὴ εἰώθασιν ἐνσκευάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδρά-  
 σκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαντοῦ μεταλλάξας · ὅτι δὲ  
 γέρων ἀνὴρ, σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ ὄντος ὡς  
 E τὸ εἰκός, ἐτόλμησας οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἐπιθυμεῖν ζῆν, 15  
 νόμους τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάς, οὐδεὶς δὲ ἐρεῖ ; ἴσως,  
 ἂν μὴ τινα λυπῆς · εἰ δὲ μή, ἀκούσει, ὦ Σώκρατης,  
 πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαντοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει  
 πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων · τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐχού-  
 μενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκῶς 20  
 εἰς Θετταλίαν ; λόγοι δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε  
 24 καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται ; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν  
 παίδων ἔνεκα βούλει ζῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψῃς καὶ  
 παιδεύῃς ; τί δέ ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν  
 θρέψῃς τε καὶ παιδεύῃς, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ 25  
 τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφό-  
 μενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέφονται καὶ παιδεύονται,  
 μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς ; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτήδειοι οἱ σοὶ ἐπι-

μελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσης ἐπιμελήσονται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς "Αἰδου ἀποδημήσης οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὄφελος αὐτῶν ἔστι τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδεῖων εἶναι, οἷσθαί γε χρή.

XVI. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἡμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεῦσι μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς "Αἰδου ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὀσιώτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδενί, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένῳ ἄμεινον ἔσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικοημένος ἄπει, ἐὰν ἀπίης, οὐχ ὑφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχυρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τὰς σαυτοῦ ὁμολογίας τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τας πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὓς ἤκιστα ἔδει, σαυτόν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ζῶντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἀδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν "Αἰδου νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέχονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μή σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ



δοκούντα, εἰς τὴν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἐρεῖς. ὁμῶς μέντοι εἴ τι οἶε πλέον ποιήσῃς, λέγε.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ΣΩ. Ἐὰ τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταύτην, ἐπειδὴ ταύτη ὁ θεὸς ὑφηγεῖται.

## NOTES.



## NOTES.

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### APOLOGIA SOCRATIS.

Page  
48

A. Line 1. "Ο τι . . . κατηγορῶν. *In what manner you* 17  
*have been affected by my accusers*, i. e., by their harangues,  
which had immediately preceded the defense of Socrates. μέν  
following ὁ τι contrasts the clauses; following ὑμεῖς it would  
contrast the pronouns ὑμεῖς and ἐγώ. Since πεπόνθατε denotes  
the receiving of an action, it is followed by ὑπό, as if it were  
a passive verb. G. 165, N. 1; H. A. 820.\* So ὑπ' αὐτῶν  
just below; and in like manner *ab* in Latin. The accusers or  
prosecutors of Socrates were three, Anytus, 18 B., Meletus,  
19 B., and Lycon, 23 E. & ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The trial of  
Socrates took place before the Heliaea, the most numerous and  
popular, and, at that time, by far the most important court  
at Athens. It consisted in all of 6,000 Athenian citizens  
(though they usually administered justice in sections of 500  
each), and being also often thronged by spectators from the  
populace, its members might well be addressed by the same  
honorable title as the members of the popular assembly, &  
ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, instead of the more distinctive title &  
ἄνδρες δικασταί. Socrates uses the latter in addressing those judges  
who voted for his acquittal in the concluding paragraph of  
his defense, capp. xxxi-xxxiii, and gives his reason for it at 40.

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\* G. stands for Goodwin's Grammar; H. A. for Hadley's revised  
by Allen; M. and T. for Goodwin's Moods and Tenses of Greek Verbs.

Page  
48

The 6,000 Heliasts were a majority of the adult citizens of Athens. The name *ἡλιαία* is connected in root with *δλία*, which in the Dorian states was the common term for an assembly of the people, and these Attic juries, even in their judicial functions, represented the people. Cf. Wachsmuth's *His. Ant.*, Sec. 47, Meier's *Attic Process*, Smith's *Dict. of Antiqq.*, and Grote's *Hist. of Greece*, vol. iv., chap. 31; also Mahaffy's *Primer of Old Greek Life*, Secc. 96-101. On the compliment implied in the title *Ἀθηναῖος*, cf. 29 D. 2. δ' οὖν. *But then, at any rate*, affirming the truth of the following statement, notwithstanding his ignorance about that in the previous clause. 3. *δλίγου*, sc. *δεῖν*, literally, to want little = *almost*. G. 268; H. A. 743, b. Cf. *δλίγου δεῖν*, 22, A. *ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην*, *forgot myself*, i. e., my true character. 4. *ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν* limits *οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι*, and is designed to qualify, or apologize for, that otherwise absolute negation of all truth in his accusers: *they have said, so to speak, nothing that is true at least*. Cf. Stallbaum in loc., and Gorg. 450 B, also Woolsey, *ibid.* 5. *αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα*, etc. *One thing of theirs I most wondered at of the many falsehoods which they stated, viz., this*. *αὐτῶν* relates to persons and is the gen. of the possessor, while *τῶν πολλῶν* is the partitive gen. after the same word *ἐν*. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.

B. 6. *χρή*. *χρήν*, impf., has the better MSS. authority, but *χρή*, pres., gives the better, not to say the only suitable meaning, and is adopted by Cron, Wagner, and other recent editors. 8. *μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι*. *μὴ* rather than *οὐ* regularly accompanies the inf., because the inf., from its very nature, usually denotes a mere conception: *that they should not be ashamed*. *ὅτι* = *because*. 9. *ἐργῷ*, *by the fact*, the actual trial. 9. *μηδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν*. Observe the emphasis: *not even in any way whatever*. 10. *αὐτῶν*, *of them*, or in them. Cf. note on *αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα* above. 11. *εἰ μὴ ἄρα* = *nisi forte, unless perchance*. Often used ironically: *unless forsooth*. 12. *λέγειν* depends on *δεινόν* = *powerful* (literally, *terrible*) *to speak*. *εἰ . . . λέγουσιν* may be rendered, if they mean this. 13. *οὐ κατὰ τοῦτους*, *not after their example*. He would acknowledge, that he was an orator according to that definition, but not

according to their exemplification of it, since *they*, as he proceeds to say, *had spoken little or nothing that was true*. 14. ἡ τι ἡ οὐδέν = *little or nothing, next to nothing*. Cf. Herod. III, 140, ἀναβέβηκε δὲ ἡ τις ἡ οὐδεὶς κω παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν. 15. πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, *truth throughout*, differing slightly from τὴν πᾶσαν ἀλήθειαν. G. 142, 4, N. 5; H. A. 672. Cf. Xen. Mem. 4, 8, 9: τὴν δίκην ἀληθέστατα εἰπών. 16. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δί', κ.τ.λ. *Not, however, by any means, Athenians, speeches rhetorically decked out as theirs were in choice words and phrases, nor carefully arranged in ornate periods, but you shall hear facts, stated without premeditation in the words which chance to occur to me*. There is the most perfect rhetoric in Plato's presentation of this defense of Socrates. The conversational style is everywhere admirably kept up. 17. ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, sc. λόγοι ἦσαν. In such comparative clauses, the noun may take the case of the preceding noun, or may be put in the nominative. λόγους is the object of ἀκούσεσθε, which is expressed in the last instead of the first clause, in order to declare emphatically and affirmatively what they *shall* hear. According to Stallbaum, ὀνόματα = singula nomina, ῥήματα = nomina una cum predicato. In the technical language of Greek grammar, ὀνόματα = nouns, ῥήματα = verbs.

C. 19. πιστεύω γὰρ, κ.τ.λ., in this connection implies, that just sentiments do not need rhetorical ornaments. 1. δῆπου, <sup>Page 44</sup> as usual, is somewhat playful = *methinks, to be sure*. 2. τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, est: *mihi homini id ætatis*—verbum abstractum loco verbi concreti positum. Stallb. Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial. Cf. D. πλάττοντι takes the gender of μειρακίῳ, or of ἐμοί, implied in τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, and implies more or less of *fictitious* and false elaboration. It is to be remembered that at this time the successful speeches in the Athenian courts were usually prepared by rhetoricians, and delivered as if their own by the parties. Lysias prepared scores of such orations, and wrote one for Socrates, which he declined to use. εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι, to come *into* your presence, your dicastery, or your assembly. 4. παρίεμαι. Ruhnken, as cited and approved by Stallbaum, says: παρήμι = *admitto*, παρίεμαι = *ad me admitti volo*, i. e., *precor, deprecor*. 6. Καὶ

Page

44

ἐν ἀγορᾷ, κ.τ.λ. Both in the agora at the counters, and elsewhere. Cf. Mat. 21, 12: τὰς τραπέζας τῶν κολλυβιστῶν. τράπεζα in modern Greek = bank.

D. 8. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτωςί. For the fact is thus, sc. as follows. Then follows the explanatory clause, which, as usual, is without any connective (asyndeton). 9. ἀναβέβηκα, sc. the βῆμα, or stand of the accused. The accuser also had his βῆμα or elevated stand in the court. 10. τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. The language of judicial proceedings. For the gen. see G. 182, 1; H. A. 756. 11. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν. This ἄν belongs to the apodosis with ξυνεγινώσκετε, where it is repeated (δήπου ἄν). It stands with ὥσπερ to intimate at the outset (by way of anticipation), that the example is a mere supposition, and then, after the intervening protasis with εἰ, it is repeated with the verb or some other important word of the apodosis. G. 212, 2; H. A. 864. τῷ ὄντι = in fact. So very often, especially in Plato. ξένος, not an Athenian but still a Greek, who might be understood in the Athenian courts, but would speak in the dialect, tone, and manner of his native country. Compare Schleiermacher's note ad loc. 13. οἷσπερ. G. 151, N. 2; H. A. 628.

- 18 A. 13. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, κ.τ.λ., = so also now, i. e., in my case at present, I make this request of you, a reasonable one as to me it certainly seems. For the personal form δοκῶ, instead of the impersonal δοκεῖ, see H. A. 944. The γε emphasizes the clause, not the pronoun, which therefore takes the unemphatic form μοι. Al. ὥς γ' ἐμοί. 16. αὐτὸ τοῦτο, this very thing, i. e., this single point, viz., whether I speak what is just or not. Here the demonstrative (enforced by the intensive, of which combination Plato is particularly fond) prepares the way for a clause, as it does above for the infinitive. 18. ἀρετή = the virtue, being in the predicate, omits the article in Greek, but requires it in English. G. 141, N. 8; H. A. 669. 20. δίκαιός εἰμι instead of δίκαιόν ἐστι with the acc. and inf.; another example of the personal for the impersonal construction.

B. 24. πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη explains πάλαι, which is altogether indefinite: for some time, many years now. πάλαι. The

Clouds of Aristophanes was put on the stage 27 years before the time of this trial. Cf. note 19, C, p. 46, l. 15. 26. τοὺς ἀμφὶ ἄνυτον. Anytus and his associates, sc. Meletus and Lycon. For this use of ἀμφὶ see Lexicon. Anytus is named, as being the most popular and at the same time the most hostile of the three prosecutors of Socrates. He was a man of large fortune but loose principles. He gained the favor of the people as a leader of the exiles at Phyle in the time of the Thirty Tyrants, and having taken offense at Socrates partly on personal and partly on professional grounds (cf. 23, E), induced Meletus and Lycon to join with him in a prosecution. According to Diogenes Laertius (2, 38, 39), the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. His. of Gr., vol. viii, chap. 68. Cf. Stallb. and Smith's Dic. of Biog. and Mythol., *Anytus*. 27. οἱ . . . παραλαμβάνοντες, *who taking the mass of you from your boyhood*, sc. as it were, under their instruction. 1. ὡς ἔστι, κ.τ.λ., *saying, there is one Socrates*, etc. The introductory particle appropriate to an indirect quotation is followed by a direct quotation, and must be omitted in English. σοφὸς ἀνὴρ, *a philosopher*. Compare the Latin *sapiens*. σοφός, as well as σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος, was more or less a term of reproach with the ignorant multitude. Cf. Grote, His. Gr., vol. viii, chap. 67, Eng. ed. 2. τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστής. φροντιστής governs the acc. as retaining the active force of φροντίζων. G. 158, N. 3; H. A. 713. 3. τὸν ἥττω . . . ποιῶν, *making the weaker the stronger argument*, or, as it is often expressed, *making the worse appear the better reason*. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8: docere quemadmodum caussa inferior dicendo fieri superior possit. The Sophists were open to this charge, as the physical philosophers were to that of inquiring into everything in the heavens above and in the earth beneath; and the art of the enemies of Socrates consisted in arraying against *him* the prejudices which the public mind already cherished, with greater or less reason, against *them*—in short, in confounding him with them, though he was, in fact, diametrically opposed to them both in faith and



<sup>Page</sup>  
45 in philosophy. Cf. below, 23, D: τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν.

C. 5. οἱ δεινοί as pred.; those before mentioned as *δεινοί*. G. 141, N. 8; H. A. 669, a. 6. οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν, *do not even believe in the existence of the gods*. This, it is well known, was one point in the indictment against Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. i, 1, 1; also below, 24 B. The physical philosophers of the age afforded a plausible, not to say just, occasion for this charge, since they, for the most part, dispensed with all efficient causes, and either failed to recognize the Deity, or else confounded him with his works. The systems, if not the men, were chargeable with atheism or pantheism. Cicero ascribes to Anaxagoras the first distinct recognition of the divine existence and agency, as an intelligent cause, in the universe. 7. ἔπειτα . . . ἔτι δὲ καί = *then . . . still further also*; or *in the second place . . . in the third place also*. 8. ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ. Explained by παῖδες ὄντες, κ.τ.λ. 9. ἂν . . . ἐπιστεύσατε. ἐν ᾗ, *where you would have been most likely to believe*. G. 226, 2, N. 2. 11. ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, *accusing me in my absence*. The form of expression (ἐρήμη, sc. δίκη) is derived from a suit at law, in which one of the parties does not appear. ἀτεχνῶς = *absolutely, really*, used especially by Plato and comic writers to affirm the improbable or unreasonable. See below, 18 D. 12. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, *but what is most unreasonable of all* is the fact *that*. Sometimes the ὅτι also, as well as τοῦτό ἐστιν, is omitted, thus leaving the following clause in direct apposition, as we often do in English. 13. εἰ . . . τυγχάνει ὧν implies no uncertainty: εἰ = *in case, or when*. The allusion is particularly to Aristophanes, who is named below, 19, C; though Cratinus, Ameipsias, Eupolis, and other comic poets, ridiculed Socrates. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.

D. 14. ὅσοι δέ, another more inaccessible class. φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι = *with envy and calumny*. The part. denotes means or manner, and may often be rendered *with*. See Lex. It belongs properly to διαβολῇ, and is extended to φθόνῳ by a species of zeugma. ἀνέπειθον. The impf. expresses the persistence of the persuasion and the growth of the calumny. 15. οἱ δέ introduces another class of persuaders,

as if *οἱ μὲν* had preceded with *φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι*, the one <sup>Page 48</sup> being the envious and calumnious, the other those who were really persuaded in their own minds of the guilt of Socrates. 16. *ἀπορώτατοι*, *most inaccessible* (*ἀ* and *πῶρος*), *most difficult to approach and convince*. Cf. Lysis, 223, B: *ἄποροι προσφέρεσθαι*. 17. *ἀναβιβάσασθαι . . . ἐνταυθοῖ*, *to make . . . come up hither*, i. e., summon him to appear in court. Observe the force of the middle voice: *for my benefit*, cf. *ἐξελεῖσθαι*, 19, A. *αὐτῶν* is partitive genitive = *any of them*, separated from *οὐδένα* for emphasis. 18. *ὥσπερ . . . ἀποκρινόμενον*, *to fight with shadows, as it were, in defending myself, and also to cross-examine while no one replies*. The participle and the infinitive in each part form a complex idea, and then the two parts or ideas are connected together by *τε καὶ*. Thus is the apparent confusion of participles and infinitives explained by Fischer. See his note ad loc. 20. *Ἀξιῶσθε* = *existimate, hold, or deem*; so Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum; or, as Wagner, *grant, assume*.

E. 23. *ἐκείνους*, *those*, sc. *earlier* and more remote accusers. *ἐκείνος* refers to the *more remote idea*, though, as in this instance, it be to the *latter word or clause*. 26. *Εἰεν*. *Well, be it so*. For the root and signification of this particle see Lex. Schleiermacher: *wohl*. It marks the establishment and completion of what goes before and the transition to another topic. 27. *ἐξελεῖσθαι*. Cf. note on *ἀναβιβάσασθαι*, 18, D. *τὴν διαβολὴν . . . χρόνῳ*. *The calumny* (misconception produced by calumny) *which you have entertained a long time, this to eradicate in so short a time*. *τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι*, sc. the eradication of false impressions from the minds of his judges. It is still further explained by *καὶ πλέον . . . ἀπολογούμενον*, *and to accomplish something by my defense*. On *πλέον τι ποιεῖν* = *proficere aliquid*, to get on or forward with a thing, to gain something by it; see Lexicon.

A. 2. *εἴ τι ἄμεινον*, κ.τ.λ. The sequel shows that he not <sup>Page 48</sup> only doubted whether it was best for him to be acquitted, but that he did not desire to live by any such means as were likely to influence his judges to acquit him. He makes his

<sup>Page</sup>  
48 defense rather as a matter of form in obedience to the laws, than with the expectation or desire of success.

B. 7. Ἀναλαμβάνωμεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. *Let us take up anew, from the beginning.* He has adverted to the charge in general terms before (18, B); but here he would resume its examination from the first, as if he had not before mentioned it. 8. ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολή, *the false opinion of me.* ἐμὴ = objective gen. Cf. εὐνοία τῇ σῇ, *good will to you*, Gorg. 486, A; G. 147, N. 1; H. A. 694. 9. με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. For the force of the middle voice, see G. 199, N. 3; H. A. 816, 6. For the double acc. (of the cognate signification γραφὴν, and the direct object με), see G. 159, N. 4; H. A. 725. Render: *has preferred against me this indictment.* γραφή is a public indictment for a criminal offense; δίκη is applicable either to public or private causes, but when used in contradistinction to γραφή, it denotes a private suit. 10. ὥσπερ οὖν, κ.τ.λ. *Therefore just as it is customary to read the bill of indictment presented by formal accusers, so must we read theirs.* ἀνθρωμοσία is primarily the oath of a party at law, and then the bill or form of indictment. 12. περιεργάζεται, *is over-busy, excessively curious, is a busy-body.*

C. 14. τοιαύτη τίς, *something like this.* He does not profess to give it exactly. Cf. Xen. Mem. 1, 1, 1. 15. ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ. The Clouds, perhaps the master-piece of Aristophanes, in which he introduces Socrates, as the principal character, sitting in a basket in the air, and uttering declamations as windy as his position. Very different explanations are given of the motives which induced the poet to treat the moral philosopher with such palpable injustice. Some have supposed that he was influenced by personal hostility, and further instigated and suborned by the enemies of Socrates. But this supposition does not accord either with the comparatively respectful tone in which Aristophanes elsewhere alludes to Socrates (cf. Birds, 1280, 1554; Frogs, 1487), or with the mild and even complimentary terms in which Plato speaks of Aristophanes here and elsewhere. Had Plato regarded Aristophanes as a bitter personal enemy of Socrates, or as having occasioned his master's death, he never would

have introduced the poet and the philosopher conversing on such friendly terms as in the Symposium, still less furnished for the poet's tomb such an epitaph as the following: "Jupiter, wishing to find an asylum for all the graces, found the soul of Aristophanes." Others have thought that Aristophanes really mistook the true character of Socrates, confounded his teachings with those of the Sophists, whom he opposed, and so in sober earnest visited upon his head the storm of indignation which was merited by the class, and by him as its leader and ablest representative. But, to say nothing of the want of discernment which is thus imputed to Aristophanes, the matter was not viewed in so serious a light either by Plato (as the considerations just mentioned suffice to show), or by Socrates, who, if we may credit the traditions, was present when the piece was performed, and stood forth before the audience that he might be recognized as "a host who furnished a large company an agreeable entertainment." There was enough of general resemblance between him and the Sophists in their talkative habits, the subjects on which they conversed, and the manner in which they reasoned (especially as he often met them on their own ground, and refuted them with their own weapons), to give plausibility to the representation of him as an arch-sophist. Doubtless also the ultra-conservative poet viewed the speculating and revolutionizing spirit of the Socratic philosophy with not a little of the same fear and aversion with which he regarded the demoralizing instructions of the Sophists. Moreover, Socrates stood in the most friendly relations to Alcibiades and Euripides, both of whom, as arch-innovators though in different spheres, were subjects of unsparing ridicule and reproach in the comedies of Aristophanes. So much of objective reality we may suppose lay at the basis of the representation which is made of Socrates in the Clouds. The rest is comic exaggeration and extravagance got up purposely, but not maliciously, for the amusement of the πολυγέλοι Ἀθηναῖοι. And surely never was comedian furnished with a more fruitful theme for inextinguishable laughter than the grotesque person, outlandish dress, and singular gait of Socrates, with which friend and foe, Athenian and stranger, all had become

Page  
46

familiar as he stood and stared, or started and ran through the streets, or fascinated some and bored and vexed others in the shops and the market-places. The intent of the piece and its author may have been misunderstood by some, and it may have had some effect in preparing the way for the prosecution, which it suggests. But it is referred to in the Apology as an illustration of popular prejudices of long standing, rather than as a cause of the present indictment. And the utter failure of the Clouds to make any serious impression on the popular mind against Socrates is seen, not only in its want of success at the time (for it gained no favor and won no prize), but also in the fact that a period of twenty-four years intervened between its exhibition and the condemnation of the Moral Philosopher. Cf. Stallb. ad loc.; Smith's Dic. of Biog. 16. περιφερόμενον, sc. in a basket (κρεμάθρα), cf. the Clouds, 225 seqq. 17. ἀεροβατεῖν. When asked what he is doing, Socrates replies in the play: ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον. 18. ὧν . . . πέρι ἐπαῖω. Observe the anastrophe and the position of πέρι, as in English: which I know nothing *about*. Socrates, as represented in the Phædo, suggests that he had in early life been a student of physics, 96 A. Xenophon quotes him as disparaging such studies, Mem. i, 1, 11. 19. λέγω, sc. the foregoing = *I say this*. ἀτιμάζων governs ἐπιστήμην. The Socratic irony is manifest in this clause, and in the following, which is parenthetical: *let me not, by any means, be prosecuted by Meletus on so weighty a charge!* sc. as undervaluing this kind of knowledge.

D. 22. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, κ.τ.λ. *But I must speak, for, etc.* 23. αὐτοὺς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς. *The greater part of yourselves.* 24. διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, hysteron proteron. With φράζειν, ἀλλήλοις is to be supplied from the accusative. 28. ἐκ τούτων, ΑΙ. τούτου. The Greeks very often employ the plural of the demonstrative in reference to a foregoing clause or single idea, where we should use the singular. Render: *from this*.

Page  
47

H. A. 685. 1. περὶ ἐμοῦ is placed before δ for emphasis = *which the many say about me*. 8. τούτων, the charges in the foregoing context—inquiring into things above, making the

worse the better reason, etc. οὐδέ γ' εἰ, κ.τ.λ. We should <sup>Page 47</sup> expect οὕτε answering to the οὕτε in the previous clause, but οὐδέ γε is more emphatic and therefore more appropriate to introduce a new topic of special importance. It is made still more emphatic by being repeated before τοῦτο ἀληθές. 5. χρήματα πράττομαι. This charge also confounded Socrates with the Sophists, who amassed large sums of money for tuition. It is denied by Xenophon, Mem. I, 2, 60.

E. 5. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. The Attics use ἐπεὶ often like γάρ = *for*; and sometimes, like *quum* in Latin, it may be well rendered *although*. Socrates treats this charge, just as he did the other, ironically, representing it as a very beautiful and honorable thing, if one were only wise and capable of doing it; and yet he feels constrained to deny it simply because it is not true. 7. Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος, κ.τ.λ. He enumerates several of the most popular Sophists and rhetoricians who had enriched themselves by teaching the sons of the wealthy at Athens. They were all foreigners. For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laer, 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. I, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. For Prodicus of Ceos, one of the Cyclades Islands, cf. Cic. Brut. 8; Xen. Mem. II, 1, 21 seqq.; Plat. Protag. and Cratyl. For Hippias of Elis, a city of the Peloponnesus, cf. Cic. de Orat. 32, Brut. 8; Plat. Hip. and Minos. See also Smith's Dic. Biog. and Mythol., and Grote's His. Gr., vol. viii, chap. 67. Grote defends the Sophists as a class with great learning and eloquence. Doubtless they have been condemned too much in the gross—with too indiscriminate severity. But they belonged to an age which was losing its faith, and had the misfortune to be the recognized teachers of the people, with no instruction to offer which could reach the real difficulty. So, though there were doubtless wise and good men among them, it was not unnatural that they were charged with exerting an influence hostile to morals and religion, nor that they received the censure which Plato everywhere attaches to them. 10. τοὺς νέους would regularly be the object of πείθειν, depending on οἷός τ' ἐστίν, instead of which, however, by a singular anacoluthon, we have πείθουσι. H. A. 1063. It should be ob-

Page 47 served, that Plato abounds in such irregular constructions and unexpected changes, doubtless to keep up the appearance of a colloquial style appropriate to the dialogue, and which is no less appropriate to the plain talk which Socrates promises to hold with his judges in this Apology. The plural verb with *ἕκαστος* is not unnatural. H. A. 609, a. *πολιτῶν* is partitive genitive after *ᾤ*: *who have the opportunity to associate gratuitously with whomsoever they please of their fellow-citizens*. 18. *προσείδεναι*: *and besides (paying them money) to feel under obligation to them*.

A. *ἐπεὶ* introduces an illustration = *γάρ*, *for*, cf. note, 20 19, E. Schleiermacher renders it by the German *ja*. 14. *ὦν . . . ἐπιδημοῦντα*, *of whose sojourning here I lately became aware*. The reference is to Evenus, the poet and Sophist, as appears below, B. He was a native of the island Paros. He is mentioned in the *Phædo*, 60, D, and *Phædrus*, 267, A. Callias, the son of Hipponicus, who informed Socrates of Evenus' stay in the city, was proverbially rich (*ὁ πλούσιος*, Plutarch), and his lavish expenditure upon the Sophists is often referred to. He in fact utterly squandered his vast property and died in poverty. *Protag.* 314, B, C; *Xen. Symp.* 1, 5; *Aristoph. Birds*, 285. See also Boeckh's *Pub. Econ. Athens*, vol. ii, p. 242. 20. *ἐμμελεῖν* is assimilated to the tense on which it depends, the thought being still under the influence of the unfulfilled condition. H. A. 919, b.

B. 21. *ἀρετήν*. Acc. of specification, or more accurately a cognate acc. with the adjective: *in the virtue* (or excellence) *becoming* them. So, in a similar illustration, Xenophon makes Socrates use the word *δίκαιος* of a horse and an ox, that is obedient to his proper law and trained for his appropriate work. Socrates used such illustrations, drawn from the lower animals and the common affairs of life, till they were threadbare and almost offensive, at least to those who could not but feel their force as directed against themselves. The "Great Teacher" abounded in this method of instruction. 22. *ἦν δ' ἀνὸςτος*. *And this (overseer) would be*, etc. 24. *τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς*, *that which is appropriate to man and also to*

*the state.* 1. πέντε μνῶν = some \$83. This was a small sum in Page  
48 comparison with the tuition fees which Protagoras, Gorgias, and some others exacted, who received 100 minæ. With the Greek μνᾶ compare the Latin *mina* and our word *money*. 2. ἐμακάρισα: the aor. is used to express the momentary action as having just taken place, or perhaps it would be better to say, without reference to time. It is so employed especially in the vividness of the drama. M. and T., 19, N. 5; H. A. 842.

C. 8. ἐμμελῶς, according to Stallbaum, has a double application to the *style* of teaching and to the *price* of tuition = *so properly* (literally, *in tune*), *so excellently* in both respects. He says, there is great urbanity in the expression. If Socrates had said, οὕτως εὐτελῶς, he would have too clearly ridiculed Evenus and so Callias. He used, therefore, a word by which, while he seemed to praise Evenus, he yet severely censured both his levity and the avarice of the other Sophists. It is used of a moderate or reasonable price in the Laws, 776, B, 760, A. 5. ἀλλ' οὐ γάρ, κ.τ.λ. The ellipsis is obvious: *but I can not thus pride myself, for, etc.* γάρ in such connection may be rendered *really, certainly: but I really do not know*. Cf. H. A. 1050, d. 6. ὑπολάβου. Compare our *take up*. 7. τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα, *your business, what is it?* The emphasis is on *your*: you deny any acquaintance with the profession of the naturalist who inquires into the secrets of the universe, or of the Sophist who teaches, and is well paid for teaching, the art of persuasion; what then, Socrates, is *your* business, profession, or pursuit? 9. οὐδὲν περὶ τούτου, *nothing more or other, nihil aliud*. Stallbaum renders: *nihil curiosius*. ἔπειτα, *then, in that case, I suppose so much talk and discussion would not have arisen, as have arisen*. γέγονεν stands where ἂν ἐγένετο would regularly have been used, to denote that this bruit has actually arisen. Oron suggests that the conditional idea can not be contained in σοῦ . . . πραγματευομένου, for we should not then have οὐδὲν. He translates: *It is inconceivable that such a report should have arisen about you alone who are no more busy than others*.

D. 18. τί ποτ', *quid tandem*. In questions, ποτέ, like



<sup>Page</sup>  
48 *tandem*, indicates surprise, wonder, impatience, or some other lively emotion. It is here retained in the indirect question, just as it would have been used in the direct, as expressive of the wonder of the inquirer. 14. τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν, *both the name*, sc. of a wise man, *and the calumny* connected with it. 16. εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, κ.τ.λ. *Be assured, however, I will tell you the whole truth*. Observe the omission of ὅτι. So in Crit. 54, D, ἀλλὰ ἴσθι, ὅσα γε, κ.τ.λ., and elsewhere after εὖ ἴστε. 17. ἀλλ' ἦ. H. A. 1046, 2 c; cf. also Jelf, 773, ob. 1. 18. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην, *pray what sort of wisdom this*. Cf. Laches, 194 D. Σω. Καί μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν. Λα. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν; the clause takes the construction of σοφίαν in the preceding (acc. after διὰ). The omission of the preposition is especially frequent in questions and answers, and serves to give a more familiar form to the dialogue. This effect is illustrated by the fact that the usage belongs to comedy but not to tragedy; cf. Jelf, 650, 5. 19. ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως, κ.τ.λ. *Just that, perhaps, which is*, etc. 20. τῷ ὄντι, *in reality*. ταύτην, *in this*, acc. of specification. So σοφίαν in the next clause.

E. 21. ἡ κατ' ἀνθρώπου, *than pertains to man, quam pro homine*, H. A. 646. 22. ἡ οὐκ ἔχω, τί λέγω, *or else I know not what to call it*—certainly it is not human wisdom—it is not any such wisdom as I possess. The irony of the passage is evident. λέγω is subjunctive. 24. ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ, *for the sake of calumniating me*. For the sense of ἐπὶ, cf. H. A. 799, 2, c; also Jelf, 634, 3, a. For τῇ ἐμῇ, instead of the objective gen., ἐμοῦ, cf. note, 19, A. 25. μὴ θορυβήσητε. *Do not raise a tumult against me*, or, as a speaker would say to a modern assembly, *do not hiss me = ne obstrepatis*. The reader will remember the popular constitution of the court, cf. note, 17, A. For the aor. subj. in prohibitions with μὴ and its compounds, cf. G. 254; H. A. 874. μὴδ' ἄν, *not even if*. μέγα λέγειν, properly denotes *boasting*, as μέγα φρονεῖν does *pride*. In the later Greek, it meant to *say something marvellous*. But it was the seeming *pride* and *arrogance* of what he said, which, he feared, would give offense, and which did actually give offense to the judges. Cf. Xen. Apol.

Soc. as cited below, 21, A; also Xen. Apol. Soc. 1, where he speaks of the *μεγαληγορία*, which all the Apologies ascribe to Socrates in his defense. 27. *ἀξιόχρεων*, *responsible*, primarily in regard to money, secondarily in regard to testimony. Cf. 38, B. *τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τίς ἐστι σοφία καὶ οἷα, for of my wisdom, whether now I have any, and of what sort it is, etc.* By a somewhat peculiar attraction, *σοφία* is drawn from the principal into the subordinate clause.

Page  
49

A. 2. *ἐμός ἐραῖπος*. Hence often attacked by Aristophanes in the Clouds and elsewhere. *τῷ πλήθει*. It is to be remembered that the word was used with frequent application to the Athenian democracy. 3. *ξυνέφυγε . . . κατῆλθε, he went with you in your recent exile and with you returned.* The allusion is to the exile of the principal men of the Athenian democracy under the Thirty Tyrants, which having taken place quite recently, is called *τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην*. This allusion was calculated to recommend Chærephon to popular favor. 5. *ὡς σφοδρός*. Cf. Aristoph. Clouds, 104, 503, seq., Birds, 1570; Xen. Mem. II, 3; Plat. Gorg., Charm., etc., pass. 6. *καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, and, I repeat it, do not be raising a tumult.* It will be observed, that the aor. subj. is used in the first request (*μὴ θορυβήσητε* above), but in the repetition the pres. imp. The former is a general request *not to do it at all*; the latter is more definite, and means: *don't be doing it, as you are doing and will be very liable to do while I proceed*, especially with this to you most surprising and perhaps offensive part of my narrative. G. 202, 1; H. A. 874, a. The Apology, which bears the name of Xenophon, declares expressly, that this part of Socrates' Defense did call forth repeated expressions of displeasure from the judges. Xen. Apol. Soc. 15. 7. *ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ*. The Greeks use the particles, *γάρ, δὴ, οὖν*, in resuming a sentence after a parenthesis, where we use *I say*. 8. *ἀνείλεν, responded*, literally, *took up*, sc. her response. This famous response is worded differently in different authorities. Cf. Xen. Apol. Soc. 14; Diog. Laert. 2, 37; Schol. Aristoph. Clouds, 144. 9. *ὁ ἀδελφός*, sc. Chærecrates, Xen. Mem. II, 3. 10. *οὔτοσὶ . . . ἐκείνος*. Cf. note, 18, E.

Page  
49

B. 18. *τί ποτε, what in the world.* Cf. note, 20, D. 15. *ξύνουδα ἐμαντῷ σοφὸς ὦν.* After *ξύνουδα, συγγινώσκω*, etc., the participle expresses *that of which one is conscious*, and may either agree with the subject of the verb in the *nom.* or with the reflexive which follows the verb and refers to the same person, in the *dative*. Here we have the former construction; below, 22, D, we have the other: *ἐμαντῷ ξυνήδειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ.* G. 280, N. 2; H. A. 982, a. *μέγα* and *σμικρόν* are adverbial accusatives. H. A. 719, b. 15. *τί οὖν ποτε λέγει, what in the world then, I say, does he mean?* *οὖν* is resumptive like *γάρ*, above, 21, A; and *λέγει* is best rendered, as it often is, by the English *mean*. Below the same form of expression follows *ἠπόρουν*, instead of the *oratio obliqua*, *ὁ τι . . . λέγει.* G. 247; H. A. 932. 18. *ἔπειτα . . . ἐτραπόμην, but at length, with much labor, I betook myself to an examination of it* (sc. the oracle or the meaning of the god, *τί ποτε λέγει*) *somewhat as follows.* *τοιούτος* usually refers to the foregoing, *τοιόσδε* to the following (cf. note, 37, A), but not always. G. 148, N. 1; H. A. 696. Cf. *τοιαύτη τις*, 19, C, and note, *ibid.* 19. *ἦλθον* stands without a connective, because this clause is in *apposition* as it were with the preceding, being a fuller and more exact statement of the examination there mentioned. Cf. 17, D, and note, *ibid.* The reader will observe that such clauses or sentences are *asyndetic*; while, with the exception of such, each clause and sentence of connected discourse in Greek usually begins with some connective particle, *δέ, καί, γάρ, οὖν*, etc. Cf. H. A. 1039.

C. 20. *ὥς . . . ἐλέγξων, supposing, that there, if anywhere, I should confute*, etc. G. 277, N. 2; H. A. 978. 22. *ὅτι οὐ τοσῷ.* Cf. note on *ὥς ἔστι*, 18, B. *σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα, but you* (sc. the oracle) *said I* (sc. was wiser). 24. *πρὸς ὃν . . . ἔπαθον, in looking to whom I met with such an experience.* 25. *καὶ διαλεγόμενος.* *Καὶ* connects *διαλεγόμενος* to *διασκοπῶν* (the intervening clause being parenthetical), and the participle, belonging to the principal subject of the discourse (Socrates), is in the nominative, though, to agree with what follows, it should be in the dative with *μοι*. It is a species of *anacoluthon*. H. A. 1063.

D. 1. ἐντεῦθεν is both temporal and causal = *from that time and for that reason*. 8. πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν . . . ἐλογιζόμεν, *I reasoned with myself*. τοῦτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. μὲν = μήν, indeed. H. A. 1037, 12. The μὲν after κινδυνεύει is correlative to ἀλλ', after which follows again the more usual correlation οὗτος μὲν . . . ἐγὼ δέ. After ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὕτως is understood. 7. οὖν denotes not an inference but a correspondence with what he has before said of the ignorance of himself and others: *while I, just as in fact, and as I have already said, I do not know, so I do not even suppose that I know*. 8. σμικρῶ τινι denotes the *degree*, and αὐτῶ τοῦτῳ the *respect* in which he is wiser. αὐτῶ = alone, see Lex. i, 3. G. 188, 2; 188, 1, N. 1; H. A. 781, 780; cf. 18, A. The difference between μή and οὐδέ, the contingent and the absolute negative, is well illustrated in the clause ἀ μή οἶδα, κ.τ.λ.: *what I chance not to know, I do not even suppose that I know*.

E. 14. ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμεν. Observe the imp. here and the aor. above. These words connect with each of the preceding participles, but in the different relations of the *fact* and the *cause*—with αἰσθανόμενος, ὅτι would strictly require to be rendered *that*; with λυπούμενος and δεδιώς, *because*. 15. τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. G. 141, N. 4; H. A. 621, b. 16. ἵτεον οὖν σκοποῦντι. Socrates here passes suddenly from the indirect to the direct narration, and gives us the *very language* of his heart at the *time* when he made this examination: *I must go then* (thought I), *in investigating the oracle what it means, to all, etc.* σκοποῦντι agrees with μοι implied as the dative of the agent after ἵτεον. For χρησμών, put as the object of σκοποῦντι instead of the subject of λέγει, see H. A. 878.

A. 18. νῆ τὸν κύνα. A very common oath in the mouth of Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 460, B; 482, B, and Prof. Woolsey's notes, *ibid.* In the last cited passage, Socrates adds: τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, which is probably to be regarded as a humorous addition. See Mitchell's note, D, App. to Aristoph. Wasps. Fischer, followed by Stallbaum, Cousin, etc., refers the origin of such oaths to Rhadamanthus, who is said, in order to avoid swearing always by the gods, to have invented several other formulæ as substitutes, such as by the dog, by

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50 the oak, by the goose, etc. In Xenophon, as well as Plato, Socrates is represented as swearing (somewhat singularly) by Juno, *infra*, 24, E; Gorg. 449, D; Hip. Maj. 291, 9; Xen. Mem. I, 5, 5; III, 10, 9; IV, 2, 9, et al. 20. οἱ μὲν μάλιστα, κ.τ.λ. An explanatory clause, hence without a connective. Cf. notes, 17, D; 21, B. 20. ὀλίγου δεῖν. Cf. note 17, A. 21. τοῦ πλείστου is governed by ἐνδεεῖς. The reader will observe the juxtaposition of the two contrasted words, φαυλότεροι and ἐπικεικότεροι. 24. πλάνην, *wandering*, sc. to visit and examine the reputed wise men. πονοῦντος agrees with μου implied in ἐμῇ. πόνους alludes to labors like those of Hercules. 25. ἵνα . . . γένοιτο: *that after all the oracle might in the end prove irrefutable*, i. e., in addition to all his labors, also (καί) to bring about a *result* the opposite of what he set out to accomplish, which was to show that the oracle must be false. Such seems to be the true interpretation of this much disputed passage. Cf. Fischer's Defense of Platonic Passages against the Amendments of Stephens; also the notes of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum *ad loc.* The opt. is used in γένοιτο because πονοῦντος is imperfect in sense. G. 204, N. 1; H. A. 856, a.

B. 28. ὥς . . . καταληψόμενος. Cf. note 21, C. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος contains an allusion to the *detection* of a criminal *in the very act*. 2. μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι: *to have been most carefully composed*. 3. διερώτων ἄν. The imperfect with ἄν denotes repetition according to the circumstances in each case: *I would ask them in each instance, what they meant to say*. G. 206; H. A. 835. So below, ἄν βέλτιον ἔλεγον: *almost all who were present would speak better* (i. e., give a better account) *than they* (the poets) *of the poems which they themselves had composed*.

<sup>Page</sup>  
51 C. 8. οὐ σοφία, κ.τ.λ. So in Ion 533, E, Socrates says, that poets and musicians, like prophets and soothsayers, compose their productions, not by *art*, but by an inspiration which displaces *reason*. The fundamental difference between real *science* or *art*, as based on established rules and understood reasons, and mere unintelligent knack, or unconscious instinct or inspiration, is an idea, on which Socrates often and

earnestly insists. Cf. Gorgias pass.; Grote's *His. Gr.*, vol. <sup>Page</sup> viii, chap. lxviii. 14. οἰομένων. G. 280; H. A. 982. εἶναι ἀνθρώπων. G. 136, N. 3; H. A. 941. αἷ, like its antecedent τᾶλλα, is acc. of specification, and σοφώτατοι is understood in the predicate after ἦσαν: *in which they were not*, sc. the wisest. 15. τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι: *supposing that I surpassed them in the same respect in which I surpassed also the politicians*. Cf. 21, D. 17. τελευτῶν, *lastly*. H. A. 968, a.

D. 18. ἐμαντῷ . . . ἐπισταμένῳ. Cf. note, 21, B. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. Cf. note, 17, A. 20. τούτου: *in this*. G. 171, 1; H. A. 748. 24. δημιουργοί is subject of ἔδοξαν. Besides its emphatic position, it is also made emphatic by καί, which is likewise repeated before the other subject of comparison οἱ ποιηταί, where it is superfluous in English, though very often so used in Greek. See above, C: καὶ ἐντεῦθεν . . . ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. Cf. also Gorg. 479, B: κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὑμῖν ὁμολογούμενων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες. 25. τᾶλλα τὰ μέγιστα, e. g., the administration of the government, to which Socrates particularly refers. 27. ἀνερωτᾶν, to ask *again*, as in the case of the poets and the politicians. ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: *nomine oraculi*. Stallb.

E. 28. δεξαίμην, in the sense of *prefer*, is very frequent in Plato. Cf. Gorg. 468, E; 471, C, et passim. 2. ἀμφότερα <sup>Page</sup> 53 is neuter, though it refers to the feminine nouns σοφίαν and ἀμαθίαν = *both the things*. G. 138, N. 2, a; H. A. 615 (2).

A. 8. σοφὸς εἶναι explains ὄνομα τοῦτο = *called this name*, 28 sc. *to be wise*. *To be* is superfluous in English, but εἶναι often follows verbs of calling. Cf. Protagoras, 311, E: σοφιστὴν ὀνομάζουσι τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι. σοφός is nom. instead of acc., because, in the mind of the speaker, *himself* is the main subject of the sentence, as having become odious—as if he had said ἀπεχθὲς γέγονα instead of ἀπέχθειά μοι γεγόνاسι. On the popular prejudice against this name, see note 18, B, and Grote as there cited. 10. ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω: *in which I may chance to confute another*, or *in whatsoever I may confute another*. G. 233; H. A. 913. τὸ δέ: *but as to the matter of fact*. It is strengthened by τῷ ὄντι = *in reality*. The fuller

formula, τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, is often used in the same way. 11. κινδυνεύει: *seems likely*, lit., runs the risk, has a chance. The use of this verb with this signification is especially common in Plato. It was suited to express his view of the uncertainty, or the probability only of all human knowledge. 13. ὀλίγου τινός . . . καὶ οὐδένος: *a little and indeed nothing*. So often μικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν = little or nothing. So *atque* in Latin sometimes adds a clause, which corrects, and at the same time increases the force of, the foregoing. For the force of τινός, cf. ἢ τι ἢ οὐδέν, 17, B, and note *ibid.* καὶ φαίνεται . . . Σωκράτης: *and he appears to mean this of Socrates*, so. that human wisdom is of no account. For two acc. after a verb of *saying*, cf. G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 14. προσκεχρήσθαι: made use of my name *besides*, i. e., *incidentally*, for another purpose. 15. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἶποι: *as if he would say*. There is an ellipsis of ποιοῖτο or some such verb, constituting an implied apodosis, with which the ἂν belongs. Cf. note, 17, D, ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν. ἂν not infrequently leaves its verb to be supplied from the connection. So especially with ὥσπερ ἂν, also with πῶς γὰρ ἂν, and similar phrases.

B. 19. κατὰ τὸν θεόν: according to the god, i. e., in accordance with his oracle, or out of regard to his authority. So in Rom. viii, 27, and elsewhere in the New Testament. καὶ τῶν ἀστών καὶ τῶν ξένων, κ.τ.λ.: *both of the citizens and of the foreigners if I suppose any to be wise*. Partitive gen. after τινά. 22. τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως. Socrates apologizes elsewhere in Plato (e. g., below, 31, 32) and in Xenophon (e. g., Mem. I, 6, 15) for not participating in the affairs of the state. His was a higher mission, viz., to educate the individual citizens. 24. πενία μυρία: *the greatest poverty*. μυρία, *Riddell* compares *Legg.* 677, c, μυρίαν τινὰ φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν. πενία = paupertas, poverty; πτωχεία = egestas, destitution. The former is the usual condition of the poorer and laboring classes; the latter, of mendicants. As to the pecuniary circumstances of Socrates, cf. Xen. Econ. 2, 3, where it appears he was commonly called πένης, and where it is said his house and all his property were worth five minæ; cf. also 38, B.

C. 27. οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων. For omission of substantive,

see G. 141, N. 4; H. A. 621, c. This is no unimportant circumstance to show how the prejudices and passions of the *multitude* were awakened against him. 27. αὐτόματοι. Socrates, as not being a professional teacher, will not be responsible for his associates, who are entirely free. 1. εἶτα instead of καὶ <sup>Page 52</sup> εἶτα, as we often use *then* for *and then* between two verbs. 5. ἀλλ' οὐχ αὐτοῖς, *but not with themselves*, as they might well be angry with themselves for their own ignorance, instead of being angry with him who exposed it. Al. αὐτοῖς, sc. the young men, but this would require ἐκείνοις. <sup>Page 53</sup>

D. 9. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, κ.τ.λ. Cf. notes, 18, B. 10. ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα, κ.τ.λ., sc. διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους διδάσκων; *that he corrupts the young by teaching things in heaven and things under the earth, and not to believe in the gods, etc.*

E. 18. ἐκ τούτων, *as the outcome of these*. Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν. Al. Μέλitos. This man is ridiculed by Aristophanes as well as Plato for his person, his character, and his bad *tragic poetry*. We learn from the Euthyphron (2, B, C), that his share in the prosecution of Socrates was to bring the indictment before the Archon Basileus, at which time he is described as still young and obscure, but vain and conceited. Besides his professional resentment in common with his brother poets, he had a personal grudge against Socrates for having refused to participate in, and severely animadverted upon, the arrest and "rendition" of Leon of Salamis by Meletus and three others at the command of the Thirty Tyrants. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 8; Andoc. De Myster. 20. ἄντρος ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν. He was a leather-dresser, and, besides sharing with other "*mechanics*" in the resentment provoked by Socrates' exposure of their ignorance as above described, he had, very likely, taken offense at his constant reference to shoemakers and other mechanics in the familiar illustration of his sentiments. He was also a popular demagogue, and had received the highest honors of the Athenian democracy. Hence in the text, ὑπὲρ τῶν πολιτικῶν. See note, 18, B. In Plato's Men. (91, A-C), we find him warning Socrates against a too free use of his tongue, lest he



Page  
53

should get himself into trouble. 21. *Λύκων ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων*. Lycon was an orator and demagogue, probably the same who is held up as a drunken brawler by Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1301. It was his part to prepare the accusation against Socrates. On all these accusers, see further in Stallbaum ad loc., and Smith's *Dict. Ant.*

- 24 A. 21. *ἀρχόμενος*. G. 277, 1; H. A. 968, a. 24. *ταῦτ' ἔστιν ὑμῖν . . . τᾶληθῇ*. *This is the truth for you*, sc. which I promised to tell you, cf. 17, B. 27. *τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι*. I incur hatred *by the same*, sc. *τᾶληθῇ*. On the sentiments of this and the following clause, cf. John, viii, 46, v. 43; Gal. iv, 16.

Page  
54

B. 5. *τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν*. These epithets are applied in accordance with polite usage, and yet not without irony. *φιλόπολις* differs from *φιλόπατρις*, according to Stallb., as *friend of Athens* from *friend of Greece*. 7. *αὐθις γὰρ δὴ . . . λάβωμεν αὐτὸν*: *for now again let us take up on the other hand*. The language implies some formality and gravity in the examination of this, as also of the former accusation. *ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγορῶν*: *inasmuch as these are different accusers*, i. e., another class, a *second*, in contradistinction to the *first*, whom he has just disposed of. 8. *ἀνθρωμοσίαν*. Cf. note, 19, B. 9. *πὺς ὁδε*, *nearly as follows*. Cf. *τοιαύτη τίς*, 19, C, and note *ibid.* The order of the points in the indictment is inverted, as it is given by Xenophon, *Mem.* i, 1, 1. Diogenes Laertius gives it on the authority of Phavorinus, as still existing in due form in the second century, in these words: "Socrates is guilty in not recognizing the gods that the state recognizes, but introducing other new divinities; and he is guilty also of corrupting the youth. Penalty, death." *φησὶν*, sc. Meletus. 11. *δαμόνια*, not = *δαίμονες*, divinities, but divine things, or things pertaining to gods.

C. 14. *ἐγὼ δὲ γε*, *but I for my part*. The *γε* is omitted in the earlier editions, but inserted by Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, etc., on the authority of the best MSS. 15. *σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται*, *serio ludit*; literally, *jokes in earnest*. It is an example of the figure called *oxymoron*. It is explained by the following participial clauses. Meletus seemed as if he must

be merely *joking, playing a part*, when he *pretended to feel* <sup>Page 84</sup>  
*so much concern about matters* (such as the education of the youth and the worship of the gods) *on which he never had bestowed an anxious thought*; and yet he made a *serious business* of it when he *rashly* (ῥαδίως) *brought men to trial* (εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους). 17. ὦν τούτῳ ἐμέλησεν. G. 184, N. 1.

D. 20. δεῦρο, *hither*, ἄγε being understood, or instead of ἔρχου. The law allowed the parties in a suit to *question* each other, and obliged the party questioned to answer. Cf. below, note, 25, D. Few probably ever turned the law to so good account, as Socrates knew how to do by his method of question and answer. ἄλλο τι ἤ. This formula, frequently with ἤ omitted, is often used, especially in Plato's Dialogues, simply to ask a question, implying an affirmative answer, like οὐκοῦν, or *nonne*, only with perhaps still stronger affirmative implication. G. 282, 3; H. A. 1015, b. Render: *do you not*, etc. 21. ὅπως . . . ἔσονται. ὅπως, with the fut. ind., emphasizes the *future fact*; with the aor. subj. the *present purpose*. The former = *how they shall be*; the latter = *how they may be*. Render: *Do you not make it a question of much importance how the young shall be of the best character possible?* G. 217; H. A. 885; M. and T. 45. 23. μέλον γέ σοι, *especially* (γε) *since it so concerns you*, or even more vague, *since you are so careful*. The participle is used in acc. absolute, with its subject the suggested thought of the previous clause. G. 278, 2; H. A. 973, a. 24. τὸν μὲν . . . διαφθείροντα, *the one who is corrupting them*. It is in emphatic contrast to τὸν δὲ ποιοῦντα, which is also made emphatic by prolepsis. H. A. 878. ἐμέ is appositive and explanatory of τὸν διαφθείροντα, and together with that is the object both of ἐϋρὼν and εἰσάγεις. εἰσάγεις, literally, *bring in*, sc. to court, cf. 29, A: εἰσάγοι . . . εἰς δικαστήριον. Here, however, it is followed by a *dative* of the *persons, before whom* he is brought, sc. the judges (τουτοῖσι). Either the magistrate or the prosecutor might be said εἰσάγειν, though more properly the former. It may usually be rendered *impeach*, or *prosecute*.

E. 4. οὗτοι, κ.τ.λ., *these the judges*. 8. νῆ τὴν Ἑραν. <sup>Page 85</sup>  
 Cf. note, 22, A. 9. ἀκροαταί. The spectators, at trials of

<sup>Page</sup>  
55 any interest before the Heliaeae, were very numerous, thus bringing that court still more under popular influence.

25 A. 10. οἱ βουλευταί. The members of the βουλή, or senate, of which there were two, the Senate of the Areopagus and the Senate of Five Hundred. Both kinds of *senators* are perhaps here intended. 11. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, κ.τ.λ. *But then, Meletus, do those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young?* The μή implies a negative answer, and here suggests some fear or anxiety, lest it may be so. ἄρα (not ἄρα) is used as suggesting that this is the only class left. 17. ἐμοῦ. G. 173, 2, N.; H. A. 752. The κατά in comp. gives disadvantageous or hostile sense to the verb.

B. 18. οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς, sc. δοκοῦσι, supplied from the preceding clause, of which this is explanatory, and therefore without a connective. 20. τοῦναντίον τούτου πᾶν. τοῦναντίον is to be taken as an appositive of the previous sentence, or a resumption of its thought, independent of construction. It may be considered as either nom. or acc. G. 137, N. 3; H. A. 626, b. 24. πάντως δῆπου, *altogether so no doubt, whether you and Anytus deny it or not.* οὐ, instead of μή, follows the conditional particle (ἐάν), because it unites with φῆτε to convey one idea, οὐ φῆτε = *deny*. 27. εἰ . . . διαφθείρει. The use of the ind. pres. implies a kind of ironical assent to the truth of the supposition: *if* (really, as you affirm) *only one corrupts them*. G. 227, 1; H. A. 901, b. οἱ ἄλλοι, *the rest, all others*.

C. 27. ἀλλὰ γάρ, *but it is not so, for; or but really*, cf. note, 20, C. 28. ὦ Μέλητε . . . ἀμέλειαν . . . μεμέληκε. A play upon the name: *Careful One*, you show your *want of care*,  
<sup>Page</sup>  
56 that you have *never cared*, etc. 3. εἰσάγεις, cf. note, 24, D. 4. ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε. The πρὸς Διὸς seems to be placed between ὦ and Μέλητε to carry out the play on the name in the foregoing sentence: *Thou before Zeus, Careful One*. Notice, however, Mem. 71, D: ὦ πρὸς θεῶν Μένων. Cases are more numerous where we have ὦ πρὸς Διὸς with the voc. omitted. 7. τοὺς ἀεὶ . . . ὄντας. ἀεὶ, preceded by the art. and followed by a part. means, *in every case*, i. e., *in every instance*, in which the supposition holds.

D. 11. ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The very words of Page 56  
the law are cited by Demosthenes in his Second Oration  
against Stephanus: Νόμος. Τοῖν ἀντιδίκων ἐπ'ἀνάγκης εἶναι  
ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή. 16.  
τηλικούτου, *at my time of life*, sc. so old, i. e., 70, cf. 17, D.  
τηλικόσδε, *at your time of time*, sc. so young, cf. note, 23, E.  
The words both mean the same, viz., either *so old* or *so young*,  
according to the connection.

E. 22. ταῦτα, the active of πείθω takes two accusatives,  
and one is retained with pass. H. A. 724. 23. οἶμαι . . .  
οὐδένα, sc. πείσεσθαι σοι. So in the next clause, there is an  
ellipsis of διαφθείρω with ἄκων, and still further on of ποιῶν  
with παύσομαι. Throughout this passage Socrates manifestly  
takes the ground that virtue is coextensive with knowledge.  
It is impossible for any man to injure others without injur-  
ing himself; and no man who really *knows* this, will wrong  
another any sooner than he would injure himself, which no  
one ever does intentionally. Such is his argument here. So  
in Xen. Mem. III, 9, 5, he reasons, that no man who *knows*  
temperance, justice, and moral excellence, would prefer any-  
thing else to these virtues. These virtues, therefore, are all  
resolvable into knowledge or wisdom. Every man *does* what  
seems to him best, and if he *knows* what is best, he will *do* it,  
and therefore do right. See also Xen. Mem. IV, 2, 20; Arist.  
Ethic. Eudem. 1, 5; Protag. 345; Gorg. 460; and Prof.  
Woolsey's remarks upon it in his Introduction.

B. 9. ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, sc. με φῆς διαφθείρειν Page 57  
τοὺς νεωτέρους, repeated from above. 11. οὐ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ.  
ταῦτα is the obj. of διδάσκων placed where it is for emphasis.  
13. ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, *of whom our discussion now is*. ὧν  
is objective genitive, = οὓς λέγομεν.

O. 16. Καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα, and I myself accordingly. 18. οὐ  
μέντοι, κ.τ.λ., not however the same as the city indeed recog-  
nizes, but others, and this is what you accuse me of, that (I  
teach them to believe that there are) others; or do you say  
that I both do not believe in any gods at all myself, and that  
I teach others this doctrine. Observe the correlation of οὔτε  
—τε, in the last member of this somewhat complicated and

<sup>Page</sup>  
<sup>57</sup> irregular sentence. *θεοὺς* usually omits the article after *νομί-  
ζειν, ἡγείσθαι*, etc., = believe in gods.

D. 22. *ἵνα τι*, with verb omitted, cf. Lex.; also H. A. 612. The idiom was, however, so established that a Greek would probably be unconscious of the ellipsis. 23. *οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ*, not simply correlative, like *οὔτε . . . οὔτε* = *neither . . . nor*, but emphatic = *not even . . . nor yet*. Cf. note, 18, C. The language implies that it was quite incredible that Socrates should not believe even in gods so universally recognized as the sun and the moon. For the omission of the article with *ἥλιον* and *σελήνην*, cf. H. A. 668. 24. *Μὰ Δί*, sc. *οὐ νομίζει*, which is understood from the foregoing question. *Μά* is not of itself negative; hence it may be used with either *ναί* or *οὐ*; but when preceded by neither of these particles, a negative clause precedes or follows, or it is clear from the context and from an accompanying adversative particle, that the sentence is to be understood as negative. Cf. G. 163; H. A. 723; see also Lex. 26. *Ἀναξαγόρου*. Anaxagoras of Clazomene taught (according to Diog. Laert. II, 8) that the sun was a mass of hot *iron*, as some understand it, or *stone*, as Socrates takes it here and Xen. Mem. IV, 7, 7, and the moon an earthy body, like our own planet. There was the more plausibility in imputing to Socrates the doctrines of Anaxagoras, since Socrates was a disciple of Archelaus Physicus, who was a disciple of Anaxagoras. 28. *οὐκ εἰδέναι*. For *οὐκ*, instead of *μή*, see <sup>Page</sup>  
<sup>58</sup> note on *οὐ φῆτε*, 25, B. 2. *Καὶ δὲ καί*, *and so now*, etc. The sentence which follows is ironical, cf. *σοφὸς δὲ*, 27. 3. *ᾧ* is the object of *πριαμένοις*.

E. *εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς*, *for a drachma at the very highest*. *πολλοῦ*, like *δραχμῆς*, is gen. of price. This was the highest price which the managers could lawfully demand for a seat in the theatre. The common price was two oboli (Dem. de Cor. 28), which was paid out of the treasury. Cf. Boeckh's Pub. Econ. Ath. II, 13; Beck. Char. Ex. Sc. 10; and Smith's Dic. Antiqq. The doctrines of the philosophers were brought upon the stage, partly to be commended, as by Euripides in his tragedies, partly to be ridiculed, as by Aristophanes in his comedies. Some have thought that the

allusion is not to the performances on the stage, but to the sale of the books of Anaxagoras at the orchestra. Cf. Schleiermacher ad loc. But as Forster well remarks, we never read of book sales there. See also *Journal of Philology* (English), vol. x, pp. 37, 38. 5. ἄλλως τε καί, κ.τ.λ., *especially when they are so absurd*; literally, *for other reasons and also* (in particular) *they being so absurd*. 6. οὐτωςί, *thus* entirely and absolutely. 8. Ἀπιστός γ' εἶ . . . δοκεῖς. Cf. note on δίκαιός εἰμι, 18, A.

A. 13. εἵκει . . . διαπειρωμένῳ, *for he seems like one having composed* (i. e., he seems to have composed) *as it were an enigma, testing the question, Whether will Socrates, the wise man forsooth, know*, etc. In the earlier editions καί is inserted between the two participles. But Plato often uses two or more participles without a connective, especially when, as here, the action expressed by one participle is preliminary to that expressed by the other—he seems to have composed as it were an enigma *in order* to test. Cf. Gorg.: τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα, ὑποδύσα, κ.τ.λ. = *having divided herself into four parts and thus put on*, or *in order to put on*, etc. For the use of the part. after εἵκει, cf. G. 280; H. A. 981. The nom. would be possible. Compare note on ξύνοδα with the part. 21, B. 14. ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου. γινώσκω, though usually followed by the acc., sometimes takes the gen. in common with other verbs denoting mental state. Jelf, 485. 17. ὥσπερ ἄν. Cf. note, 17, D. 20. ἦ . . . λέγειν, *how it is clear to me that he is speaking thus*, sc. contradictions.

B. 23. ἐν τῷ εἰωθότῳ τρόπῳ, *in my usual method*, sc. of question and answer, with common illustrations. 26. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλὰ, *one after another*, again and again. The acc. is cognate. 3. τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, *the question which follows*, i. e., in order and thought.

C. 4. δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι. δαιμόνια is here constructed as an adjective. So Cicero translates τὸ δαιμόνιον by *divinum quiddam*, de Div. 1, 54. Schleiermacher and Stallbaum (see their notes ad loc.) argue, that Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle understood it to be used in this sense in the indictment. Certainly if he could have taken it as a noun

Page  
59

(meaning divinities, instead of an adjective meaning divine things), it would have been far easier for Socrates to show the glaring inconsistency of his accuser, and he might have spared all his argumentation and illustration drawn from *ἱππικὰ πράγματα, ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα*, etc. The expression in the indictment had reference to those divine voices or monitions which Socrates professed to hear and obey as the guide of his life (cf. 31, D, and notes *ibid.*), and which would more properly be called *divine things*, than *divinities*. 5. ὥς ὤνησας: *what a service you have rendered—how obliging you are*—que tu m'oblige. Cousin. Al. ὠκνησας. μόγης = tandem aliquando, Stallb. 8. ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω, *but then I believe in divine things at all events*, so. whether they be old or new, i. e., though they be new ones as charged in the indictment. 9. ἀντιγραφῇ = ἀνωμοσίᾳ, cf. note, 19, B, and Fischer's note ad loc.

D. 13. ἦτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας. The word *δαίμονες*, in Homer and the early Greek poets, is synonymous with *θεοί*; in Plato and other writers of his day it denotes more especially the inferior deities constituting an intermediate and connecting link between the superior gods and men; and in Plutarch and some of the latest Greek classics, it sometimes signifies bad as well as good beings of a super-human order, thus *approaching* to the New Testament sense of demons or evil spirits. Cf. Symp. 202, E: πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ, κ.τ.λ. 16. τοῦτ' . . . χαριεντίζεσθαι, *this would be wherein I say* (27, A) *that you speak riddles and joke, to say that I who do not believe in gods, on the other hand do again believe in gods, since at all events I believe in demons*. The last clause repeats the premise (already laid down at the beginning of the sentence) in closer connection with the main point in the conclusion—a practice not unfrequent with Plato, and one of many by which his style is made to resemble the language of conversation. 20. ὧν δὲ καὶ λέγονται, *from whom you know they are said to be*. The preposition (ἐκ) is often omitted before the relative after having been inserted before the antecedent. H. A. 1007. 23. ἡ [καὶ] ὄρων. Forsterus delendam censebat hanc particu-

lam (ἡ); sine caussa idonea; nam ἡμίονοι διπρὶ possunt, et ἵππων παῖδες, et ὄνων παῖδες. Fischer. That is, mules may have horses or also asses for their *male* parents, for the case to be illustrated limits the comparison to *male* parents.

E. 25. οὐχί limits ἐγράψω; ἀποπειρώμενος denotes the end in view = *for the purpose of testing me*, and ἀπορῶν the cause = *because you were at a loss*. 27. ὅπως δὲ σύ, κ.τ.λ. *But that you should persuade any man possessed of the least understanding, that it is the part of the same man to believe in things pertaining both to demons and to gods, and the same man not to believe either in demons or gods or heroes, is beyond the scope of human ingenuity, lit., there is no means by which (ὅπως) you could persuade, etc.* I have inclosed οὐ in brackets (as does also Cron), because, though found in most of the MSS., and therefore inserted by Becker and Stallbaum, neither they nor any other editor has been able to explain or translate it, and it is omitted by Forster, Fischer, Ast, Schleiermacher, and Cousin.

4. Ἀλλὰ γάρ. Cf. note, 25, C. Socrates here brings the direct defense to a close, saying that it does not require much argument, since what he has to fear is not the indictment or the prosecutors, but the multitude—not the evidence or the argument, but popular prejudice and passion. What follows is intended, not so much to avert the sentence which he anticipates from the judges or even to deprecate the displeasure of the people, as to vindicate his character, assert his mission, and bear witness to the truth, that more impartial judges may appreciate his merits—that a better age may honor him, as a missionary and a martyr. 9. καὶ τοῦτ' . . . αἰρῇ, *and this it is which will convict me, if indeed it should lead to my conviction*. 10. ἀλλ' . . . φθόνος. This clause is an emphatic repetition and explanation of the τοῦτ' at the beginning. Such colloquial repetitions (cf. note, 27, D) are especially frequent in antithetic clauses. 12. οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή, *and there is no reason to fear lest it should (that it will) stop with me*, i. e., that I shall be the last victim.

B. 13. Εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνεται. Εἴτα in questions implies astonishment or indignation, as ποτέ does surprise and wonder, cf.



Page 60 note, 20, D. 17. τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι are taken together as a limiting gen. with κίνδυνον, literally, the risk of living or dying, i. e., *the question of life or death*. 18. ἄνδρα, a man emphatically, not merely a human being, ἄνθρωπον. It is the subject of ὑπολογίζεσθαι. οὗτον . . . ὀφελός ἐστιν, *who is of any use, however little*. ὀφελος takes the person to whom it belongs, or of whom it is predicated, in the genitive. See examples in the Lexicon. With the sentiment of this passage compare Crito, 48.

O. 22. οἱ τε ἄλλοι καὶ = *especially*; literally, *both the others and* (in particular) *the son of Thetis*. For ἄλλως τε καὶ = *especially*, cf. note, 26, E. The allusion is to Achilles, Hom. Il. xviii, 90-125. 23. παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρὸν τι ὑπομείναι, *in comparison with* (properly, *alongside of*) *submitting to anything dishonorable*. 25. θεὸς οὖσα, *being a goddess*, and therefore able to foretell the future. 26. τιμωρήσεις. G. 199, N. 8; H. A. 816, 12. Render: *if you shall avenge the murder of Patroclus your friend*. 28. αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, κ.τ.λ.; the very words of Thetis to her son, Il. xviii, 96. This quotation interrupts the sentence, and instead of a clause depending on ὥστε (l. 24), which should regularly have followed, it goes on with an independent clause connected by δέ. 2. τοῦ θανάτου. The article is unusual with θανάτου as abstract.

D. 3. Κακὸς ὢν denotes the *state in which* to live were to be dreaded more than death: *to live being a bad man*, that is, an unfaithful friend and a cowardly soldier. 4. αὐτίκα τεθναίην . . . ἄχθος ἀρούρης. Parts of two Homeric verses (Il. xviii, 98 and 104) brought together. 6. μὴ . . . οἶει, *you do not suppose, do you*, implies a neg. answer. G. 282, 2; H. A. 1015. 7. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει. Cf. note, 17, D. 8. οὐ ἄν, *wherever*. 9. ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ. Anacoluthon for ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθεῖς, which would correspond with ἢ ἡγήσάμενος βέλτιον; instead of which we have ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ, corresponding to ἐαυτὸν τάξῃ, as if the first ἢ had preceded τάξῃ, instead of ἡγήσάμενος. 11. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, *before*, i. e., *more than the dishonorable*.

E. 12. εἶην εἰργασμένος. Heindorf makes ἐργάζεσθαι here, as he says it often is, equivalent to ποιεῖν. But Stallbaum,

with good reason, renders *εἶην εἰργασμένος*, I should have <sup>Page 61</sup>*perpetrated* (not merely *done*). 13. *εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με . . . τότε μὲν οὐ . . . τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ . . . ἐνταῦθα δέ, ἴφ, when on the one hand the commanders . . . then on the one hand I . . . but when on the other hand the god . . . then on the other hand I*, etc. *μὲν . . . μὲν* and *δέ . . . δέ*, with their clauses, seldom appear so regularly and formally balanced. Cf. Jelf, 765, 6. The clauses introduced by *δέ* contain the main point, which the clauses introduced by *μὲν* only illustrate and enforce. 14. *ὕμεις εἴλεσθε*. The judges are taken as representing the entire people. 16. *ἔμενον* (past tense of the ind.) denotes an historical fact; *λίπομι* (contingent) implies a mere supposition. The bravery and physical endurance of Socrates, as a soldier, were a prodigy and a proverb in that already somewhat degenerate age. In the battle at Delium, the Athenian general Laches declared, that if all the Athenians had fought as bravely as he, the Boeotians would have erected no trophies. It will be observed, that the preposition *ἐπὶ* is used to denote the locality of this battle, while *ἐν* is used with *Ποτιδαία* and *Ἀμφιπόλει*. Wherever this battle is referred to, it is thus designated *ἐπὶ Δηλίου* (cf. Xen. Mem. iii, 5, 4), whereas in other battles *ἐν* is the usual preposition. The reason seems to be, that Delium was properly the name of the *temple* of Apollo, and, though the city received the same designation, the old association forbade its extension so as to embrace the surrounding country, where the battle was fought. 18. *δεῖν* is used as appropriate to *φῆθην* rather than to *τάττοντος*, to which it should belong. The style is conversational.

A. 20. *δεινὸν τῶν εἶη, a strange thing indeed it would be*. 29 It is a repetition or resumption of *δεινὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος* at the beginning of the section. 21. *ὥς ἀληθῶς*. *ὥς* gives emphasis to some adverbs and adjectives besides superlatives. There is an ellipsis of a corresponding demonstrative (*οὕτως*), and also of an appropriate verb: *εἰσάγοι οὕτως ὥς ἀληθῶς εἰσάγοι*. *εἰσάγοι εἰς δικαστήριον*. Cf. note, 24, D. 27. *τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, to man*, i. e., mankind. H. A. 659. 27. *ὃν* is attracted into the gender of the predicate.

B. 1. *Καὶ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., and this, how is not this ignorance* <sup>Page 62</sup>

<sup>Page</sup>  
62 *which is to be censured, that of supposing that one knows what he does not know.* 3. *τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα*, in this respect and here, emphatic repetition in order to limit the superiority strictly to this single point. 4. *τῷ*, in anything, dat. of the respect. 5. *τούτῳ ἂν*, sc. *φαίην εἶναι*, I should say that it was (i. e., that I was wiser) in this. 6. *οὕτω καὶ οἶομαι* corresponds to *οὐκ εἰδώς*, which is equivalent to *ὥσπερ οὐκ οἶδα*. 7. *τῷ βελτίονι, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ*, the better, whether god or man. 8. *πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν, κ.τ.λ.*, in comparison therefore with the evils which (*ὧν*, gen. by attraction) I know to be evils, I will never fear nor flee those which I know not if perchance they are good, that is, I will never shun the latter rather than the former—the uncertain rather than the certain. Cf. *πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ*, 28, D.

C. 11. *ἀπιστήσαντες = ἀπειθήσαντες*, which Stephens substituted for it in his edition = disobeying, *disregarding*. *τὴν ἀρχήν* with a negative means, not in the first instance, i. e., not at all. 12. *εἰσελθεῖν* for *εἰσάγεσθαι*, to be brought in hither for trial. 13. *ἀποκτείνειν*, to put me to death, i. e., condemn me to death. So Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 5. 14. *εἰ διαφευξοίμην*. G. 202, 4; H. A. 855, a. *ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοντες . . . διαφθαρήσονται*. On the use of *ἂν* with the fut. ind., which is rare in the Attic Greek and entirely denied by some, see G. 208, 2, at end; H. A. 845. Stallbaum is inclined here to connect *ἂν* with *ἐπιτηδεύοντες* only = *ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύοιεν . . . καὶ . . . διαφθαρήσονται*. But it is more natural to suppose that *ἂν* gives a contingent sense to *διαφθαρήσονται* also. 18. *ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφ' ὧτε*, on this condition, however, that you no longer, etc. *ἐφ' ὧτε* is equivalent to *ὥστε*, and is accordingly followed by the inf. G. 267; H. A. 999, a.

D. 20. *εἰ οὖν . . . ἀφίοιτε*. *οὖν* is here resumptive = *I say*. It will be observed that the same protasis is resumed twice—that is, the sentence is commenced with essentially the same condition, varied only in form, three times (*εἰ μὲν νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε . . . εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε . . . εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε*), before the apodosis is subjoined. In the first instance, the ind. (*ἀφίετε*) is used, implying some probability of his release; in the other instances,

the same condition is expressed as a mere contingency by the use of the opt. (εἴποιτε, ἀφίοιτε), corresponding to which we have the opt. with ἄν (εἴποιμ' ἄν ὑμῖν) in the apodosis. 22. ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ. Ἀσπάζεσθαι *est aliquem salutare ita ut eum amplexaris*; φιλεῖν, *salutare aliquem ita, ut eum osculeris*. Hoc loco significant hæc verba: *grato lætoque animo vestram humanitatem et clementiam amplector atque veneror*. Stallbaum. 22. πείσομαι μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν. Cf. Acts v, 29, and iv, 19. 24. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι. οὐ μὴ, with the subj. instead of the fut., is used in strong denial. G. 257; H. A. 1032. 25. αἰεὶ, *continually, from time to time*. 26. Ἀθηναῖος ὢν, πόλεως, *being a citizen of Athens, the greatest city*. G. 137, N. 1. 28. ἰσχύν, *strength of mind, intellectual and moral power*, particularly *fortitude* and the kindred masculine virtues, as appears from what follows. Compare the glorification of Athens in the funeral oration of Pericles. Thuc. II, 35.

E. 5. ἀπειμι. The present of εἶμι and its compounds is generally used by the Attics in a future sense. So in English, I go or am going = I shall or will go. ἐρήσομαι, ἐξετάσω, ἐλέγξω. Notice the progressive meaning of the words as descriptive of the Socratic method. 7. φάναι δέ, *but to say that he does*. In Laches, 187, 188, Nicias gives a very similar though more minute account of the manner in which Socrates would hold every one he conversed with to the work of self-examination: "You do not seem to know, that whoever is nearest to Socrates in reasoning, just as in relationship, and whoever approaches him in conversation, even though he should begin to converse at first on some other subject, he will, with infallible certainty, be brought round in the discussion, till he is obliged to give an account of himself, in what manner he is now living, and how he has lived his past life; and once caught in it, Socrates will not let him go, till he has well and beautifully put all these things to the test . . . and I almost knew, long ago, that our discussion now, being in the presence of Socrates, would not be about the young men, but about ourselves."

A. 9. Καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ. Cf. καὶ θεῷ καὶ 30

Page 68 ἀνθρώπων, 29, C. Verbs of *doing* and *saying* more commonly take the indirect as well as the direct object in the acc. G. 165, N. 3. The dat. suggests *for the sake of*. 10. ὥσῳ, *by as much as*. The full construction would require a corresponding demonstrative (τοσοῦτῳ) with μᾶλλον, denoting the *degree of difference*. G. 188, 2; H. A. 781, a. 11. ἐγγυτέρῳ may be followed either by a gen. or a dat. denoting that *to which* there is a *nearness*. G. 182, 2, and 186. That *in which*, or *in respect to which*, the nearness exists, may also be either gen. or dat. But it is not according to usage to put both in the gen. or both in the dat. See Stallbaum's note on the proper reading of this passage, and compare ad rem, as well as ad verba, the passage above cited from Laches: ὅς ἂν ἐγγυτάτῳ Σωκράτους ἢ λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένοι. 13. τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν, *my service to the god*. The dat. *to* or *for* can follow substantives. G. 185; H. A. 765, a. 16. μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, *no, nor so zealously*, cf. note on μηδ' ὅπως οὕτως, 17, B.

B. 17. λέγων, κ.τ.λ. Observe the sentiment, that the higher good includes the lower, as the greater does the less. 20. εἰ . . . διαφθείρω. Cf. note, 25, B. 21. ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη βλαβερὰ, *these instructions and persuasions must be injurious*. Compare the argument of Xen. Mem. I, 2, 8: how then could such a man corrupt the young, unless the cultivation of virtue is corrupting. 22. οὐδὲν λέγει, *he says nothing*, that is, *he is utterly mistaken*. Cf. Laches, 195, B; N. 1: ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτός τις ἐφάνη. ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία· καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις. So τὶ λέγειν is to say something, i. e., to speak well and truly, cf. Crit. 46, D; Xen. Mem. II, 1, 12. πρὸς ταῦτα, *wherefore*, literally, in reference to these things, in *view* of them. 23. ἢ πείθεσθε . . . ἢ μὴ, that is, *unconditionally—don't propose any conditional acquittal, like that suggested 29, C; since I would not on any condition (ἄν refers to an implied condition) do differently, not even if I must die* (strictly and emphatically *be dead*) many times over. ὥς has its ordinary subjective effect. G. 277, N. 2; H. A. 978. Notice ἄν with future participle is

a peculiar apodosis representing ποιήσω ἄν. Cf. 29, C; M. <sup>Page 63</sup> and T. 41, 4; p. 58, l. 3, and reference there.

C. 26. Μη θορυβεῖτε. Cf. note, 21, A. Socrates here enters upon another topic, and discourses upon it with such freedom and boldness, such a consciousness of his own innocence not merely, but such an assurance of his divine mission, and such compassion not for himself but for them if they should reject his instructions and condemn him to death, that they must either recognize his superior wisdom or take offense at his arrogance. Some modern critics even, Ast for example, regard the self-complacency of this and some other parts of the Apology as quite insufferable, quite un-Socratic. But is there not the Socratic irony here? Are there not at the same time Socratic truthfulness, fearlessness, and earnestness? It should be remembered that he presents himself throughout as vindicating, not so much himself as truth and justice, philosophy and religion, and God. 27. ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, *stand by what I asked of you*. Cf. 17, D. μοι is the ethical dat., and may be expressed by *pray*. 1. μέλλω <sup>Page 64</sup> γὰρ οὖν, *for I am about now* (οὖν, accordingly, in accordance with that request) *to say also some other things at which perhaps you will cry out*. This clause is connected by γὰρ οὖν (more closely than it would be by γὰρ alone), not to the clause which immediately precedes, but to the previous one (ἐμμείνατε, κ.τ.λ.). 6. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναυτο, *for they would not even be able*, sc. if they wished. ἂν referring to an implied condition. G. 226, b; H. A. 903.

D. 6. οὐ . . . θεμιτόν = nefas, not in accordance with the law of nature and of God, and therefore not possible in the nature of things. Schleiermacher: *nicht in der Ordnung*. Cousin: *pas . . . au pouvoir*. Stallbaum: *neque legibus divinarum sapientiae respondere*. 7. ἀμείνονι ἀνδρί, *for a better man to be injured by a worse*, instead of ἀμείνονα ἄνδρα, *that a better man, etc.*, the design being to link it more closely with οὐ . . . θεμιτόν εἶναι. This famous saying of Socrates has been widely quoted and commented on from the earliest times. Cf. Epic. Encheir. 52; Max. Tyr. Diss. 18, 8; Plut. de Tranq. 17; and not only by philosophers but by the Christian Fathers,

Page 64 as Origen, Theodoret, etc. The reason for the assertion, as explained by Plutarch, and illustrated by Crito, 44, D, is, that bad men, however numerous and powerful, can not make the good man bad or the wise man a fool, and that is the only real evil which can befall a man. ἀποκτείνειε. Cf. note, §9, C. Here the word not only refers to the condemnation rather than the execution of the sentence, but, like the two verbs which follow, it has a causative sense = *procure* my condemnation to death, to exile, or to disfranchisement. 8. ἀτιμώσκειν denotes (not dishonor in general, as some have understood it, but) *deprivation of civil rights*. This might deprive of *all* rights and privileges, or do so only in part. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ., *but these this man* (viz., the prosecutor) *probably supposes, and many another man perchance, to be great evils*. τίς here gives an indefinite extension and application to ἄλλος, like *many a* in English. 10. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, intell. οἶμαι μέγα κακόν. Stallb. 12. πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, *I am very far from making a defense for my own sake*. Observe the emphatic insertion and juxtaposition of ἐγὼ with ὑπὲρ ἑμαυτοῦ = *I for myself*. H. A. 1062. 14. ὑμῖν, dat. after δόσω. Cf. note, 30, A. Socrates means that he was given or sent to the Athenians by Apollo to be their monitor and reprover.

E. 16. ἀτεχνῶς . . . προσκείμενον, *really, though the comparison may be too ridiculous, attached to*, etc. προσκείμενον, besides the passive sense of *being attached to*, involves also the active signification of *pressing upon* or *following up*, as a gadfly does a horse, to suit which the word was chosen. γελοιότερον. H. A. 649, b. The clause explains τοιοῦτον instead of the more regular construction with οἶος. 19. μύωπος may mean a *spur* or a *gadfly*. Ficinus, Schleiermacher, Aet, Cousin, and some others, take it here in the former sense. But the epithets προσκείμενον, προστεθεικέναι, and προσκαθίζων, apply better to a gadfly. Moreover, this makes the comparison more laughable (γελοιότερον), and is more in the spirit of the Socratic irony. So Forster, Stallbaum, Carey, etc. 20. οἶον δῆ, *as for instance now*, introduces the explanation or application of the simile of the gadfly. Such is the prevailing use of οἶον by Plato.

A. 25. *ἴσως* is often strengthened by *τάχ' ἄν*, and is equivalent to *mayhap*. *ἀχθόμενοι . . . πειθόμενοι*. The reader will observe the singular succession of participles. Some of them may be rendered into English by verbs; *ἄν* gives a potential sense to the participle (*κρούσαντες*), G. 207, 1; H. A. 987, a: *but you mayhap being offended, just like sleepers when they are roused out of sleep, would (will) dash at me, and hearkening to Anytus, rashly put me to death*. 26. *κρούσαντες* still keeps up the allusion to the gadfly. So does *ἐπιπέμφει*, *send upon you*. 1. *ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, κ.τ.λ.*, *but that I am just (τυγχάνω ὦν) such a person, as to have been given by the god to the city, you might discern from this fact*. The thing to be proved is that his character is such, that he might well be supposed to have a divine mission; and the proof is his self-forgetfulness and disinterested devotedness to the highest good of others, which, he argues, is something more than human (*οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε*). Compare Cousin's translation and Stallbaum's note ad loc. *δεδόσθαι*. G. 261; H. A. 952.

B. 5. *ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων*, *to suffer my private affairs to be neglected*. It will be seen, from the *τοσαῦτα ἥδη ἔτη*, that both *ἀνέχεσθαι* and *πράττειν* express *continued past action*, in other words, they are *imperfects*. 10. *εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον*, *I should have some reason*, i. e., my conduct would be explicable on ordinary grounds without supposing a divine mission. 12. *τοῦτο . . . ἀπανασχυντήσαι*, *to reach this (such a) pitch of shamelessness*. G. 159, N. 2; H. A. 716, b. *ἀπό* in the verb is emphatic, *to be so utterly shameless*.

C. 14. *ἢ ἐπραξάμην . . . ἢ ᾔτησα*, *that I ever either exacted or asked pay of any one*. *πράττεσθαι* = *exigere* (*ex-agere*), *ausmachen*, *make money*. *ἱκανόν . . . πεῖριαν*, *for sufficient*, I think, is the *witness* (observe the article *τὸν μάρτυρα*) *I bring forward, that I speak the truth*, viz., *my (well-known) poverty*: *παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὃν παρέχομαι ἱκανός ἐστιν*, pred. use of adj. Ad rem, cf. note, 23, B. 18. *ἀναβαίνων*, unemphatic. Socrates, like other citizens, was obliged to be present in the assembly.



Page  
65

D. 21. θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, *something divine and demoniacal*, if we may be allowed to use the word demoniacal in its etymological sense of *superhuman*, or *proceeding from δαίμονες*. Cf. note, 27, D. 22. ἐπικωμῶδῶν, *calumniating or satirizing* after the manner of the ancient comedy. The reference is to the ἔρετα δαιμόνια καινά of the indictment, 24, B. 24. αἰὲ ἀποτρέπει . . . προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε. Ast makes this statement an argument against the Platonic authorship of the Apology, as being inconsistent with what Xenophon (Mem. iv, 8, 5) and others say of the positive as well as negative character of the divine influence. But the same declaration is made almost in the same words in the Theages, 128, D. So Cicero likewise understood it, de Div. 1, 54: nunquam impellenti, sæpe revocanti. And though Xenophon, and Plato himself in other passages (e. g., Phæd. 242, B, C; Theæt. 151. A), appear to ascribe to the voice a persuasive as well as dissuasive influence, that is only a general statement of the *fact*, whereas here we have a more definite and precise explanation of the *manner*; for, after all, the discrepancy is more apparent than real, since a dissuasive from all that he should not do, involved instruction in all that he should do. Cf. 40, A, B, C; also Schleiermacher's note ad loc. As to the nature of this voice, or sign or oracle, as he elsewhere calls it (ἡ μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου . . . τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, 40, A), there has always been much discussion, and the question may still perhaps be said to be sub judice. Some have supposed that Socrates believed himself to be under the guidance of a particular δαίμων, guardian genius or tutelary divinity, whose special, if not sole office, was to lead and protect him. But no such idea would be gathered from this, nor indeed from any other passage in Plato or Xenophon, where this subject is mentioned. Others have gone to the opposite extreme and have come to the conclusion that the δαίμων of Socrates was nothing more than the voice of reason, considered as the voice of God, in his own soul. But this falls as far below the demands of the passage before us—of the appropriate significance of the language of Socrates—as the other goes beyond and superadds to it. After a diligent

comparison of the language of Plato and Xenophon, together with such light as Plutarch, Cicero, and subsequent writers have shed on the subject, I find scarcely any room left for doubt that Socrates meant by his *φωνή*, and *θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, very nearly that same divine teaching and guidance which good men in every age have believed to be communicated to themselves, and to all who seek it by prayer and in the use of proper means—partly within the soul, and yet not *from* within but from above—partly by outward signs, omens, oracles, dreams, and visions. Cf. below 33, C; *ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων*, κ.τ.λ. Certainly the Apology gives us no intimation of a tutelary divinity peculiar to himself, and in the Memorabilia, Socrates explicitly declares, that the same divine teaching is within the reach of all men. Cf. below, 40, A, B, C; Xen. Mem. I, 1, 3, 4; I, 4, 15, 18; IV, 3, 13; IV, 8, 1. See also an interesting discussion of this question in Plutarch, De Genio Socratis. 24. *τοῦτο* is the object of *πράττειν*, which is transferred to the relative clause = *τοῦτο πράττειν ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράξειν*. Al. *τούτου* gen. after *ἀποστρέπει*. 28. *πάλοι*. He would be allowed to take part in public life from the age of 20.

E. 1. *ἀπολώλη . . . ὠφελήκη*. This form of the pluperfect is common in Plato, though not to the exclusion of the common form, cf. *ξυνήδειν . . . ἦδειν*, 22, D. G. 119, 4; H. A. 458, a. Observe the repetition of *ἂν* in each disjunctive clause (*πάλοι ἂν . . . οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς . . . οὔτ' ἂν ἐμάντόν*) and compare the examples in Stallb. here and at Gorg. 475, E. 3. *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν . . . οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ . . . ἐναντιούμενος*. A striking repetition of the negative. Socrates shows himself no demagogue or even democrat. In this, he had the company and sympathy of most of the literary men and philosophers of Athens, who, as a class, cherished little respect or affection—and had little reason, in their personal relations to it, to cherish respect or affection—for the Athenian democracy. But more than this, the unbending integrity and firmness of Socrates placed him often in the attitude of *opposition* to the *existing* government, whether democratic or aristocratic, insomuch that he was deemed quite an impracti-

Page 66 cable. Compare his resistance to the popular assembly as described below, 32, B, with his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and "rendition" of a fugitive from oppression, 32, D; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 2, 3.

- 32 A. 7. Καὶ εἰ μέλλει. Καὶ εἰ, *even if*, is to be distinguished from εἰ καί, *although*. καὶ εἰ concedes what is not true, or what is true only to a limited degree (the limit here being marked by ὀλίγον χρόνον); εἰ καὶ concedes what is true, simply and without degrees. Cf. Hermann ad Viger. 832; Stallb. ad loc.; and H. A. 1053, 2, a. 8. μὴ δημοσιεύειν. In Xen. Mem. i, 6, 15, Socrates gives as a reason for not engaging in public affairs, that he could do more to control and benefit the state by educating as many others as possible to be good citizens and able statesmen, than he could by undertaking the affairs of state in his own person. 13. οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι, *I would not yield in the least to any one whatever*. οὐδ' . . . ἐνὶ is more emphatic than οὐδενί. ὑπεικάθοιμι: for the form, cf. G. 119, 11; H. A. 494. The verbs of this form have been taken as intensive, but examples fail to prove that they differ in meaning from the simple forms. It remains also a matter of question whether they should be treated as presents or aorists, though this verb is now generally taken as the latter. 14. μὴ ὑπείκων δέ, κ.τ.λ., *and as soon as I did not yield, just so soon I should perish*. The first ἅμα belongs with ὑπείκων, the second, strengthened by καί, with ἀπολοίμην. 15. φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, *displeasing and wearisome indeed*. δικανικά has reference primarily to *pleadings in the courts of law*, which are apt to be tediously minute and circumstantial. Some take it here in the sense of *boastful*. It is fair to say that the exact meaning of these words is not very well established.

B. 16. ἄλλην μὲν . . . ἐβούλευσα δέ, *I never held any other office, but I was made a member of the βουλὴ* (council of five hundred). See the same fact, and βουλεύειν used in the same sense, Xen. Mem. i, 1, 18. For the use of the aor. to signify entrance upon the office, cf. G. 200, N. 5, b; H. A. 841. 17. ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς, *the tribe to which Socrates belonged, viz., Antiochis*. 18. πρυτανεύουσα, *presiding*, i. e., *furnishing*

*the prytanes*, who acted as presidents both of the council and of the popular assembly. Each of the ten tribes chose by lot fifty representatives in the council, and these representatives, or the tribe through them, presided during about one tenth of the lunar year, or thirty-five days. Moreover, these fifty representatives of the tribe were subdivided into five bodies of ten men each, each of which presided during a fifth part of the presidency of the tribe, i. e., about one week. Out of these ten *proedri* (as they were called) for the week, an *ἐπιστάτης* or chief president was chosen by lot, who held the keys of the public treasury and archives, and presided as chairman in the council and also in the assembly for one day. Socrates was *ἐπιστάτης* on that day when the fate of the ten generals was to be decided, and refused to put the illegal proposition to vote in the assembly. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 2: *ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἐπιστάτης γενόμενος. τοὺς δέκα στρατηγούς.* The Athenians chose ten generals, one for each tribe, at the commencement of a war. Sometimes they were all in the field together. More frequently, however, only three were sent out to carry on the war, while the others took charge of the war department at home. In the case before us, the battle at Arginusæ, only eight were actually present. For the details, see Xen. Hellen. i, 7. 19. *τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους, who did not bring away for burial* the bodies of the slain. They were victorious in the battle (over the Lacedæmonians at Arginusæ), and in order to pursue the enemy, they left the care of the dead to some of the inferior officers, instead of attending to it in person. For this they were accused before the assembly, and, in spite of the intervention of Socrates, condemned, and six of them actually put to death. The fact illustrates in a striking manner the sacred interest and importance which the Greeks attached to the rite of burial. Though they had gained the victory, the generals had not done their duty or *finished* their work, till the dead were buried. So the *Iliad* was not deemed complete till the burial rites of the heroes, Achilles and Hector, were narrated in the 23d and 24th Books; and the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles are prolonged to considerable extent beyond the

Page  
66

catastrophe for the same purpose—to put the minds of Grecian hearers and readers at rest from that pious horror which they entertained of remaining unburied. Had certain critics of the Homeric poems considered this matter duly, they would not have found in the last two books an argument against the unity of the Iliad. For the account of the feeling at Athens, cf. Grote, Part II, chap. lxiv. τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας. Cf. G. 191, N. 6; H. A. 788 and a. 20. ἀθρόους, *together*, by one vote, cf. μὴ ψήφῳ, Xen. Mem. i, 1, 18. παρὰ νόμους. The law required that the vote should be taken separately, cf. Xen. Hel. i, 7, 37: κρίνεσθαι δίχα ἕκαστον. ὡς . . . ἔδοξε. Xenophon says (Hel. i, 7, 39), they soon repented of it, and punished the authors of the measure as deceivers of the people. 21. ἐγὼ μόνος, κ.τ.λ. The prytanes all opposed at first, but when threatened with the vengeance of the people, they all gave in except Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus. Xen. Hel. i, 7, 15. 22. μηδὲν ποιεῖν. G. 283, 6; H. A. 1029. Compare, however, 81, D and E. It is to be noticed that κωλύω does not take μή with its inf. ἐνδεικνύμαι καὶ ἀπάγειν, to *indict* me and *lead me away* to punishment. As Attic law terms, these verbs signify an especially summary proceeding without the formality or delay of a criminal prosecution. See Lex. under ἐνδειξις and ἀπαγωγή. 25. βοῶντων. See in Xen. Hel. i, 7, 13, 14, the tumult and uproar of the meeting.

Page  
67

O. 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ δλιγαρχία . . . οἱ τριάκοντα. There was always an oligarchic faction at Athens, who were aided and sustained by Lacedemonian influence; and when, at the close of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedemonians triumphed, they placed thirty of this faction in the supreme power, who were afterward known as *the thirty* (or the thirty tyrants). The noun added to the numeral is a later expression. 2. με πέμπτον αὐτόν, *myself and four others*. H. A. 681, b. εἰς τὴν θάλαμον. The round building where the fifty prytanes held their sittings and dined together at public expense, used also by the thirty. Compare the round temple of Vesta in Rome, which was the *fireside* or hearthstone of the early Romans. 3. Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον. A native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens,

who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants. 6. ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν, *to implicate in their own crimes*. Page 67

D. 7. ἄν, *again, or in turn*, sc. as in the case of the ten generals under the democracy. So αὖ above, l. 2. He resisted the democracy and the oligarchy *alike* in their wrong doings. 8. εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, *if it were not too rude* (rustic) *an expression*, is an apology for the use of οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν in such a connection as would probably offend the polite ears of the Athenians. Of. Euthyd. 288, E; Gorg. 509, A. 9. τοῦτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει, *for this, I say, I care everything*. τὸ πᾶν is an adverbial or synecdochial acc., the exact opposite of οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν. 10. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη ἡ ἀρχή, κ.τ.λ., *for me* (emphatic both in form and position) *that government* (of the thirty), *strong as it then was, did not so terrify*. 13. ἤγαγον Λέοντα. He was put to death. Xen. Hel. II, 3, 89. ῥ'χόμεν ἀπιὼν οἶκαδε, *went immediately home*. 15. διὰ ταχέων = ταχέως. The government of the Thirty Tyrants lasted only about eight months before Thrasybulus advanced against them. It was then some months later before peace was established.

E. 17. τοσάδε ἔτη, *so many years as I have lived*. 18. ἔπραττον. The imperf. denotes *continued* action. 19. τοῖς δίκαιοις, the things that are just = justice. ὥσπερ χρῆ, *as one ought* always to do—this is implied in the present. 21. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς, sc. διεγέμετο, would have lived so many years.

A. 23. τοιοῦτος φανούμαι, *shall be found* (on examination) *33 such a man*, sc. one who has never fallen in with any one in anything contrary to justice, as explained by the following clause. 26. ἐμούς μαθητὰς εἶναι. Socrates was charged by his enemies with the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades, the one the prince of demagogues and the other the leader of the Thirty Tyrants. They had indeed listened to his conversations; but neither they nor indeed any other man (he proceeds to say) were his *disciples*, for he had no disciples, and never professed to be a teacher. Hence he never called his hearers *μαθηταί*, but οἱ συνόντες. See this whole topic discussed at length, Xen. Mem. I, 2. 27. τὰ ἐμὰυτοῦ, my proper

Page 67 business, my appointed mission, already described as assigned him by Apollo.

Page 68 B. 1. οὐδέ gives emphatic denial to both clauses as unified by μέν and δέ. 2. μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, sc. διαλέγομαι, *but in case I do not receive pay, not converse*. 3. παρέχω . . . ἐρωτᾶν, *I give liberty to question me to rich and poor alike, and if any one chooses to answer my question, and hear what I may say*, I give him liberty to do that. παρέχω ἑμαυτόν is to be supplied from the previous clause. For the voice of ἐρωτᾶν, cf. G. 261, 2, R; H. A. 952, a. Compare Gorgias, 480, D, ἐὰν μὲν γε πληγῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ἢ τύπτειν παρέχοντα. 5. τούτων . . . ὧν . . . μηδενί. *Of (in respect to) these (alleged disciples) I should not justly bear the responsibility, to no one of whom I ever promised, etc.*

C. 13. ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν, κ.τ.λ. The same words are used above, 23, C. There, however, the participle ἀκούοντες stands last, and is followed by its proper case, the genitive, ἐξεταζομένων, κ.τ.λ., while here the verb χαίρουσιν follows the participle and is followed by its appropriate case, the dative, viz., ἐξεταζομένοις, κ.τ.λ., *I told you the whole truth, viz., that they enjoy hearing examined those who think they are wise but are not*. 16. τοῦτο, sc. to examine those who suppose that they are wise but are not. ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, resumptive of the claim as made before. 17. παντὶ τρόπῳ. Among these ways, Xenophon (Mem. I, 1, 3) specifies οἰωνοῖς, θυσίαις, φήμας, συμβόλοις. 20. εὐέλεγκτα, strictly, *easy to be confuted*; but here, *easy to be tested and proved*. εἰ γὰρ δὴ, *for if really*.

D. 21. χρῆν δήπου, *they ought surely*. The imperf. implies that they were not doing it. G. 222, N. 2; H. A. 897. εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι . . . νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ., *both if any of them, after having become older, became conscious that when they were young, etc.* Instead of εἴτε the correlative member of the sentence begins with the more emphatic εἰ δέ. So below, 40, D, E, εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἰσθήσις . . . εἰ δ' αὖ οἶον ἀποδηῆσαι. So δέ is sometimes antithetic to τέ, and οὐδέ to οὔτε. 25. αὐτοί, *themselves*, in contradistinction from their relatives. So αὐτοῦς in the previous clause. 28. μεμνησθαι depends on χρῆν in the antithetic member of

the sentence, the force of which still continues. 1. ἐνταυθοί. Page 65  
H. A. 788, b. 2. Κρίτων οἴκοι, *this Crito here*. His name has become identified with that of Socrates, as his friend and patron, and is perpetuated in the Platonic dialogue, or rather monologue, called Crito. He was a wealthy Athenian, of the same *deme* (δημότης) or ward as Socrates, viz., Alopecce, and now, it seems, like him, far advanced in life. The son Critobulus seems to have evoked great admiration for his beauty, but as an example of enlarged manhood to have done little credit either to his father or his teacher. Cf. Xen. Mem. I, 3, 8 seqq.; Athen. 220, A; Xen. Symp. iv, 10.

E. 8. Λυσανίας. Cf. Diog. Laert. 2, 60. ὁ Σφήττιος, of the deme Sphettus. It was customary at Athens to add by way of distinction to the name of the individual the ward to which he belonged, and often also the name of his father. The same object was accomplished at Rome, as it also is in modern times, by several names. 4. Αλοχίον, usually called the Socratic, to distinguish him from the orator of the same name. He established no school of philosophy, but taught the doctrines of his master for money, and wrote Socratic dialogues. The extant dialogues, however, which bear his name are not genuine. ὁ Κηφισιεύς, of the deme Cephisia. This Antiphon is to be distinguished from the orator and from several others of the same name. The son, Epigenes, is mentioned by Xenophon (Mem. iii, 12), as well as by Plato in his Phædo, 59. 5. τοίνυν, *moreover*, is not inferential but transitional, as it often is in the orators as well as the philosophers. Cf. Stallb. ad loc., also Schaefer ad Demosth. Several of the names which follow are found only here, e. g., Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Æantodorus. Touching Demodocus, see Theag. 127, E; Adeimantus, brother of Plato, de Repub. 357-368, 548; Apollodorus, Phæd. 59, A, 117, D; Xen. Mem. iii, 11, 17. Apollodorus was a most ardent and devoted follower of Socrates. Theages and Plato also were favorite disciples. 8. καταδεχθῆναι = Latin, deprecari, sensus est: non potest Theodotus Nicostratum fratrem rogare, ne me accuset et contra me testetur. Stallb.

A. 18. μάλιστα μὲν is correlative to εἰ δὲ τότε. The best 34



Page 69 time for Meletus to call some of these witnesses—the time when he *ought especially* to have called them—was in the course of his *argument* before the court; *but if he forgot it then*, etc. 15. παραχωρῶ, *give way, yield him the floor*, as we say, or in the technical language of the Greek bar, let him speak or testify during my water (the measure of *time* by the clepsydra). Cf. Mahaffy, *Primer of Old Greek Life*, sect. 98.

B. 20. ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες, *might have a reason for helping me*, i. e., for defending me, right or wrong. 22. ἀλλ' ἤ. Cf. note, 20, D. 23. ξυνίσασι Μελέτην, κ.τ.λ. *They know as Meletus knows*, etc. Comp. note, 21, B. 25. Εἶεν. Cf. note, 19, A. Socrates here concludes his direct defense, ἀ μὲν . . . ἀπολογεῖσθαι . . . τοιαῦτα, and proceeds to justify himself in not resorting to the ordinary means of moving the compassion of his judges and so saving his life. Cf. Mahaffy, *Primer of Greek Life*, sect. 96. 27. Τάχα δ' ἂν, κ.τ.λ. Such means of acquittal were expressly prohibited by law. Cf. Demos. adv. Timocr.; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 4. But the law was disregarded, and it was the prevailing practice to bring in the wives and children of the accused, and to resort to all possible ways of exciting the compassion of the judges, as is manifest from many passages of the orators and of Aristophanes, e. g., Vesp. 568 sqq.; Demost. in Mid. 99; Isoc. de Perm. 31. Ast thinks the Apology here a manifest imitation of Isocrates in the passage last cited, and therefore not genuine; but with how little reason, see Schleiermacher ad loc.

Page 70 C. 4. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα, κ.τ.λ., *while I, as ought to have been expected (ἄρα), will do none of these things*. 5. καὶ ταῦτα, *and that, too, when incurring*, etc.

D. 9. οὐκ ἀξιώ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δ' οὖν, *for I for my part do not expect it, but if, I say, any one of you is in such a state of mind*. For ἀξιώ, cf. 19, D; for οὖν, 21, A. 11. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, *and well I may have, for in the very language of Homer*. Acc. in apposition with a sentence, G. 137, N. 8; H. A. 626, b. So quotations, especially proverbs, are often introduced. The quotation is from Od. 19, 168, where Odysseus, in the guise of a beggar, is thus addressed by Penelope. The expression is proverbial, and denotes that

the person to whom it is applied is a man among men, sprung <sup>Page 70</sup> from men and related to them. 14. *νῆεις . . . τρεῖς*, and sons even, men of Athens, three of them, cf. Crit. 47, B, note. *μειράκιον*, a young man, sc. Lamprocles, who is called *μέγας* in Phæd. 65, and is introduced in Xen. Mem. II, 2, holding a conversation with his father touching his filial duty to his termagant mother. 15. *παῖδια*, small children, sc. Sophroniscus and Menexenus, cf. Phæd. 8, where they are called *σμικοί*. Seneca (Epis. 104) says that the sons of Socrates resembled their mother rather than their father.

E. 18. *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν, κ.τ.λ.*, but whether I can meet death with confidence or not is another question. He barely hints at this as one reason for his course, but modestly dismisses it as not exactly pertinent on the present occasion. 20. *πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν*, however that may be, for reputation both mine and yours, etc. Cf. note, 17, A. So just below, *ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον*, but whatever may be the fact, it is at least supposed. 22. *τηλικόνδε*, sc. seventy, cf. 17, D. *τοῦτο τοῦνομα*, sc. σοφός, cf. 23, A. 23. *ψεῦδος*, the subs. is often associated with the adj. *ἀληθής*, as shown by Heindorf, Ast, and Stallbaum.

A. 28. *τι εἶναι*. H. A. 703, a. 2. *ὥσπερ . . . ἐσομένων*. <sup>Page 71</sup> 35 G. 277, N. 3; 278, 1, N.; H. A. 978, a; 972, a. 9. *καὶ ὅτι οὖν εἶναι*, to be even anything whatever, i. e., to have any weight of character, however inconsiderable. 14. *χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης*, but irrespective of the reputation, sc. which attaches to me and of which we have been speaking. Observe the force of the article. The emphatic negative *οὐδέ* should also be noticed; it appears to me that it is *not even* right. The second *οὐδέ* is not merely correlative to the first, but emphatic = *no nor*, or *nor even*.

C. 17. *καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια* is to pervert justice for the sake of pleasing. So *κατα-χρᾶσθαι* = mis-use or abuse. 18. *ταῦτα*, sc. *τὰ δίκαια* = justice. *ὁμόμοκεν*. The oath of office taken by the *δικασταί*, and the security it afforded, are very often adverted to, particularly by the Attic orators, e. g., Demos. de Cor. 2 and 6. The substance of the oath was that they would administer justice according to the laws so far as

<sup>Page</sup>  
71 there were laws, and where no laws existed, according to their own best judgment of what was right. Cf. Poll. Onom. 8, 122; Demos. adv. Lept. 118. 21. ἐθίξεσθαι. The passive has permissive meaning, *nor should* you permit yourselves to be accustomed. Cf. Crito, 48, D: ἀγόμενοι, permitting ourselves to be taken away.

D. 24. ἄλλως τε μέντοι . . . πάντως καί, *both every other way, to be sure, but especially when accused of impiety, etc.*, cf. note on ἄλλως τε καί, 26, E. The expected order is broken suddenly to emphasize the utter inconsistency of such a proposition. 25. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, cf. note, ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, 17, D. 27. θεοὺς . . . εἶναι. Observe the emphatic position of these words, the one at the beginning, the other at the end of the clause: *I should teach you not to believe in the existence of the gods.* 2. νομίζω τε γάρ, sc. θεούς, *for I both believe in them. ὥς οὐδεὶς = more than any.* 3. καὶ ὑμῶν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι, *and I commit it to you and the god to decide.* This clause is to be closely connected with its correlative clause (νομίζω τε . . . καὶ . . . ἐπιτρέπω), and in that connection it implies, that he *shows* his belief in the gods practically by his calm reliance on the providence of God in this trial for his life. It will be observed that Socrates here uses the singular τῷ θεῷ, though he has been using the plural just before. He may refer to the god at Delphi, of whom he has often before spoken particularly, and in the singular number (cf. τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, 20, E, sqq.), and who, having indirectly, by means of the oracle, involved him in difficulty, would now provide for the best result; or he may refer to the supreme God, whom he often, as represented in the writings both of Plato and Xenophon, singles out and distinguishes from the inferior deities (cf. Xen. Mem. iv, 3, 13).

With the above words of pious resignation and confidence, Socrates concludes the first and principal part of his defense, and submits the question of guilty or not guilty to his judges. They pronounce him guilty by a small majority of votes. The question still remained, what punishment should be inflicted. In all those cases, where the laws do not prescribe the penalty (ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοί)—and charges of impiety were of this sort,

cf. Dem. in Timoc. 702, 5—it was customary for the accuser Page  
72 to propose what he deemed a suitable penalty (τιμᾶσθαι), and the accused, if he chose, to propose some other punishment (ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι or ὑποτιμᾶσθαι), and then the judges decided between these two, no third proposition being admissible. Cf. Grote, vol. viii, chap. 68; also Boeckh, Meier and Schömann, and Smith's Dic. Antiqq.: Ἀγῶνες ἀτιμητοὶ καὶ τιμητοί. The accusers of Socrates pronounced him worthy of death. Had Socrates chosen to propose banishment, for instance, instead of death, he might doubtless have escaped the extreme penalty, cf. 37, O; Crit. 52, C. But when he disdained to acknowledge guilt by any counter-proposal, and even claimed reward instead of punishment as his due, the judges took offense and sentenced him to death. His remarks on what he thought the proper sentence constitute the second part of the Apology, capp. 25–29.

A. 6. τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν depends on ξυμβάλλεται. The 36 infinitive is emphatic in its position, and suggests a word of prevention, as in the mind. ξυμβάλλεται would regularly take a preposition—*εἰς* or possibly *πρός*, cf. Rep. 1, 331, B, where the inf. is repeated in *εἰς τοῦτο*. The article simply marks the infinitive a little more distinctly as the object of the main action; otherwise we should expect the infinitive alone. The *μὲν* is correlative to *δέ* at the commencement of the next chapter: Τιμᾶται δ' οὖν. 7. μου. G. 173, 2, N.; H. A. 752. ἄλλα τε . . . καί, *both many other things conspire to cause, and especially the fact that it has happened to me not unexpectedly*, cf. note on ἄλλοι τε καί, 28, C. The full and regular construction would have been καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον, κ.τ.λ. ἐλπίς and its derivatives are used with reference to objects of fear as well as hope. So spes and sperare in Latin, cf. Verg. At sperate Deos memores fandi atque nefandi. 11. παρ' ὀλίγον . . . παρὰ πολύ. παρὰ implies *comparison*, for I, for my part, *did not suppose it would be thus by little, but by much*, sc. that the votes against me would exceed those in my favor. Cf. H. A. 802, near the end. οὕτω belongs to ὀλίγον, cf. 40, A: πάνυ ἐπὶ συμκροῖς, where πάνυ goes with συμκροῖς. 12. εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι, κ.τ.λ. We have accepted here the reading of

<sup>Page</sup>  
73 Stallbaum, Cron, and the best MSS., instead of the common reading *τρεῖς*. If a *change* of thirty votes would have turned the scale, the *majority* against Socrates must have been sixty. Diogenes Laertius, II, 41, as usually interpreted, says that the number of votes against him was 281. Deducting 60 from this number, we have 221 for the number of votes in his favor, and 502 for the whole number of votes cast. But the sections of the Heliastic courts usually consisted of 500 each, or a multiple of 500, with one additional dicast to avoid a tie vote. And if 281 of the 501 dicasts voted against Socrates, only 220 could have voted for him, and then a transfer of 80 votes would not have secured his acquittal. We may suppose, however, that he was content with an approximate statement in round numbers. 12. *μετέπεσον*, fallen over, sc. into the other urn, which received the votes for acquittal. 13. *ἀποπεφύγη*. For this form of the plup. see note, 31, E. 15. *ἀνέβη*, etc. Upon the *βῆμα* to aid Meletus in the advocacy of his cause, cf. note, 18, B. 17. *χιλίας δραχμάς*. The prosecutor, unless he received a fifth part of the votes, was liable to a fine of a thousand drachmas and also a forfeiture (*ἀτιμία*) of the right to appear as prosecutor in future—a very useful and very necessary check on the virulence of public prosecutions in the Athenian courts. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 103; in Mid. 23; Boeckh, Pub. Econ. Ath., chap. ix, 11. Socrates argues that Meletus (not being the most popular or influential of the three accusers), if he had been the sole prosecutor, would not have carried more than a third as many votes as were actually gained by the joint influence of the three, and consequently would not have received a fifth part of all the votes. Cf. Schleier. ad loc. *τὸ πέμπτον μέρος*. Observe the force of the article, *the* required fifth according to the well-known law. Demosthenes (de Cor. 103) uses simply *τὸ μέρος* in the same way, *the* required *portion*.

B. 19. *ὁ ἀνὴρ*, sc. the accuser, of whom he had just been speaking in the foregoing chapter. *τιμᾶται* is middle voice. The usage in regard to the penalty and counter-penalty (*τιμᾶσθαι* and *ἀντιτιμᾶσθαι*) has been explained above. 20. *ὑμῖν* can be taken as ethical dative. *τῆς αἰτίας* is gen. of price after

*ἀντιτιμήσομαι*, to be supplied from the question. 21. ἡ δὲ ὁλον, <sup>Page 73</sup> *or is it needless to ask—is it evident*, etc. 22. παθεῖν refers to corporal punishment, ἀποτίσαι to a pecuniary penalty. The question is asked in the words of a judicial formula, cf. Dem. in Timoc. 105. ὁ τι μαθὼν differs from τί μαθὼν only in being relative and indirect. It may be rendered *because*, but further indicates surprise or censure. This implication can be expressed in English only by a parenthesis: *because I did not keep quiet (and what had I taken into my head, literally, learned, that I did not)*. Cf. M. and T. 109, N. 7, b, near the end; H. A. 968, c. 23. ὥνπερ οἱ πολλοί, sc. ἐπιμελοῦνται, supplied from ἀμελήσας, as often a positive from a corresponding negative word, *not caring for those things which the mass care for*. 25. τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, not the *other* magistracies, for the specifications which precede are not all magistracies, but *the rest*, sc. *the magistracies*, or the magistracies besides. So Gorg. 473, C: πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων=the citizens and the rest, viz., the strangers. So οἱ ἄλλοι is often used. See Lex. ἄλλος II, 8. ξυνομοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων. Conspiracies and factions abounded at Athens in the age of Socrates. 27. ἐπιεικτέστερον . . . σφάζεσθαι, *too upright a man to be safe if I went into these things*. ὄντα is better established than ἴοντα. Its pregnant meaning with εἰς has a parallel in πάρεσιν ἐνταυθοῖ, 33, D. Notice also ἐνταῦθα with ἦα in the next line. For both, cf. H. A. 788.

C. 1. ἐνταῦθα here is equivalent to ἐπὶ τοῦτο, answering <sup>Page 73</sup> to ἐπὶ τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, and ἴων is redundant: *but to go and confer on each individually the greatest benefit, to this (literally, there) I went*. 8. τῶν τε ἄλλων . . . ἐπιμελείσθαι, that is, on the principle that the man is more than his property, the state more than its possessions, and in general persons or things more than their appurtenances. The same great principle is often inculcated by our Lord in the gospels, cf. Mat. vi, 25, 33.

D. 11. τιμᾶσθαι here also is mid. = *to amerce myself*. Compare E, below: εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι. 12. τοιοῦτον ὅ τι, instead of τοιοῦτον οἶον, to make it more indefinite; *such a good of whatever kind it may be, as*, etc. Below we have a still more singular mixing of correlatives: μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως, ὥς, where we should expect

Page 78 **μᾶλλον** . . . ἢ or οὕτως ὥς, but find both forms brought together. A similar construction occurs at 30, A: πρότερον μῆδ' οὕτω σφύδρα ὥς, except that there μῆδέ is interposed between πρότερον and οὕτω, and makes the construction somewhat less concise and abrupt. 13. πένητι. Cf. note, 23, B. *εὐεργέτη*, a *public benefactor*, a term of honor, which the Athenians conferred by formal vote on those who had deserved well of the state, and which foreigners, and even foreign kings and princes, were ambitious to receive. So in Egypt, Ptolemy Euergetes. ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρα παρακελεύσει, *for your admonition*, i. e., to instruct you, the adj. taking the place of the *objective* gen. 14. **μᾶλλον** πρέπει, see above. 15. ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι. The Prytaneum was a sort of city hall or state house, where the laws and public archives were kept, where some of the magistrates had their meals, and entertained, at the public expense, not only ambassadors from foreign states, but citizens who had deserved well of the state. Cron says, "as table companion of certain officials. Not of the archons who ate in the *θεσμοθέσιον*, nor of the prytanes who ate in the *θῶλος*, but apparently of certain priests." To be thus entertained was the highest honor. Socrates claims it as a *εὐεργέτης* who has rendered the most useful services to the state, and also as affording him the requisite leisure, that he might devote himself wholly to the instruction of the citizens. 16. πολὺ γε μᾶλλον. Victors in the public games were honored with entertainment at the Prytaneum. Socrates claims the honor as due to himself *much more at least* than to such. ἵππῳ, a *race-horse* under a rider; ξυνοπίδι, a *two-horse chariot*; ζεύγει, a general term for carriage, here denotes especially a chariot drawn by more than two horses, and may be rendered *four-horse chariot*. 17. Ὀλυμπίῳ, at the *Olympic games*. The acc. (Ὀλυμπίαδα or Ὀλύμπια) more frequently follows νικᾷν. See Lex. under νικάω. 18. δοκεῖν εἶναι . . . εἶναι. Socrates was an uncompromising enemy of all *seeming*, and often exposes the *folly*, as well as the baseness of it, since the best way to *seem* to be good (in whatever excellence), is to *be* good. Cf. Xen. Mem. I, 7, 1. Compare the immortal verse of Æschylus, 592, Ἐπτα Ἐπὶ Θήβας: Οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἀριστος

ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει. 19. ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι, Page 73  
 sc. because he is rich, as the victor in a chariot must be, while I am poor. He here has respect to the πένητι above, as in the preceding clause he refers to the εὐεργέτη. He is a *real benefactor*, and he is *really poor*. He both deserves and needs to be provided for in the Prytaneum.

A. 22. παραπλησίως . . . ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς 37  
 ἀντιβολήσεως. The reference is to chap. xxiii, where he scorns to resort to supplications or appeals to compassion, and yet denies that he does this *αὐθαδιζόμενος, from arrogance*. Here he employs the rare word ἀντιβόλησις instead of the usual ἱκετεία. 25. τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, not *such as that*, but *such as this*; not *such as you suppose*, but *such as I proceed to explain* (cf. note, 21, B), i. e., it is not arrogance but truth and duty that impels me. 26. ἐκὼν εἶναι is stronger than ἐκὼν alone. It means, *so far as depends on my will*. Cf. G. 268, N.; H. A. 956, a. 27. πείθω sometimes takes two acc. διελέγμεθα. The perf. has respect to this apology, which he regards as virtually finished—it was finished so far as the question of guilt or innocence was concerned. 28. ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις. He probably has particular reference to the Lacedemonians, whose laws Socrates, in common with most of the philosophers, highly revered, and who, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, never decided *capital* trials hastily, but extended them over several days.

B. 5. ἀδικήσιν. G. 202, 3, h. 6. του κακοῦ, *some evil*, Page 74  
 i. e., *any punishment*. So τοιούτου τινός, *anything of this sort*. It is gen. of *price* or *penalty*, and is accompanied with the dat. of the *person* (ἐμαντῷ) on whom the penalty is assessed. The same construction is seen in οἱ Μελήτης μοι τιμᾶται, et passim. Ad rem, cf. note, 38, B. 7. ἢ μὴ πάθω. ἢ is interrogative: *shall I do it through fear that I may suffer death, when I am so ignorant of death that I do not know whether it is a good or an evil?* 9. ἔλωμαι, subj. aor. in a deliberative question. It is to be rendered by the future. It is followed by a partitive genitive: *shall I choose of those things which I know to be evil*, sc. imprisonment, banishment, etc. We have in this sentence another example of that usage



<sup>Page</sup>  
74 which occurs so often in Plato—two constructions condensed into one. The author might have said: *ἔλωμαί τι τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστίν*, or *ἔλωμαί τι τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδα κακά ὄντα*, or with attraction of the rel., *ὣν εὖ οἶδα κακῶν ὄντων*. But instead of either we have parts of both.

C. 11. *τῇ δὲ καθισταμένη ἀρχῇ*, *the ever-shifting government*. The Eleven who had charge of the prisons, executions, etc., were chosen *annually* (one from each of the ten tribes, with a secretary). Socrates implies that it were hardly worth while to live subject to the caprice of such a succession of petty tyrants as might chance to be *established from time to time* (such is the exact force of *ἀεὶ καθισταμένη*) over the public prisons. Cf. note on *ἀεὶ*, 25, C. 12. *δεδέσθαι*. M. and T., 18, 3, N. 13. *ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν . . . ἔλεγον*, sc. perpetual imprisonment, because he had no money and therefore would never be released. 15. *τιμήσωμαι . . . τιμήσαίτε*. Observe the change of voice. The middle voice is used of the *accuser* and the *accused*, and the active of the *judges*.

D. 20. *βαρύτεραι*, *too burdensome*. It is fem. as referring to *διατριβάς*. 21. *ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα, κ.τ.λ.*, *will others, then* (or *forsooth*), bear them easily? The clause is an irregular apodosis to *ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες, κ.τ.λ.* 27. *κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελάνω, κ.τ.λ.*, *and if on the one hand I do repulse them, they will themselves drive me out of the city*. *ἐξελῶσι* is Attic fut. G. 110, II, 2, N. 1 (b); H. A. 424.

<sup>Page</sup>  
75 E. 4. *ἡμῖν*, Eth. Dat., *please tell us*, is inserted simply to make the discourse more emphatic and subjective. G. 184, 3, N. 6; H. A. 770. 5. *ἐξελθών*, sc. into exile. 8. *ὥς εἰρωνευομένη*, *supposing that I spoke ironically*.

38 A. 12. *ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος, κ.τ.λ.*, *and that a life without investigation is not worth living*, literally, not to be lived. This clause depends on *λέγω ὅτι*, and *ἀνεξέταστος*, contrary to the prevailing usage, is to be taken in an active sense. The active meaning, however, carries with it the passive. 13. *ταῦτα δ'*, *this on the other hand*. *δέ* emphasizes the apodosis in the latter of the two supposed cases. M. and T. 57.

B. 18. *ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτίσειν*, as much as I was about to pay, i. e., as much as I should be likely to be able to pay.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην implies that he would have considered the loss of property, if he had it, no real loss. This accords with what he had said above (37, B), that he would not amerce himself to the amount of *any evil*, for he did not deserve it. 19. νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ, *but now* I can not amerce myself in a sum of money, *for I have not got it*. It is usually printed thus: νῦν δέ—οὐ γάρ, and treated as a case of aposiopesis. But this reading of Cron comes to the same thing. 25. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι. Intell. *φασί*, quod continetur præcedenti verbo κελεύουσι. Stallb. 26. ἀξιώχρεω. Cf. note, 20, E. The comparatively small fine in which Socrates here proposes to amerce himself (only half a talent, or about \$500), and the whole strain of his remarks on the subject, prove that he was not in earnest. Accordingly the Apology ascribed to Xenophon denies that he proposed a counter and lower assessment. He was not really desirous to preserve his life. He must have foreseen that his judges would not accept such a substitute for the death penalty, which the accusers had named in their indictment. He must also have known that his freedom of speech, his playful irony, and especially his assumption of entire innocence which merited reward instead of punishment, would provoke the hostility of those judges at least who had already pronounced him guilty, and, as they had to choose between the penalties proposed by the parties, they would certainly choose that of the accusers and put him to death. According to Diogenes Laertius, eighty who had voted for his acquittal now passed over to the majority and voted for his death. Cf. Cic. Orat. 1, 54: Socratis responso sic iudices exarserunt, ut capitis hominem innocentissimum condemnarent.

Here ends the second part of the Defense. The vote is now taken touching the penalty, and Socrates is condemned to death by an increased majority. He then concludes his speech in a tone of conscious innocence and moral heroism, in which, as Cicero says, he appears, not so much in the attitude of a culprit or a suppliant before his judges, as of their master and lord.

C. 1. Οὐ πολλοῦ . . . χρόνου. The remainder of the life of Socrates (now 70 years of age) was so short, that it was

<sup>Page</sup>  
76 hardly worth their while to incur so much dishonor for the sake of extinguishing what would soon have terminated in the course of nature. 2. ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν, *you will have the name and blame*, both here in a bad sense, though often in a good one. For ὑπό, cf. note, 17, A.

D. 15. τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας, i. e., what Socrates would consider audacity and shamelessness, viz., daring to say and do such things, whether true or false, noble or ignoble, as would disgrace him, while persuading them. Cf. εἰάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν, below, 39, A.

E. 20. τότε, sc. while making my defense, before sentence was pronounced. 23. ἐκείνως, sc. ἀπολογησάμενος, *having de-*

<sup>Page</sup>  
77 *fended myself in that way.*

39 A. 3. μή οὐ . . . ἦ. G. 218, N. 2; H. A. 867. 5. θάπτον γάρ, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Homer's Ἄτη, Il. ix, 505.

B. 6. ἄτε . . . ὣν, *as . . . being* = inasmuch as I am. ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου. Cf. Od. viii, 329: οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα· κίχ' αἰνεῖ τοι βραδὺς ὥκυν. 7. δεινοί is the opposite of πρεσβύτης, and ὀξεῖς of βραδύς. The swifter pursuer, viz., vice, is represented as overtaking the swifter party, viz., the judges who condemned Socrates; while Socrates himself, tardy with years, is seized upon by the more tardy pursuer, viz., death. 9. θανάτου δίκην ὀφλὼν, *having incurred sentence of death*. ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας, sc. as judge. Compare Maximus Tyrius (Diss. 9), where he says: Socrates was, indeed, put to death, but the Athenians were condemned, and God and truth was their judge. 10. ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν = *having been convicted of wickedness and injustice*. 12. μετρίως ἔχειν, *to be suitable*, i. e., well.

C. 14. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, the after this, i. e., the sequel, or consequence. 16. χρησμοδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. This idea, that the soul, when about to leave the body, shows its divine nature and prophetic power, was widely prevalent among the ancients. Thus Patroclus predicts the death of Hector (Il. xvi, 851 sqq.), and Hector prophesies the death of Achilles (Il. xxii, 358 sqq.); cf. also Phæd. 84, E; Xen. Apol. 30; Cic. de Div. i, 30; Sex. Empir. Math. ix, 20. 19. οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε. For the double acc., cf. G. 159, N. 4; H. A.

725. 21. τοῦ δίδοναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, from giving proof of <sup>Page 77</sup> your life, i. e., *from the necessity of letting your manner of life be put to the proof.*

D. 26. ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους, *by putting men to death.*

28. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' αὐτή. G. 28, 3, N. 1; H. A. 480, 8.

E. 6. ὑπέρ, notice the preposition ὑπέρ rather than περί, <sup>Page 78</sup> as if he would defend the conclusion. 6. ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι, *while the magistrates are busy, and I do not yet come, whither when I have come, I must be put to death,* i. e., before the Eleven (cf. note, 37, C) are ready to lead me away to prison.

A. 12. τί ποτε νοεῖ, what in the world it means, or what <sup>40</sup> can be its meaning. Cf. note, 20, D. ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί. He has habitually addressed the court hitherto as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. The change here is intentional, since that portion of the court whom he now addresses were *judges* indeed, that is, administrators of *justice*. 14. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου, *for the customary prophetic voice of the divinity.* Cf. 31, D, note *ibid.* Schleiermacher considers ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου as a gloss, because Plato elsewhere calls the voice itself τὸ δαιμόνιον, and where a genitive of source is added to μαντική, φωνή, etc., it is not τοῦ δαιμονίου, but τοῦ θεοῦ. Stallbaum admits that the combination here is unusual, but does not, for that reason, feel at liberty to depart from the established reading. 16. καὶ πάνν ἐπὶ συμκροῖς, *even on very trifling occasions.* πάνν is often placed thus before the preposition for the sake of emphasis. 18. ἃ γε δὴ οἰηθεῖν ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται, *which one might certainly suppose to be, and are in fact usually considered.* The relative is the object of the first verb and the subject of the second. The former verb is optative, to denote what any one might naturally suppose; the other is indicative, to denote what is in fact the prevailing sentiment. The reader will observe the difference between οἶομαι and νομίζω here implied and habitually observed.

B. 27. τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι. In a conversation with Hermogenes, recorded by Xenophon (Mem. iv, 8), Socrates assigns several reasons why, aside from his hopes for another world, he deemed it better for his happiness in this life, and

<sup>Page</sup>  
78 better for his reputation, that he should die then rather than live to a more advanced age. Add to these the considerations touching a future life, which follow in the next chapter of the Apology, and we have the most complete demonstration of his deliberate preference to be condemned rather than to be acquitted, and thus a justification of the otherwise inexplicable manner and spirit of his defense.

<sup>Page</sup>  
79 C. 4. Few passages in the Greek classics have been oftener cited, translated, and commented upon in ancient or modern times, than the chapter on which we now enter. Cf. Plut. Cons. ad Apol.; Xen. Cyrop. viii, 7, 18 sqq.; Cic. Tusc. Quæst. i, 41, where it is translated; also the Christian Fathers, Eusebius, Theodoret, etc., etc. 5. *δυσὶν γὰρ θάτερον*. Stallbaum remarks, that here we doubtless have the true Socratic doctrine of a future state, whereas the Phædo and other Dialogues exhibit Plato's views on the subject. Accordingly Xenophon in his Cyropædia, as above cited, makes Cyrus on his death-bed discourse in exact accordance with the passage before us. 6. *οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι*, of such a nature as to be nothing, i. e., to be annihilated. So below, D: *οἷον ὕπνος*, and E: *οἷον ἀποδημῆσαι*. 7. *κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα*, according to what is said, i. e., the common opinion. 8. *τῇ ψυχῇ*, dat. for the gen. G. 184, 3; H. A. 767. The gen. would represent the subject of the action. 9. *τοῦ τόπου*. The gen. of the *place from which*, without a preposition, may follow a verbal noun as well as a verb. *τοῦ ἐνθένδε*, for *τοῦ ἐνταῦθα*, because of the motion expressed by *μετοίκησις*.

D. 9. *εἴτε μηδεμία*. This *εἴτε* has its correlative in *εἰ δ' αὖ* below, E, which is only more emphatic than another *εἴτε*. Compare *οὔτε . . . οὐδέ γε*, 19, E, and note *ibid.* 10. *οἷον ὕπνος*. Cf. Od. xiii, 79, 80: *νήδυμος ὕπνος . . . θανάτῳ ἀγχιιστα ἐοικώς*. 12. *ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι* introduces a long and involved sentence. The force of the *ἂν* falls on *εὔρεϊν* several lines below, where it is repeated (cf. notes, 17, D, and 23, B). *οἶμαι* itself and *δέου* are also repeated. 18. *μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην*, not only a private individual. H. A. 1035, a. The reader need not be informed that by the great king the Greeks mean the king of Persia, the richest and most powerful sovereign with whom they had

to do in all their early history. The comparison of death to night and sleep has always been, as it is now, common especially with the poets. Cf. Hom. Il. xiv, 231; xvi, 672; Od. xiii, 80; Catul. v, 5; Hor. Od. i, 28, 15.

A. 26. εἰς Ἅιδου, to Pluto's, sc. house or realm. So we omit the word house after the owner's name, and the word church after the name it bears. 1. Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθους, nom. by attraction to the relative ὅπερ. Minos and Rhadamanthus were brothers (hence closely connected by τε καὶ), both sons of Jove, and celebrated kings, judges, and lawgivers, the former in Crete and the latter in the islands of the Ægean. Æacus, who reigned in Ægina, was also a son of Jupiter, and the father of Peleus and Telamon. Triptolemus was the favorite of Demeter, the inventor of the plow and agriculture, and the great hero in the Eleusinian Mysteries. We find Minos represented as performing the office of judge in the lower regions in the Homeric poems (Od. xi, 568 sqq.); Rhadamanthus in Pindar (Olymp. ii, 137 sqq.); when Æacus was first added to the number, we do not know. In the Gorgias (523, E) these three are represented as administering justice at the entrances to Tartarus and to the Isles of the Blessed: Rhadamanthus to souls from Asia, Æacus to those from Europe, and Minos, as president judge, to decide in doubtful cases. Triptolemus is assigned that office only in this passage, though in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (158) he sits in judgment on earth. Perhaps he is introduced here to give prominence to the Eleusinian hero, or since *others*, whose names are not mentioned, are here said to be judges in the lower world, we may perhaps suppose that the common opinion ascribed to Triptolemus and others the same office and occupation there which they held on earth. The conception is, however, limited here to those early and just judges and lawgivers whom the imagination of the Greeks had invested with the dignity of demigods (δοιοὶ τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ). 5. ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν τις δέξαιτ' ἂν ὑμῶν; Quanti tandem æstimatis. So Cicero renders it. Tusc. Quæst. i, 41, 98. 7. ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε, κ.τ.λ., for to myself also the converse there would be delightful, where I might converse with Pala-

Page  
80

*medes and Ajax the son of Telamon.* Both these Grecian heroes had come to a tragical end, the former at the hands of the army, the other by his own hands, in consequence of unjust decisions brought about by the wiles of Odysseus. The story of Ajax is found in Homer (Od. xi, 541 sqq.); that of Palamedes in the Tragic Poets, especially Euripides.

B. 10. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι . . . οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἶη. This clause is explanatory of the foregoing, hence it is without a connective, and hence also the participle in the dative answering to ἔμοιγε. 11. τὸ μέγιστον is in apposition with the following proposition. G. 137, N. 3; H. A. 626, b. In this proposition the participle ἐξετάζοντα is in the accusative, agreeing with the subject of διάγειν, with which οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἶη is again understood. 15. τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγοντα, sc. Agamemnon, to see whether he was really as great, and Odysseus as wise, and Sisyphus as crafty, as the Poet represents them to have been. Hom. Il. iii, 178; Od. ix, 19; Il. vi, 153.

C. 18. ἀμήχανον ἂν εἶη εὐδαιμονίας, *would be an immense sum of happiness.* The genitive is partitive. Or it can be, as Ast supposes, a genitive of specification = in respect of happiness. 19. τούτου γε ἕνεκα, sc. for conversing with men and examining them—*they do not, methinks, for this put men to death there, as they do here.* 25. ἓν τι τοῦτο = *one thing, viz., this.* The τι first states it indefinitely; then τοῦτο is added to define it.

Page  
81

D. 2. ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων, *to be set free from the business and troubles of life.* The perfect is used as referring to a completed condition or state, and that conceived, not actual. 4. βέλτιον ἦν. The tense in anticipation looks at the result as already reached; *it was better* as conceived, in anticipation by an overruling Providence.

E. 9. ταῦτα ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἀπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπων, i. e., besiege them with warnings and expostulations. λυπεῖν here takes a double accusative, as a verb of *doing ill.* G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 12. ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, *if they think they are something when they are nothing.* The same idea is expressed in the same words by Paul, Gal. vi, 3.

## CRITO.

Page  
82

A. 1. *τηνικάδε*, at this time of day, that is, at so early an hour. *τηνικά* and its corresponding relative and demonstrative words, together with their derivatives, have respect, in Attic usage, not to time in general, but to the *hour of the day*, or, figuratively, to the precise day or hour of some event. *ἢ οὐ πρὸς ἔτι ἐστίν*, or is it not still early in the morning? Buttman writes *πρῶ* (without the iota subscript); Fischer *πρῶ*; the earlier editions *πρωί*, which Bekker, Ast and Stallbaum shorten into *πρῶ* after the authority of the poets and the old grammarians. 2. *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*, certainly it is, is the most common expression of full assent in Plato's Dialogues. Sometimes it stands in construction with a verb, as in Apol. 26, B, but more frequently by itself, as here. *πάνυ γε* is also frequent in affirmative answers, cf. Apol. 25, C. The *πάνυ* expresses assent, the *μὲν* and *γε* restriction, and *οὖν* accordance = certainly so far (it is) as you say. 4. *τηνικά μάλιστα*, what time of day about. *μάλιστα*, with words of number, denotes uncertainty, or indefiniteness. 5. *Ὁρθρος βαθύς*, very early dawn. *πρῶ* is simply morning; *ὄρθρος* is the dawn or rising of the day. *βαθύς* adds emphasis, very early. We speak of midnight deep, deep night, etc. The Greeks extend the same figure to morning and evening—the former in its earliest, and the latter in its latest stages. 6. *τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου*. I have said in the Preface, perhaps the same cell, hewn out of the solid rock, near the old Agora, which now bears the name of "the Prison of Socrates." Professor Felton says: "undoubtedly; I read the Phædo there, and when I came to the passage where Crito says, *the sun is yet upon the mountains*, I stepped to the entrance of the cell, and lo! the shadows



<sup>Page</sup><sub>83</sub> covered the valleys, but the sun still lingered on Mars' Hill, the Acropolis, and Lycabettus." 7. ὑπακούσαι, to *hearken* and hence *open* the door for admittance. ὅπως gives emphasis to the expression of surprise: I wonder *how it happened* that he was willing to admit you, sc. at so very early an hour, as he was not accustomed to open the prison gate very early, cf. Phædo, 59, D. 9. καί τι καί εὐεργέτηται, and *he has also been somewhat obliged by me*. The augment in this verb is commonly omitted, but no rule can be recognized. 12. Ἐπεικὼς πάλαι, *a considerable time since*.

B. 13. εἶτα πῶς, *then how did it happen, that, etc.*, expressive of surprise. 15. οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον, *I should not myself prefer to be in so much sleeplessness and sorrow*, sc. if I had been at liberty to choose simply for *myself*; but for *your sake* I felt constrained not to disturb your quiet slumbers. This reason is implied here and more fully expressed below: ἐπίτηδές σε οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἵνα ὡς ἡδιστα διάγῃς. 16. ἐν τοσαύτῃ, sc. so much as I have suffered, while I have been watching your peaceful slumbers. τε preceding ἀγρυπνία shows that τοσαύτῃ belongs not only to ἀγρυπνία, but also to λύπη = so much both sleeplessness and sorrow. 17. ὡς ἡδέως = ὅτι οὕτως ἡδέως. So below, ὡς ῥαδίως = ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως. <sup>Page</sup><sub>83</sub> Stallb. 1. διάγῃς. G. 218; H. A. 881, a. 2. τρόπου, turn of mind, or manner of life, hence = *character*, Lat. mores. For the gen., see G. 173, 1; H. A. 744. As to the sentiment, compare Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 2. 6. τηλικούτον ὄντα, *a man of my age*, sc. 70, Apol. 17, D.

C. 8. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύεται, κ.τ.λ., *but not at all does their age set them free from grieving at their present fortune*, literally, as to not grieving, or so as not to grieve. τὸ ἀνανακτεῖν is acc. of specification, and does not differ essentially from ὥστε ἀνανακτεῖν. μὴ οὐχί = ne non, or quo minus. G. 283, 6 and 7; H. A. 1034, a. Instead of αὐτοὺς, αὐτοῖς was the reading previous to Bekker. 14. ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ. Cf. note, 18, A. 15. ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'. This is one of several ways in which the superlative is strengthened by the Greeks. The origin of the formula is variously explained. In such passages as this, it may be analyzed as Stallbaum does, viz., = ἐν

τοῖς βαρέως φέρουσιν ἐγὼ βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι. In other passages, τοῖς seems to be neuter, and to be used like a pronoun, i. e., ἐν τοῖς = ἐν τούτοις. H. A. 652, a. 16. τίνα ταύτην, sc. φέρεις = τίς ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία, ἣν φέρεις. ἡ τὸ πλοῖον, κ.τ.λ., or has the vessel arrived, etc. The ἥ in such interrogative sentences is restrictive of a more general question, or corrective of the foregoing context = but why do I ask? The vessel here mentioned is that in which Theseus returned from Crete, bringing back in safety the seven young men and seven maidens whom the Athenians were obliged to send every year as a tribute to Minos, the Cretan king. Ever after this unexpected deliverance, the same vessel (patched and repaired till its identity became a vexed question for the speculative philosophers) was sent every year in sacred procession to the island of Delos, as a thank-offering to Apollo. And from the moment when the sacred stern was crowned with garlands till its return, it was unlawful to defile the purified city with any public execution. It so happened that the vessel set sail for Delos the very day before the condemnation of Socrates. He thus gained a respite of some thirty days, which he spent in prison, but in free conversation with his friends. See the whole thing explained in full, Phædo, 58. Cf. also Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 2; Plut. Vit. Thes., etc.

D. 18. δοκεῖ μέν. μέν is not unfrequently used, especially after δόκει, οἶμαι, and the like verbs, without the corresponding δέ expressed, but implying some such clause as σαφῶς δ' οὐκ οἶδα. It may indeed be taken as simply the same with the longer form μὲν. Here δοκεῖ μέν is employed with that Attic urbanity which avoids positive assertions, even when no doubt is intended, for just below he says: δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι ἤξει τῇμερον. Sunium was the southeastern promontory of Attica. 23. τύχη ἀγαθῇ. G. 188, 1; H. A. 776. A formula of prayer or well-wishing, often used by the Greeks in entering upon any enterprise or at the mention of any anticipated event, equivalent to the Latin, quod bene vertat. The use of it by Socrates in this connection is a striking illustration of his cheerfulness and hopefulness in view of death.

A. 27. πον, I suppose, ni fallor. τῇ ὑστεραία ἡ ἡ ἂν ἔλθῃ = 44

Page 83 the next day after the ship may arrive. *ὑστεραίᾳ* is followed  
 Page 84 by *ἢ* because it involves a comparative. 1. *Φασι γέ τοι δῆ, so say, at least, to be sure, those who have the disposal of these things*, sc. the Eleven. *φασι* is emphatic, *they say so, to be sure*, though Crito would fain doubt it and show them to be mistaken, if he can but persuade Socrates. 2. *τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας*, the coming day, i. e., the day about to dawn = *to-day*. G. 179, 1; H. A. 759. 3. *τῆς ἐτέρας*, the second day = *to-morrow*. Socrates means, of course, the same days which Crito above calls *τήμερον* and *αὔριον*. 4. *ὀλίγον πρότερον*, a little while ago, of course after midnight; dreams before midnight the ancients deemed false. 5. *κινδυνεύεις* = *δοκεῖς* in Attic writers. How it came to have that meaning, see explained in Stallb. ad loc., and in the Lexicons. *ἐν καιρῷ τι, quite opportunely*.

B. 9. *ἤματι κεν τριτάτῳ, κ.τ.λ.* These are the words of Achilles declaring to Agamemnon his intention to return home to Phthia, and his expectation to arrive there on the third day. Hom. Il. ix, 363. Socrates finds in them a beautiful accommodation to his own departure to his heavenly home. This dream is not to be set down as a mere fiction of Plato. Besides the general truthfulness and trustworthiness of this dialogue, Socrates was a notorious dreamer of dreams or seer of visions, and a full believer in their divine significance. Moreover, he was a great reader and admirer of Homer. What, then, could be more natural or probable than that his approaching departure to another world, which he talked of by day and meditated on by night, should present itself before him in his dreams and clothe itself in the familiar language of the Homeric Poems? 11. *ἐναργές*, clear, i. e., easy to be understood. *μὲν οὖν* = *imo vero, nay but*. 12. *δαίμονι* is used as a form of address, in itself respectful, and in its own proper signification *only* respectful, yet sometimes applied in such a connection, and spoken in such a tone of irony or severity, that some lexicographers have erroneously concluded that it was in its nature a term of reproach as well as of honor. Compare *μακάριε Κρίτων* below, and our *My dear sir, My excellent fellow*. 18. *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*, yet even now, implies that Crito had

previously plied Socrates with unavailing arguments of the same kind. 14. οὐ μία, *not one merely*. Al. οὐδεμία. 15. χωρὶς μὲν . . . ἔτι δέ, *besides in the first place* sustaining the loss of an invaluable friend, I shall *in the second place* incur the reproach of many. The unusual concurrence of μὲν and δέ in the same proposition, sets forth strongly the *twofold* evil. The correction of Wolf, τοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι for σοῦ ἐστερηῆσθαι of the MSS. is with good reason adopted in all the recent editions. 16. οὐδένα μὴ ποτε. This combination has the same emphasis of negation as οὐ μὴ = *such as there is no reason to expect that I shall ever find*. G. 257; H. A. 1032. 17. ὥς οἷός τε ᾧν σε σφίξειν. The ὥς belongs with the participle ᾧν, not, as Buttmann and some others have taken it, with the infinitive ἀμελῆσαι, and performs here the office which it usually performs with a participle, viz., of denoting the *ground or supposition* on which Crito would appear to many to have neglected the preservation of the life of Socrates: *as if I was able*, i. e., *supposing that I was able to save you*—a supposition which, in this case, was contrary to the fact, since the inflexible will of Socrates rendered it impossible for Crito to save him. Cf. G. 277, N. 2, a; H. A. 978.

C. 19. τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα, ἣ δοκεῖν, *what reputation could be more dishonorable than this—than to be reputed*. Here the comparative is first followed by a genitive, and then by an explanatory clause with ἣ. It will be observed that δόξα and δοκεῖν have the same root. 26. ὥσπερ ἂν πραχθῇ, *just as they may chance to be done*, however that may be. H. A. 914, B.

D. 28. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα. Al. δηλοῖ by conjecture. But the emendation is not necessary. The passage is explained by Stallbaum, Jacobs, and others, as an example of anacoluthon: Nam Crito quum additurus esset haec: ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐξειργασμένα ἐστίν, constructione repente mutata, rem multo gravius eloquitur, dicens: ὅτι οἱοί τε εἰσιν οἱ πολλοί. Stallb. 4. εἰ γὰρ ὤφελον. G. 251, 2, N. 1; H. A. 871, a. 5. ἵνα . . . ἦσαν. The past tense of the indicative here implies that they are *not* able. G. 216, 3; H. A. 884. 7. οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον, κ.τ.λ. The noble sentiment is here implied, that so

<sup>Page</sup>  
85 long as the multitude can not alter a man's *character* for better or worse, all else is of no account. The concluding clause in this chapter, *ποιοῦσι . . . τύχῳσιν*, means, that the multitude are governed by mere chance and caprice instead of fixed principle.

E. 10. *ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προμηθεῖ*, *you do not, do you, feel anxious for me*, etc., in form expecting a negative answer, yet implying a suspicion or a fear that he does. G. 282, 2; H. A. 1015; cf. also 25, A. 11. *οἱ συκοφάνται*. The word is well explained in the *Lexicon* of Liddell and Scott, and the class of men in *Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities*. 12. *πράγματα παρέχουσιν*, *make trouble*. Notice here present of continued action; with *ἀναγκάσθωμεν*, aorists of single act. 13. *ἢ καὶ πᾶσαν, κ.τ.λ.*, *either to lose even all our property, or at least large sums of money, or even to suffer some additional heavier penalty, such as imprisonment, exile, or death*, cf. below, 53, B. 15. *ἔασον αὐτὸ χαίρειν*, *bid it farewell*, that is, dismiss the fear.

45 A. 16. *ἡμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιοι ἐσμεν*, cf. H. A. 944, a. For *που*, cf. note, 44, A. 18. *ἀλλὰ ἐμοὶ πείθου*. *ἀλλά* with the imp. suggests an anticipated unwillingness or objection. 21. *μήτε τοῖνυν φοβοῦ*. The sentence, interrupted by a long explanation, is resumed in *μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενος*, below, B, and is there followed by the correlative clause, *μήτε δ' ἔλεγες*. 23. *τούτους* is contemptuous, like the Latin *iste*, cf. below, 48, C: *τούτων τῶν πολλῶν*, and *Demosthenes*, passim. 24. *ὥς εὐτελεῖς*, sc. *εἰσιν*, *how easily they can be bought*. Crito knew this from his own experience, cf. *Xen. Mem.* II, 9, 1. *ἐν' αὐτούς*, *for them*, sc. to bribe them.

B. 25. *σοί* is made emphatic by its position. *ὑπάρχει, is ready for your use*. *ἱκανά* is added to express the idea that his property alone is, in his opinion (*ὥς ἐγώμαι*), *sufficient*. Crito was wealthy, cf. note, 33, D. 27. *ξένοι*. *Simmias* and *Cebes* were *Thebans*, cf. *Phæd.* 59, C. Notice the omission of the article; *ξένοι* are mentioned only as a class, and are then particularized by *οἱτοί*. *If you do not think proper to*  
<sup>Page</sup>  
86 *spend my money, there are strangers, these*. 3. *ἀποκάμης, fail, or hesitate*. *ἀποκάμνω* is more frequently followed by a parti-

inciple, though sometimes, as here, by an infinitive. H. A. 983<sup>Page 85</sup> and 986. 4. ὁ ἔλεγε ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, cf. Apol. 37, C, D. 5. ὁ τι χρῶο σαυτῷ, *what to do with yourself*. G. 188, N. 2; H. A. 777, a. 6. ἄλλοσε, by attraction for ἄλλαχού. G. 153, N. 4 and 3; H. A. 1003.

C. 10. οὐδὲ δίκαιον. οὐδέ is emphatic, *not even right*. 13. σπεύσαιεν τε καὶ ἔσπευσαν. See the same combination of the opt. with the ind.—of the probable with the actual—Apol. 40, A: οἰηθείη ἂν τις καὶ νομίζεται.

D. 16. οἰχρήσει καταλιπών. G. 279, 4, N. It is an emphatic form, as if Socrates were in *haste* to leave his children orphans. Observe the force of the ἐκ in ἐκθρέψαι and ἐκπαιδεύσαι, to bring up and educate *completely*. 16. τὸ σὸν μέρος, *so far as you are concerned*. Orphans at Athens were provided for by the state, and intrusted to the care of the Archon Eponymus. Still they must, of course, be subjected to many inconveniences (cf. Hom. Il. xxii, 490); and *so far as Socrates was concerned*, his children would be left *to do well or ill, just as they might chance to do*. 19. χρή. Αἱ χρεῖν. 21. βραθυμότατα is the opposite of ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείος. 23. φάσκοιτά γε δή, *especially if one claims*.

E. 27. Καὶ ἡ εἴσοδος τῆς δίκης, κ.τ.λ., *both the coming in of the case into court*, cf. Demos. adv. Phorm.: μελλούσης τῆς δίκης εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον. 28. ὥς εἰσῆλθεν. Later editors and the best MSS. read thus instead of εἰσῆλθες, the reading of Stallbaum. ἔξον μὴ εἰσελθεῖν. G. 278, 2; H. A. 973. He could have avoided the trial, either by flight and voluntary exile, or by inducing, as he might easily have done, the accusers to withdraw the charges before the trial had commenced. αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών, κ.τ.λ., *the entire management of the case*. Socrates did not employ advocates, or resort to any of the ordinary means of influencing the judges. 2. κατάγελως.<sup>Page 87</sup> Cornar, with the approval of Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and others, suggests that there is an allusion in this word to the absurd and ridiculous conclusion of a comedy, which has its three parts, the πρότασις, ἐπίτασις, and καταστροφή, corresponding with the εἴσοδος, ἀγών, and κατάγελως of the Socratic drama, as it is here represented. 3. διαφευγέιναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν

<sup>Page</sup>  
87 is expegetical of τὸ τελευταῖον τουτί: *and finally this almost farcical conclusion of the matter, that it should seem to have slipped out of our hands, through some sloth and unmanliness of ours.*

46 A. 4. εἴ τι . . . ὄφελος ἦν. Cf. note, Apol. 28, B. The force of the perfect is seen not only in βεβουλευσθαι, but also in πεπράχθαι = *to have consulted, to have been done.* 10. ἀδύνατον, κ.τ.λ., *impossible (for us) and no longer practicable.*

B. 18. ἡ προθυμία, κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the copula (ἐστίν), cf. H. A. 611. For the sentiment compare the words of Paul to the Galatians, iv, 17: καλὸν δέ ζηλοῦσθαι ἐν καλῷ. 17. τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ. The strongest argument, in other words, the truth as it appears to his mind after careful consideration, is here beautifully represented by Socrates as his best *friend*, and the only one to whom he yields a controlling influence. See Lex., ἐμός, II, 2.

C. 24. πλείω limits μορμολύττηται, as it is construed by Stallbaum; not ἐπιπέμπουσα, as it is construed by Buttmann. 26. δεσμούς καὶ θανάτους. Observe the force of the plural. All these in their worst forms and degrees are mere bugbears to frighten children—such is the spirit of the passage. See Gorgias, 473, D, where to Polus' fearful array of punishments, the rack, castration, crucifixion, covering with pitch and burning alive, Socrates replies: Μορμολύττει, You are bringing up bugbears, not proofs. Compare Paul's emphatic enumeration of his sufferings, 2 Cor. xi, 23: ἐν κόποις, ἐν πληγαῖς, ἐν φυλακαῖς, ἐν θάνατοις. 27. μετριώτατα σκοποῖμεθα. Cf. note, Apol. 39, B. This question, in many editions, is put into the mouth of Crito. But it seems more appropriate to Socrates, who, in the next sentence, answers himself, as he often does.

<sup>Page</sup>  
88 1. ἀναλάβοιμεν, *resume* for further consideration. 2. ἐκάστοτε, *in every instance*, sc. when we were discussing the subject in our frequent former conversations. Hence the imp. ἐλέγετο here and below repeatedly.

D. 3. πρίν governs δεῖν. 4. Κατάδηλος is for κατάδηλον, being attracted by λόγος. ἄρα = *forsooth, as it seems.* H. A. 1048, 1, and note, Apol. 34, B. ἄλλως = *temere, without reason.* 8. ὥδε ἔχω, sc. in danger of losing my life. 10. τε

λέγειν, *to say something*, sc. to some purpose, of some importance, cf. Xen. Mem. II, 1, 12. Page 88

E. 14. ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια, *in all human probability*. 27. ἱκανῶς is explained below by καλῶς.

B. 27. τὰ τοιαῦτα, *such things as these*. 28. τοῦτο πρᾶτ-  
των, *practicing this, making a business of it*. Cf. Herod. vi,  
125: ἡμεροδρόμον τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα. So πρακτέον, below.  
We see here Socrates' fondness for illustrations drawn from  
the common pursuits of life. 10. καὶ ἐδεστέον γε, *yes, and*  
*eat and drink*. γε = *yes*. So καὶ υἱεῖς γε, Apol. 34, D, might  
be rendered, *yes, and sons*. The eating and drinking here  
come within the province of the ἱατρός, as the gymnastic ex-  
ercises come under the direction of the παιδοτρίβης. Page 88

D. 1. αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι. These verbs are often  
followed, as they are here, by an accusative of the person  
*before whom one must be ashamed and afraid*, especially to  
do anything dishonorable or wrong. 3. ἐγίγνετο . . . ἀπώλ-  
λυτο. The imperfect has reference to what *was said* in former  
discussions, cf. ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε above, and below: πῶς αὖ τὰ  
τοιαῦτα ἐλέγετο. H. A. 833; M. and T. 11, N. 6. Page 90

E. 8. πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίωντων δόξῃ, *by obeying not*  
*the opinion of the wise*; but of the unwise, is implied in the  
antithesis by the position of μὴ. Cf. Xen. Mem. III, 9, 6: καὶ  
μὴ ἂ οἶδε δοξάζειν = *not what he knows*, but what he does not  
know. 16. ᾧ . . . λωβᾶται, *which the unjust injures*. The  
editions before Bekker changed ᾧ to ὃ. But the MSS.  
have ᾧ, and λωβᾶσθαι may be followed either by the accusa-  
tive or the dative. 17. φανλότερον = *cheaper, less valuable*,  
the opposite of τιμώτερον, below.

A. 24. τί . . . ἡμᾶς. τί for ὃ τι, cf. G. 282, 1; H. A. 1011; 48  
For the two acc. cf. G. 165; H. A. 725, a. 1. μὲν = μὴν. Page 91

B. 5. οὗτός τε ὁ λόγος, κ.τ.λ., is correlative to καὶ τόνδε  
αὖ σκόπει. To the suggestion, that the multitude have power  
to put him to death, Socrates has a twofold answer: in the  
first place, that does not invalidate the argument which we  
have gone through with, nor make it any less conclusive, or  
in any way different from what it was, before his life was  
endangered; and in the second place, he says, *consider also*,



Page

91

*whether this doctrine, once admitted by us, abides or not, that we must not set the highest value on mere living, but on living well.* 11. Τὸ δὲ εὖ, κ.τ.λ. *And does it still remain true that to live well is the same thing as to live honorably and justly, or does it not remain true? πρότερον, aforesaid, i. e., in former discussions.*

C. 18. σκέψαις. G. 154; II. A. 995. ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων, 44, E, seqq.; δόξης, 45, B, seqq.; παίδων τροφῆς, 45, C, D. 19. μή, sc. ὅρα. G. 218, N. 2; H. A. 867. ὅρα is expressed below, 49, D. 20. ῥαδίως, lightly, rashly. 21. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἂν, *yes, and would restore them to life again.* For the force of ἂν with the participle, cf. G. 211; H. A. 987, b. 22. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν is added to express contempt, and, in connection with οὐδενὶ ξὺν νῶ, it implies, that it is characteristic of the multitude to act thus without reason. ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ, *the argument so establishes the point.* This use of αἰρεῖ arises from its use to express a victory at the games, or a conviction in a court of justice. Cf. *ratio vincit*, Hor. Sat. i, 3, 115, et al. αἰρεῖ, see Lex. A, 5. 24. καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες . . . καὶ χάριτας. Zeugma, τελοῦντες being strictly applicable only to χρήματα, and ἄγοντες being required with χάριτας. 25. καὶ αὐτοί, κ.τ.λ., *and whether we shall do right ourselves both in leading out of prison, and in being led out.*

D. 28. μὴ οὐ δέη, κ.τ.λ., *we must not consider the question, whether we must die, if we remain in prison and keep quiet, nor whether we must suffer anything else, however dreadful, rather than do wrong, i. e., we must not take the consequences into the account at all, but only the question of right and wrong.* Before μὴ οὐ, there is an ellipsis of a verb of seeing, or fearing, and the meaning is, I fear, that we must not take into account, etc. G. 218, N. 2; H. A. 867.

Page

92

E. 9. ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ, κ.τ.λ., *as I esteem it of great importance to do this with your consent.* 11. ἐάν. H. A. 1016, c; M. and T. 71, N. 1. σοι ἱκανῶς, *to your satisfaction.*

49 A. 14. ἐκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι = ἐκόντας ἀδικεῖν δεῖν ἡμᾶς. G. 281, 2; H. A. 991, a. 20. καὶ πάλαι . . . ἄρα, *and so for a long time we, men of such advanced years.*

B. 22. ἡ παντὸς μᾶλλον, *or rather*. The repeated and pressing questions mark the reluctance of Crito to accept the conclusion. 25. ὅμως, *yet*, i. e., whatever may be the consequences. 26. τυγχάνει ὄν, *turns out to be*. 3. ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται. The general sentiment of antiquity not only justified but required retaliation, as just and manly, cf. Meno. cap. iii: αὕτη ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή, ἱκανὸν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττειν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς δ' ἐχθροὺς κακῶς. Eurip. Fragm.: ἐχθρὸν κακῶς δρᾶν ἀνδρὸς ἡγοῦμαι μέρος. Xen. Mem. ii, 6, 35. A similar view is also taken in Plato's Republic, B. I. But Socrates in the Gorgias, 469, A, insists that it is far better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.

C. 5. οὐ φαίνεται, *it appears not*, that is, it is clear from the argument that we must in no case do an injury. 15. οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν, κ.τ.λ., *not even if he suffer anything however severe by them*. 21. κοινωνεῖς, *whether you hold these opinions in common with me, and think as I do*.

D. 16. καθομολογῶν, *admitting to your detriment*. So L. and S. But perhaps καθομολογῶν differs from ὁμολογῶν only in emphasis or extent = *in admitting all this*. 25. τῆς ἀρχῆς, the *premise* or *first principle* of the argument, sc. that it is never right to do an injury, etc. To τῆς ἀρχῆς, as the *premise*, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο stands opposed as the *conclusion*.

A. 7. ἀπιόντες ἐνθένδε, *in going out hence*, sc. from prison, 50 This clause is to be connected, not only with ποιούμεν, but also with ἐμμένομεν, *whether in going out hence . . . we abide by what we have admitted to be right*. 12. Οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. "One might almost think that Crito will not understand because he dreads the repugnant conclusion." Cron. 14. ἀποδιδράσκειν; used of stealthy flight, and so especially of slaves. 15. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, *the commonwealth*. So Cic. in Verr. ii, 46, 114; a communi Siciliae. For an imitation of this personifying of the state, see also Cic. in Cat. i, 7, 18. 17. ἄλλο τι ἢ = *nonne, do you not*. G. 282, 3; H. A. 1015, b.

B. 20. ἀνατετράφθαι, *be immediately and utterly subverted*. For this force of the perfect, cf. H. A. 849, a. αἱ γενόμεναι δίκαι, *the judgments that have been rendered*. 24. ὑπέρ . . . ἀπολλυμένου; *in behalf of this law which is threat-*

Page 94 *ened with destruction.* The present participle, as often, denotes expectation or apprehension. Cf. M. and T. 10, 1, N. 7.

C. 26. ὅτι ἡδίκηει γὰρ ἡμᾶς. The ὅτι in direct quotations is pleonastic. The γὰρ refers to an implied clause: we do right to escape, *for the state did us an injustice*, sc. when it pronounced sentence against us. 6. τῷ ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. The reader will recognize here an allusion to the well-known method of discussion, which was so characteristic of Socrates as to be called "the Socratic method."

D. 8. πρῶτον μὲν. The *second* question, which answers to this as the first, is found in ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφήν, κ.τ.λ., and is introduced with ἀλλά instead of εἵπειτα, in consequence of the intervening question, μέμφει τι, κ.τ.λ. 9. ἐλάμβανεν, *imperfect* to denote the *process* through which the wife was obtained. The editions previous to Buttmann had ἔλαβε. 12. ἔχουσιν, participle. 16. ἐν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ, i. e., in physical and mental education, cf. Repub. 376, E: ἡ μὲν [παιδεία] ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. The former comprehended the whole *exercise* and *training* of the body, in which the Greeks so excelled; the latter the entire *discipline* and *culture* of the mind, or, as the word denotes, the department of the *muses*. The prominence which the Greeks gave to the cultivation of the *taste* and the *emotions*, helps to explain the name by which they called this department of education. Some writers add a third department, viz., γράμματα, letters, or primary education. Cf. Smith's Dic. of Antiqu., *Gymnasium*. Aristotle, in his Politics, viii, 2, makes four departments, adding to letters, gymnastics, and music, the department of drawing and painting, γραφική.

E. 19. δοῦλος. Cf. Cic. pro Cluentio, 53: Legum omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus. 23. ἡ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα. The unusual position of σοι (hyperbaton) is explained by the fondness of the Greeks for bringing contrasted words into juxtaposition. σοι is dat. after ἐξ ἴσου.

Page 98 51 A. 28. ἄρα. Cf. note, 46, D. 2. καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς, κ.τ.λ., is an emphatic repetition of πρὸς δὲ τὴν πατρίδα, etc., above.

4. *ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελόμενος* is ironical. 7. *ἡ πατρίς*. Page 96  
We insert the article, contrary to our former reading. It seems necessary to mark the particular fatherland of any individual.

C. 18. *πείθειν* depends on *δεῖ*, implied in *ποιητέον*.

D. 1. *τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποικέναι*, *by having given liberty*. Page 97  
2. *δοκιμασθῇ*, when he has been examined and approved, i. e., admitted to the rank of a citizen, *al. δοκιμάση*. 4. *ἐξείναι* depends on *προαγορεύομεν*.

E. 12. *ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ* denotes a "*tacit compact*," but one of a very different kind from that fiction, in which some political philosophers of modern times find the *origin* of society and government.

A. 17. *προτιθέντων ἡμῶν*, *sc. ἡ πείθεσθαι ἡ πείθειν*, *al-* 52  
*though we refer it to your choice*, i. e., lay it before you for consideration, the allusion being to the peculiar rights and privileges of an Athenian citizen in canvassing laws when they are proposed, and moving for their repeal afterward, if they are found to be oppressive. The style is intentionally repetitious in imitation of the style of conversation.  
21. *ἐνέξεσθαι* = *will be implicated in*, or *obnoxious to*. So *ἔνοχος* = *obnoxious*, cf. Xen. Mem. i, 1, 64: *πῶς οὖν ἔνοχος ἂν εἴη τῇ γραφῇ*. 22. *ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα*. Cf. note, 48, C: *ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ'*.

B. 1. *διαφερόντως*, *pre-eminently above*. 2. *θεωρίαν*, a Page 98  
*spectacle*, such as the games and religious festivals. As these were attended by the leading men from all Greece, the non-attendance of Socrates, with the single exception of going once to the Isthmian games, might well be remarked as an indication of singular satisfaction with Athens. 4. *στρατευόμενος*. Cf. *ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλῷ*, Apol. 28, E, and note, *ibid.* 6. *ἐπιθυμία* first governs *πόλεως* and *νόμων* in the gen., and then is followed by the infin. *εἰδέναι*, with which is to be understood a pronoun in the acc., referring to those genitives, *a desire of another city or other laws—to know them*; classed by Cron as a case of prolepsis. H. A. 878.

C. 9. *τά τε ἄλλα καί*, *besides all the rest*, *sc. of your*

Page  
98

acts, which prove your preference for Athens. Cf. note on ἀλλά τε . . . καί, Apol. 36, A. 11. φυγῆς τιμῆσασθαι. Cf. note, Apol. 37, C. 16. αἰσχύνει, *respect*, lit., feel ashamed before. ἐντρέπει, *regard*, lit., turn yourself toward.

E. 26. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίεν ἢ, *do you not then, they would say, violate*, etc., lit., do you do anything else than violate. The ἂν would regularly follow φαίεν; but when two clauses are incorporated in one (especially with φαίη or φαίεν), the particle is often attracted out of its place, cf.

Page  
99

Hermann on the particle ἂν. 1. ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα. Cf. Apol. 17, D. 4. οὔτε Λακεδαιμόνα . . . οὔτε Κρήτην. These states were often cited as models of law and order by Plato and other political philosophers of the day, cf. Repub. 544, C; Legg. 634. δῆ = scilicet. ἐκάστοτε = quotiescunque de iis loqueris. Stallb.

53 A. 11. ἐὰν ἡμῖν γε πείθῃ. Sub. ἀλλ' ἐμμενεῖς.

B. 21. τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, *to the polity of these men*, instead of these states, as if πολίτων, instead of πόλεων, had preceded. Examples of this figure (*synesis*) are frequent in Plato. 24. βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς, κ.τ.λ., that is, will confirm others in an opinion favorable to the judges, so that they will be regarded as having decided the case right. 28.

τάς τε εὐνομουμένας . . . τοὺς κοσμοτάτους, *the cities that have good laws, and the men who have the most regard for law and order*. 8. τίνας λόγους, *what discourses, Socrates? such forsooth as you utter here, that*, etc. ἢ is strictly *or*, and ἀναισχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος is understood after it. 5. ἂν φανείσθαι. Cf. note on ἂν . . . διαφθαρίσονται, Apol. 29, C.

D. 7. ἀπαρεῖς, *you will depart*, lit., carry away, remove. 9. ἐκεῖ γὰρ . . . ἀκολασία. The Thessalians were infamous for their social and political vices. Cf. Demos. Ol. i, 22: ταῦτα γὰρ (τὰ τῶν Θετταλῶν) ἄπιστα μὲν ἦν δήπου φύσει καὶ αἰεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις; and Athenæus, vi, 260, B: ἀκόλαστοι καὶ περὶ τὸν βίον ἀσελγεῖς, and many other passages from different authors. 11. σκευήν, *a cloak or wrapper sufficient to cover the whole body*, as is implied in περιθέμενος. The word is often used of robes or costumes for the stage.

Διφθέρα is a *dress of skins*, worn by rustics, and hence peculiarly fit for a disguise. 18. Σχήμα is also referred to the dress by Stallbaum, but it is better to take it in the more general sense of gait, or *personal appearance*, as the Latin *habitus* also is often used. Page  
100

E. 16. ἴσως, ἀν μή, κ.τ.λ., *perhaps not, if you do not offend any one; but if otherwise*, i. e., if you do offend any one, you will hear, etc. 18. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει, κ.τ.λ., *so you will pass your life in fawning upon everybody and being their humble servant—doing what, but feasting in Thessaly, having gone abroad for an entertainment, forsooth, into Thessaly*. The irony, which runs through the whole, is made more pungent by the contemptuous repetition of *Thessaly*. 22. ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται? *what will become of them*—where shall we find them? G. 184, 3, N. 6; H. A. 770.

A. 22. Ἀλλὰ δὴ = *at enim, at inquires*. Stallb. 24. τί δέ; *why, pray?* A question of surprise. 26. ἀπολαύσωσιν is, of course, ironical, as it often is taken in a bad sense. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, *or not this indeed*, sc. ποιήσεις, i. e., you will not take your sons to Thessaly. αὐτοῦ, *here*, in Athens. 27. θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται, fut. mid. in the sense of fut. pass. G. 199, 3, N. 4; H. A. 496.

B. 10. οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε . . . οὔτε ἐκεῖσε, *neither here in this life . . . nor when you come thither, into another world*. These two clauses beginning with οὔτε are correlative to each other, while those beginning with οὐδέ are only emphatic additions to the former. Page  
101

D. 25. οἱ κορυβατιῶντες, those who celebrate the rites of the Corybantes in the worship of Cybele in Phrygia. As these rites were accompanied with noisy music and wild dancing, the Corybantes were an expressive figure of persons so inspired and possessed with certain ideas or feelings, as to be incapable of seeing or hearing anything else. In the case of Socrates, it is the voice of the Laws, in other words, the voice of God, that so rings in his ear and possesses his soul. The passage is one of singular beauty. The Laws stand before him personified, embodied, clothed with more than human authority. They reason with him. They

expostulate with him on the folly and wickedness of the course which his friends are pressing upon him. They draw nearer and nearer to him, and speak in more earnest and commanding tones, till at length he can see and hear nothing else, and puts an end to the fruitless arguments and entreaties of his friends in those words of humble yet sublime piety: It is the voice of God—let us obey.

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